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Summary
The theory of macroeconomic policy is now in a 
difficult position. After the demise of the old 
keynesian orthodoxy, dissatisfaction has grown with 
monetarist ideas, too. This thesis aims to contribute 
to the search for a new framework for macroeconomic 
policy. Throughout the thesis great emphasis is put on 
two key ideas. The first is that both monetary and 
fiscal policy should be used in a well designed policy 
package. Such a policy package should consist of 
"simple" rules, on the grounds that simple rules, more 
easy to understand and monitor in the eyes of the 
private sector, would enhance the credibility of the 
government's pre-commitment. The second idea is that 
foreign wealth accumulation, operating through 
cumulating current account imbalances, plays a key role 
in the determination of the open economy macroeconomic 
equilibrium and its stability. Therefore open economy 
models should include wealth effects and the current 
account. Furthermore, policy evaluation should take 
into account, among other things, the implications of 
alternative rules on foreign wealth. We shall consider
ii
policy design both in a "small" individual country and 
in the broader context of policy coordination.
The thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 1 we 
provide a general introduction to the issues to be 
discussed in the rest of the thesis. Chapter 2 reviews 
the literature on flexible exchange rate determination 
under "monetarist" policies. Chapter 3 presents a more 
general model of exchange rate determination under a 
"monetarist" regime, focussing on the instability risk 
inherent to such policy rule. In chapter 4 we discuss 
new ideas for the conduct of macroeconomic policy in an 
open economy and evaluate the performance of 
alternative simple policy rules. Chapter 5 reviews the 
debate on international policy coordination, and 
chapter 6 evaluates some proposals for policy 
coordination which involve simple rules. In chapter 7 
we summarize our main results and outline future 
research.
iii
PART I
SIMPLE RULES FOR THE OPEN ECONOMY
CHAPTER 1.
THE DESIGN OF SIMPLE RULES FOR THE OPEN ECONOMY 
1.Introduction
It is often argued that macroeconomics currently is in 
a state of flux. Several schools of macroeconomists 
have fought in the intellectual arena to provide a 
suitable policy framework. But the alternative policy 
packages which have been advocated, either orthodox 
Keynesians, monetarists or new classicals, seem to have 
been unable to tackle both the unprecedented levels of 
unemployment that several among the main industrial 
economies are facing and the trade imbalances which 
endanger the stability of the international monetary 
system.
More recently, new attempts have been made to 
design alternative macroeconomic policies aiming to 
improve the performance of the advanced economies. This 
thesis may be considered part of such efforts. The 
design of macroeconomic stabilization policies requires 
a general framework involving the definition of 
objectives, instruments and of the methodology to be 
followed in the policy design. This chapter provides a 
preliminary discussion of the subject, setting the
1
necessary framework for the analysis of alternative 
stabilization policies, to be carried out in the next 
chapters.
2 .Macroeconomic policy in historical perspective
The philosophy of macroeconomic policy making has 
undergone thorough revisions during the post-war era. 
Up until the collapse of the Bretton Woods regime 
policy was guided by what has been labeled elsewhere1 
as "orthodox Keynesianism". This policy framework had
the following features. It was thought that in an
"uncontrolled" system prolonged periods of
underemployment of resources would occur. It was also 
believed that nominal wage "stickiness" would prevail 
when productive resources were underutilized. Therefore 
policy was mainly concerned with stabilizing output at 
full employment by means of fiscal and monetary 
instruments. The existence for each country of an
external objective was also recognized, as under an
exchange rate regime of "adjustable pegs" countries 
were in principle allowed to revise nominal parities
lSee Vines, Macjeickowski and Meade (1983) and Vines, 
Blake, Weale and Meade (1989)
when facing fundamental disequilibrium of the balance 
of payments.
After the end of the Bretton Woods era and the 
appearance of severe inflation problems in the major 
industrial countries during the '70s, "monetarism" took 
over "orthodox Keynesianism". Monetarists held a rather 
optimistic view about the self-stabilizing properties 
of a market economy. It was believed that wage and 
price flexibility would ensure a sufficiently high 
level of output and employment without need for any 
kind of Keynesian "fine tuning". Furthermore, the 
recognition of forward-looking behaviour in the private 
sector, combined with the faith in market clearing, led 
to the famous "policy ineffectiveness" proposition®. As 
a consequence monetarists argued that macroeconomic
policy should be re-oriented. At the international 
level exchange rate flexibility would introduce a free 
market mechanism which would enable each country to 
obtain its own desired rate of inflation. On the
domestic side, monetarists argued that policy should
not be concerned with output stabilization, but should 
rather focus on the domestic inflation rate by setting 
an intermediate money supply target. The enphasis on
2Sargent and Wallace (1975)
rules originated from a profound distrust for the
government's capability of successfully managing the 
economy and from the belief that incumbent governments 
would exploit fine tuning for their own purposes at the 
expenses of general welfare. After the rational
expectations revolution this argument has been replaced 
by a more sophisticated point, made by Kydland and
Prescott (1977), concerning the dynamic inconsistency3 
of optimal policies.
But over the last few years consensus on
monetarism seems to have faded, too. Basically,
dissatisfaction with the monetarist philosophy of 
policymaking is centered around four points, concerning 
the self-stabilizing properties of a market economy, 
the implications of forward-looking behaviour in the 
formation of expectations, the efficiency of monetary 
targets and the insulating properties of a flexible 
exchange rate. We shall briefly state the reasons of
dissatisfaction with each of these propositions in
turn.
3we shall deal with this subject in sections 3.2 and
3.3 of the present chapter.
4
Wage-price flexibility
Monetarists held the optimistic view4 that 
antiinflationary policies would not generate high 
unemployment to the extent that announced policies were 
credible. Actual history has turned out to be quite 
different. A key feature of a modern market economy is 
the existence of a whole range of implicit and explicit 
contracts®. As a result the macroeconomy exhibits a 
considerable degree of inertia and the adjustment of 
prices and quantities which is necessary in response to 
shocks can only occur gradually, leaving room for 
prolonged disequilibrium periods. Furthermore, evidence 
of hysteresis effects has been found6 in the labour 
market. This casts serious doubts on the supposed 
irrelevance of policy for the long run position of the 
economy, as "full employment" equilibrium cannot be 
conceived as independent from the past evolution of the 
economic system and, among other things, from the 
history of the policy stance.
Rational expectations
It is now widely accepted that rational agents will 
form their expectations about future economic events
4Friedman (1968)
50kun (1981)
6Layard and Nickell (1985)
5
making use of all available information. But gathering 
information may prove to be costly and access to the 
relevant information might simply be not possible. As a 
matter of fact forward markets have not spread to some 
key markets, like the investment goods'7. This fact of 
life is probably another justification for the 
considerable degree of inertia that modern advanced 
economies exhibit. On the other hand, the so called 
"efficient markets", where prices are flexible and 
information is quickly available, have witnessed high 
volatility and speculative "bubbles": prices have often 
moved in sharp contrast with the predictions of 
economic theory. This leads to the conclusion that 
accepting the rational expectations hypothesis is a far 
cry from inferring continuous equilibrium in the "real" 
economy as postulated in the "policy ineffectiveness" 
proposition. The simple recognition of the existence of 
contracts provides a rationale for the persistence of 
disequilibrium in the labour market even under the 
assumption of rational expectations8 .
7See McKinnon (1988) 
8See Taylor (1979)
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Money supply targets
At the beginning of the 80s governments in a number of 
industrial economies have adhered to the monetarist 
prescription of setting monetary targets. But the 
experience of targeting the money supply has been 
rather disappointing. Basically this happened because, 
in contrast with former evidence, the demand for money 
function has turned out to be unstable. Furthermore, 
the task of monetary control has been complicated by 
the growing financial integration of open economies. 
Anti inflationary policies which relied on attempts to 
control monetary aggregates often ended up in excessive 
interest rates hikes and exchange rate appreciations, 
imparting unduly contractionary stimula to the "real" 
sector.
Flexible exchange rates
The widespread belief that exchange rate flexibility 
would insulate national economies has been 
contradicted, too. Fifteen years of unmanaged float 
have witnessed wild gyrations in exchange rates, 
persistent trade imbalances and the resurgence of 
protectionism. Recently, calls for increased
7
international policy coordination and for a reform of 
the international monetary system have gained ground®. 
Given the difficulties monetarist policies have run 
into, it should not come as a surprise that a great 
deal of research has recently been devoted to the 
definition of new ways of designing macroeconomic 
policies.
3.The search for a new policy framework
The search for alternative policy strategies has 
focussed on the following aspects.
-establishing the theoretical framework necessary to 
advocate new policy rules.
-defining an appropriate methodology for policy design. 
This should not be considered a merely technical 
aspect. The debate on the time inconsistency of optimal 
policies has clearly shown how the design of policy is 
crucially affected by the way the economy is conceived 
to work.
-setting policy targets and instruments
9We shall devote more attention to the subject in part 
two of this thesis
8/<?
In this section we discuss these issues in turn.
3.1.The resurgence of ■ore interventionist policies
Recent years have witnessed the resurgence of a more 
"activist" philosophy of policymaking. The case for 
interventionist policy rules has been reformulated, 
allowing for forward-looking behaviour in the private 
sector. In a seminal article, Buiter, (1981), 
contrasted fixed rules, of the type advocated by 
Friedman, versus contingent rules, involving a higher 
degree of discretion. The terminological distinction 
between the two can be drawn as follows.
- Open loop rules, or fixed rules, require all present 
and future values of the policy instrument to be known 
when the planning period starts.
- Closed loop rules, or contingent rules, specify the 
value that policy variables will take in the future as 
a function of the information that will be available at 
the time when these values will actually have to be 
assigned.
A key difference between contingent and fixed rules is 
that the latter require the initial determination of 
instrument values regardless of future states of the 
world, whereas the former only require the functional 
form of the policy feedback to be defined in advance,
10
the actual future values of the policy instruments
depending on the occurring disturbance. Closed loop 
policies allow for a flexible response to precedently 
unforeseen disturbances and so doing exploit new
information which would not be considered under open
loop policy rules.
Buiter showed that the optimal closed loop rule always 
dominates the optimal open loop rule. Particularly 
relevant for the aims of this thesis is his criticism 
of the new classical proposition that only
unanticipated policy shocks may affect the economy, 
i.e. only fooling the private sector by making them 
believe that the inflation rate will be below its 
actual level the government may raise output and 
employment through a monetary expansion. Buiter 
demonstrated that, as long as private and public 
opportunity sets differ, known contingent policy rules 
will affect real outcomes. A classical example10 of 
monetary feedback rules having real effects relies 
simply on the existence of multi-period wage contracts 
which are non-contingent, i.e. make use of initial 
information only, combined with a contingent monetary 
rule which at any period in time is a known function of
lOFischer, (1977), and Phelps and Taylor, (1977)
11
the information publicly available. The point is very 
simple but quite important: to the extent that shocks
hit the economy and the necessary wage-price adjustment 
is delayed by the existence of contracts, room is left 
for contingent policy rules which may reduce the 
welfare loss that would otherwise be generated. This 
conclusion applies despite the fact that the functional 
form of the rule is known in advance: policy is
effective as long as private contracts are not made 
contingent on future information.
This would seem to leave room for a resurgence of the 
use of optimal control techniques which seemed so 
promising at the beginning of the 70s11 .
3.2.Optimal policies and the time inconsistency
critique
The definition of the optimal policy involves two 
conceptual tasks.
The first is the representation of an appropriate 
mathematical framework, where the three sets of 
endogenous (state), exogenous (forcing) and policy 
(control) variables are specified12, along with the 
stochastic properties of the economic system and the
U S e e  Currie (1985)
12For a general review of the subject see Blackburn 
(1987)
12
set of dynamic equations which link the above
variables. The standard, linear controlled system may 
be represented as follows13: 
dx(t) = Ax(t) + Bw(t);
where x(t) is the n,l-vector of state variables, w is 
the m ,1 vector of control variables, d represents the
time derivative. all variables are defined as
deviations from equilibrium, so that the forcing 
variables do not explicitly appear. Matrices A and B 
are time invariant. The second step in the optimal 
control exercise is the definition of a performance 
measure:
J = exp(-rt)[x(t )Q x (t ) + w(t)Rw(t)]dt
where r is a discount factor, Q is a symmetric positive 
semidefinite matrix of order n,n and R is a positive 
definite time invariant matrix of order m,m. J shows 
that the controller penalizes deviations of state and 
control variables from their long run values.
The optimal control problem involves choosing the
sequence of w(i) which minimizes J given the dynamic 
system, the initial state of the system and some
appropriate terminal condition. The resulting outcome
satisfies Bellman's principle of optimality, which
13For simplicity we refer to the deterministic case
13
states that at any point in time the optimal policy is 
merely the prosecution of the original plan computed at 
the beginning of the control exercise14. This initial 
plan is described as time consistent because no 
incentive exists for the controller to revise it. Such 
time consistency holds when the control technique is 
applied to a non-intel1igent system, but not when the 
controlled variables themselves react to the initial 
optimal plan, as it is the case in rational
expectations models. In this class of models at least 
some state variables are non-predetermined and 
instantaneously respond to shocks and to policy 
announcements. As a result a difference can arise
between the optimal policy sequence w(t+l), 
w(t+2),....w(t+i) computed at time t and the optimal 
policy sequence w(t+l), w (t+2),....w (t+i) computed at 
time t+1. To understand why this happens one must bear 
in mind that at year one the controller takes into 
account that policy actions planned for the years ahead 
affect the current state of the economy because some 
state variables immediately respond to expectations
about the future. But at year two bygones are bygones, 
and the optimal policy in year two will be based on the
14Be1lman (1957)
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influence of present and future policy actions on the 
current state of the economy, ignoring their influence 
on year one. And it is precisely at this stage that an 
incentive exists for the controller to revise his 
policy. Consider an example described by M. Miller 
(1985). Suppose that in an open economy the Government 
announced at year one a future interest rate rise in 
order to fight inflation. Rational agents that believed 
such an announcement would discount this and Increase 
demand for domestic currency. The resulting exchange 
rate appreciation would deflate the domestic economy 
before the monetary contraction actually takes place. 
But in year two the optimal policy would not 
contemplate the same monetary contraction as that 
previously announced, since the past anticipation of an 
interest rate rise would have already deflated the 
economy. The initial policy plan is therefore time 
inconsistent because the government has an incentive to 
fool the private sector, making them believe a future 
course of action and then revising it. But if rational 
agents anticipate this incentive they may act in ways 
which are different from the one implied in the optimal 
control exercise. As a result attempts to optimize 
might be counterproductive.
15
This point was forcefully raised by Kydland and 
Prescott (1977). They argued that, as optimal plans in 
models were agents adopt a forward-looking behaviour 
are time inconsistent, rational agents would recognize 
the existence of an incentive for the government to 
"renege” on announced policies and would therefore base 
their expectations on the anticipation of future re­
optimizations. A possible equilibrium of the resulting 
game would be an optimal government plan accounting for 
the private sector expectation that the government will 
reoptimize taking the behaviour of the private sector 
as given. The following example, drawn from Barro 
(1985), might further clarify the issue. First, assume 
that anticipated monetary policy only affects the price 
level. Second, monetary "surprises" may alter real 
output. Third, the government welfare function 
positively values an output expansion above the 
"natural" rate10 . Fourth, inflation is a social evil . 
At any point in time an incentive exists for the 
policy-maker to generate unexpected inflation and raise 
output. But forward-looking agents anticipate this 
incentive and expect an inflation rate which is higher 
than "announced". Hence the government must
15this might be due to existing distortions which make 
the "natural" level of output too low
16
"accomodate" a higher inflation rate just to keep 
output at the natural rate. In this context, Barro and 
Gordon (1983) describe an equilibrium solution where, 
although the policy maker has the power to operate 
inflation surprises, he lacks the incentive for doing 
so because the expected inflation rises to just that 
level at which the marginal cost of a surprise 
inflation is equal to its marginal benefit in terms of 
higher output. As it may seem intuitively obvious, the 
outcome where the policy is time consistent is heavily 
inferior to the one which would prevail if the optimal 
time inconsistent policy were implemented. The solution 
advocated by Kydland and Prescott was that Governments 
should constrain themselves to follow a non optimizing 
arbitrarily fixed rule which might turn out to be 
preferable to a time consistent policy.
"economic theory [should] be used to
evaluate policy rules and that one with good 
operating characteristics be selected.... it 
is preferable that selected rules be simple 
and easily understood, so that it is obvious 
when a policymaker deviates from the policy.
There should be institutional arrangements 
which make it a difficult and time-consuming
17
process to change the policy rules in all but 
emergency situations"1®
Referring to the former example a fixed rule would 
spare the economy the higher expected inflation rate
which is necessary to render the marginal cost of an
inflation surprise equal to the benefit accruing from 
the corresponding output expansion.
An important strand of the literature following the
work of Kydland and Prescott has stressed the
importance of the government precommitment to carry 
through the plan implied by the initial optimization 
and has suggested that the loss of reputation following 
a policy surprise might impair the successful 
implementation of future policy plans and therefore 
would deter governments from reneging on announced 
policies1 7 . In this context it might be superfluous 
that governments are forced by law to abide rules, 
provided that departures from the announced policy may 
be easily recognized by the private sector.
A further development, which is of key importance for 
the research to be carried out in this thesis, has been 
the search for simple contingent rules which, by not
16Kydland and Prescott (1977), quoted in 
Christodoulakis et al. (1989)
17See Barro and Gordon (1983) and, for a more general 
treatment, Levine (1988)
18
involving the degree of complexity typical of optimal 
policies, are easily understood by the private sector. 
This is discussed in the next two subsections, in which 
we also discuss the connections between the time 
inconsistency problem and the use of simple rules.
3 .3.The design of simple ■acropolicy rules 
In general a fully optimal rule is a rule contingent on
all state variables. Intuitively it should be clear
that this is the most efficient way of steering the
controlled economy as the fully optimal rule controls 
"everything". But a rule which is exceedingly complex 
and difficult to understand and to monitor might raise 
serious problems of credibility. If policy 
precommitment is to be made credible in the eyes of the 
private sector, then it is crucial that policy 
assessment may be carried out easily. Simple feedback 
rules may well serve this purpose. Another reason for 
advocating the choice of simple rules concerns 
robustness1®. An obvious reason why fully optimal 
policies outperform simple rules is that the former
exploit the details of the dynamic system to be 
controlled. But to the extent that these aspects are 
model specific, highly uncertain and subject to
18see Currie and Levine (1985)
19
frequent changes over time, the gains from full 
optimization may prove illusory. Optimal policies may 
perform badly in the face of even minor alterations of 
the dynamic structure of the economy. By contrast well 
designed simple rules may turn out to be more robust in 
presence of such changes1®.
A third source of skepticism with fully optimal 
policies concerns the way the loss function J is
defined. Very often®0 the range of variables included 
in the objective function is not related to plausible 
consideration about social welfare; instead its choice 
is made with the aim of obtaining "acceptable" 
results21 . Methods have been suggested for "tuning" the
penalty matrices so that dynamic instability is
prevented22 or the optimal solution trajectories are 
kept reasonably close to the target path2 3 . But under 
no circumstances could policies designed following such 
methods be regarded as the outcome of a genuine 
optimization process. Ad-hocery is certainly an
inherent feature to the design of simple rules when the 
functional form and the strength of control parameters
19This has been clearly shown by Christodoulakis and 
Levine (198'7)
20See Vines et al. (1989)
21See Vines et a l . (1989)
22See Doyle and Stein (1981)
23See Rustem et a l . (1979)
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are selected, but very often full optimization removes 
it only to re-introduce arbitrariness in the design of 
the objective function.
It has been argued elsewhere that simple rules should 
be selected according to the following lines8*:
-the dynamic structure of the rules should be simple 
-each instrument should respond to a limited set of 
variables. Of preeminent interest for the present work 
is that class of simple rules (assignment rules) which 
assign each instrument to a specific set of target 
variables. Within this set of assignment rules we shall 
be concerned with decoupled control rules8® which 
entail the assignment of each instrument to a specific 
target variable.
The simple rules we shall be dealing with throughout 
the thesis will take the following general form: 
dw = hildT + hBIT;
where w and T are respectively the vectors of control 
and target variables, h* and h2 are the vectors of 
control parameters and I is the identity matrix. We 
shall therefore consider decoupled rules involving 
proportional and integral control8®.
24See Currie, Holtham and Hughes Hallett (1988)
25This definition is drawn from Vines et a l . (1983)
26in the sense of Phillips (1957)
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3.4.Time Inconsistency and simple rules
The problem of time inconsistency potentially applies 
to simple rules as well as to full optimal control. 
Consider again the M. Miller example of an interest 
rate rise to fight inflation through currency 
appreciation. Suppose that a simple proportional rule 
were operated which required merely an interest rate x% 
above the world interest rate for every 1% that 
inflation was above target. An inflation shock would 
lead to an immediate raising of interest rates. It 
would also immediately lead to a currency appreciation 
whose extent partly depended on the knowledge that 
interest rates would remain high all through the future 
period during which inflation was brought down. This 
knowledge that, according to the rule, interest rates 
would be high in the future would therefore bring 
inflation down immediately through the currency 
appreciation. But when the future arrived there would 
be an incentive for the government to revise the rule 
so as to lower x. Such a redesigned rule would enable a 
partial relaxation of the high interest rate policy and 
would be desirable because the past anticipation of the 
high interest rate policy would have already deflated 
the economy.
22
This example shows that simple rules, as well as
optimal policies, run into the time inconsistency 
problem when the private sector adopts a forward- 
looking behaviour. In this thesis we do not tackle this 
problem. We simply assume that reneging would involve a 
loss of reputation whose cost, in terms of a lesser
chance to implement policies requiring such reputation, 
would be sufficiently high to prevent the government 
from redesigning its policy. In this context the 
adoption of simple rules is precisely meant to help the 
private sector to understand government's behaviour and 
so more accurately build it into their expectations2,7. 
Throughout the thesis we shall therefore assume that
the government sticks to announced policies and that
the private sector fully trusts the government.
3.5.Targets and instruments of macroeconomic policy 
The next issue to be discussed concerns the choice of 
targets and instruments of macroeconomic policy.
The adoption of targets
We have already stated that the experience of setting 
monetary targets has been disappointing. Basically, 
this failure is to be ascribed to the frequent shifts 
in the velocity of circulation which occurred over the
27This was discussed in Vines et a l . (1989), chapter2
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last few years. The adoption of new policy targets 
obviously reflects the underlying philosophy of 
policymaking. Whatever the merits of a money supply 
target per se, monetarist policies relied on the 
presumption that governments should only be concerned 
with inflation control, neglecting output fluctuations. 
If policy were to retain this principle and the only 
required change was to allow for the apparent 
inefficiency of monetary targets as a result of 
velocity shifts, then the natural substitute would be a 
price level target (or an inflation rate target2®). 
Barro (1985) has advocated the choice of a price level 
target, precisely on the grounds that it would enable 
the policymaker to offset shocks originating in the 
money market. As an alternative he considered the 
adoption of a nominal exchange rate rule2®. Obviously 
the adoption of such rule would raise the issue of 
international leadership in the definition of the 
global inflation target. Others have suggested30 that 
policy aim at stabilizing nominal GDP. In contrast with
28Needless to say, the two targets are closely 
interrelated, as setting a price level target implies 
integral control of inflation.
29McKinnon (1988) has advocated the return to a fixed 
exchange rate regime. We give a detailed account of his 
proposal in chapter 5.
30Hall (1980), Vines et al. (1983), Taylor (1984)
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the former proposals, this rule prescribes a policy 
feedback on both the price level and on real output. It 
relies on the presumption that wage-price stickiness 
leaves room for policy effects on output stabilization. 
Vines et a l . (1989) put forward two reasons for
adopting a nominal income target. The first is that it 
would still discourage inflationary wage claims in the 
labour market as trade unions would anticipate that an 
inflation rate above target would be matched by a loss 
of output and employment, even although it would do 
this less rigorously than a strict price level target. 
The second is that, should prices rise for some 
unforeseen event, the money GDP target would set a 
ceiling to the corresponding output loss, whereas under 
a price rule the recession would need to be intensified 
as long as the price level were above target. A 
widespread criticism of this proposal is that it 
implies that the policymaker puts equal weight on 
output and price fluctuations. Fischer (1988) argues 
that such a trade-off would be unlikely to be accepted 
if put explicitly. In principle, there is nothing that 
should prevent the policymaker from stating a target 
which exactly reflects his preferences in terms of 
output and inflation. A boundless range of targets
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would then be available, but to the extent that some 
cost was attached to output fluctuations such targets 
would still be in the spirit of a nominal income 
target, whose basic feature is the explicit recognition 
of the influence of policy on output fluctuations. In 
some recent attempts to evaluate the performance of 
simple policy rules nominal income targets have been 
adopted3 1 . We shall make the same choice in this 
thesis, namely in chapters 4 and 6.
But controlling nominal income only might not be enough 
to ensure that policy does not lead to adverse results 
in the long run. Vines et a l . (1989) have advocated the
adoption of a national wealth target along with nominal 
income. They suggest that policy should aim at 
targeting the distribution of national resources 
between investment and consumption. The first reason 
for doing so obviously is that ensuring sufficient 
investment would help achieving sustained productivity 
growth in the longer run. The second reason is that a 
wealth target would prevent stabilization policies that 
curb current inflation at the cost of lower growth in 
the future. An obvious example of how such outcome 
might occur is a policy combining a lax fiscal stance
31Vines et al. (1989),
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with relatively high real interest rates. As a result 
domestic output and inflation would be kept on target 
but the policy mix would raise consumption relative to 
investment, with adverse results in the longer run. In 
an open economy such policy would generate another 
undesirable consequence: higher interest rates would
appreciate the exchange rate and penalize the trade 
sector. The "wrong" policy mix would cause a current 
account deficit. In the long run the inevitable 
exchange rate depreciation would require a contraction 
of domestic consumption to offset the inflationary 
consequences of the devaluation, and free resources for 
the improvement of the foreign balance. Furthermore, 
the permanent accumulation of foreign debt would cause 
a permanent future subtraction to national disposable 
income, as foreign debt would have to be serviced. 
Indeed much of the recent debate on policy 
stabilization has focussed on the importance of 
pursuing policies that are consistent with external 
balance. The well known target zones proposal is built 
with the aim of avoiding unsustainable trade 
imbalances3 2 . In this thesis we shall evaluate policy 
proposals which include a wealth target. But since the
32We shall review this proposal in chapter 5
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scope of this work is restricted to the analysis of 
stabilization policies in a context which rules out 
capital accumulation, we shall only consider a foreign 
wealth target, defined as the net stock of financial 
claims on foreign residents held by the domestic 
private sector3 3 .
Adopting a foreign wealth target is a fundamental 
departure from the monetarist orthodoxy. Followers of 
the monetary approach to the balance of payments3**, 
suggest that governments should focus on the internal 
objective, neglecting the evolution of the current 
account, whose balance is merely regarded as the result 
of saving-consumption decisions of the private sector. 
Typically, monetarists assert that, as long as the 
budget is balanced, governments should not be concerned 
with external disequilibria simply because the private 
sector will not run a permanent deficit. But this 
approach seems open to criticism for several reasons. 
We have already pointed at the danger that policies who 
neglect the external constraint might produce illusory 
gains in the short run control of the domestic target
33This definition is drawn from the seminal works of 
Branson (1978) and Kouri (1976)
34The approach was explicitly put forward by Frenkel 
and Johnson (1974), but still retains great influence, 
see Genberg and Svoboda (1988) and the review in 
Boughton (1989)
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at the expenses of the long run performance of the 
economy. But we see two more reasons for setting a 
foreign wealth target.
First of all, external deficits increase the 
consumption of current generations at the expenses of 
the future ones (Cooper, 1985). Therefore governments 
might be concerned with ensuring that such a transfer 
is consistent with the collective preferences of the 
public (Boughton, 1988). Secondly, the danger of 
withdrawal on short notice might turn external debt 
into a serious threat to national independence 
(Dornbusch and Park,1988).
We agree with the view that setting a foreign 
wealth target, in a direct or indirect way3 0 , must be a 
key element of a policy package. Throughout the thesis 
we shall be greatly concerned with the current account 
implications of policy. This is one of the main 
distinctive elements of the research.
Instruments selection
Traditionally, Keynesian policies relied on both 
monetary and fiscal instruments. The monetarist 
"counterrevolution" stressed the role of the monetary
35As an example of an indirect way of setting a foreign 
wealth target consider the target zones proposal, where 
the choice of an exchange rate target implies the 
definition of the country's net external position.
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instrument. Controlling monetary aggregates has proven 
extremely difficult, but the manipulation of interest 
rates has been quite effective. The monetary feedback 
policies we shall analyze in this thesis will therefore 
involve control of a short term real interest rate. 
Rules of this kind have recently found growing 
acceptance3 6 . It is well known since Poole's (1970) 
seminal article that pegging the interest rate 
insulates the economy from the adverse effects of 
demand for money instability. The traditional
monetarist objection to an interest rate peg is that 
such policy would leave the economy without a "nominal 
anchor". This argument does not apply here, as a)we 
consider an interest rate feedback rule and b) this 
operates on the real rate. It is a familiar danger that 
pegging the interest rate instead of monetary
aggregates might cause instability because, when 
inflation rises the real rate falls. But here we 
operate a rule on the real interest rate, so that a 
rise in inflation causes a rise of the nominal rate and 
this is part of a feedback policy designed so that real
rates would be raised when inflation increased.
36See Currie and Levine (1985), Edison Miller and 
Williamson (1987) Vines et a l . (1989), Currie and Wren-
Lewis (1988)
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Controlling a real interest rate obviously faces the 
difficulty of measuring the actual inflation rate but, 
as Edison Miller and Williamson (198^) suggest, this is 
by no means more difficult than measuring and 
interpreting monetary aggregates.
The existence of a second target, besides the domestic 
objective, raises the issue of selecting an additional 
instrument, if policy goals are to be met. Fiscal 
policy would seem the most obvious candidate. After a 
period of widespread acceptance of the monetarist 
prescription that governments should simply opt for a 
balanced budget, recent years have witnessed a 
resurrection of policy "packages" which involve active 
use of the fiscal instrument for the purpose of 
macroeconomic stabilization3,7. New classical
theorists33 would appeal to the Ricardian equivalence 
theorem to assert that fiscal policy cannot affect the 
saving/consumption decisions of rational forward- 
looking agents. But the work of Blanchard (1985) has 
shown that such ineffectiveness proposition only holds 
under the assumption of infinitely-lived agents. When 
this restrictive hypothesis is removed it is shown that
37See Meade (1983), Williamson (1987), Boughton (1989), 
Vines et a l . (1989)
38See Barro (1974)
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even rational, forward-looking consumption decisions 
made in the context of a life-cycle hypothesis are 
affected by the current fiscal policy stance.
The fiscal instrument will be part of some of the 
policy proposals to be assessed in this thesis. Shifts 
of the fiscal stance can be operated on either side of 
the budget accounts, that is, by manipulating either 
expenditures or revenues. Vines et a l . (1983) have
argued in favour of tax rate rules, as such instrument 
are likely to be more flexible and less costly to alter 
than public expenditures. In chapter 4 we shall refer 
to the tax rate as the fiscal instrument, whereas in 
chapter 6 we shall refer to the more general concept of 
a fiscal stance index8 0 .
,3..,6 Summary
This chapter has pointed out how new progress has 
been made in the search for a policy framework 
alternative to the monetarist orthodoxy. Such a new 
framework is built on the following basic hypotheses.
39The reason we do so in chapter 6 is that since we 
wish to provide a further evaluation of the target 
zones proposal, we want to keep our model as close as 
possible to the original version of Edison, Miller and 
Williamson (198^-)
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-sluggish price adjustment leaves substantial room for 
disequilibrium and therefore for macroeconomic 
stabilization policies
-such policies are designed to provide a stable 
environment. Hence they are publicly announced and 
policy makers recognize that rational forward-looking 
agents will behave according to their perceptions of 
government's policies. Therefore credibility and 
sustainability are essential prerequisites of policy 
packages. In this context simple feedback rules might 
turn out to be more appealing than full optimization, 
-policy targets should include both inflation and 
output; we opt for nominal income. Furthermore, the 
adoption of national wealth targets would prevent 
policies which yield short run gains at the expenses of 
the longer term performance of the economy.
3.7.Outline of the rest of the thesis 
The thesis is laid out as follows.
Chapter 2 is a basic literature review of models 
of floating exchange rates. It enables us to build up 
the key pieces of our model. It points to the 
importance of wealth effects for exchange rate 
determination, as it has been pointed out by Branson 
(1979) and by Dornbusch and Fischer (1980). But it also
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shows that scarce attention has been paid to the 
problem of exchange rate determination in models where 
goods prices are sticky, exchange rate expectations are 
forward looking, and wealth effects occur.
Chapter 3 presents a more general model of this 
kind and highlights the danger of instability inherent 
to such models under a monetarist regime. Several 
criticisms have been raised of monetarist policies'40; 
in this chapter we stress another reason of 
dissatisfaction, as we show that under such policies 
dynamic instability might occur. Furthermore, we show 
that the danger of instability arises because the 
process of wealth accumulation, operating through the 
current account, is deliberately not controlled under a 
monetarist regime. Indeed the enphasis on the adoption 
of foreign wealth targets is a key issue throughout the 
following chapters.
Chapter 4 is a central contribution of the thesis 
to which chapters 2 and 3 lead. We abandon the 
monetarist orthodoxy and move on to evaluate the 
relative performance of 4 alternative policy 
assignments in an open economy which involve simple 
feedback rules. This is done by means of both algebraic
40See Vines et a l . (1983), chapter 2
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analysis and numerical simulations of a small 
theoretical model. The rules we consider can be 
described as follows.
Rule 1, a "monetarist" rule, assignes a real interest 
rate feedback to a nominal income target. Rule 2, which 
originates from the "Group of Cambridge", working with 
Meade, and from Boughton (1989), adds fiscal control of 
a foreign wealth target to the monetary control of the 
internal objective. Rule 3 simply reverses the Meade 
assignment, as it sets fiscal control of domestic
nominal income and monetary control of the foreign
wealth target. Finally, rule 4 applies in a small
country context the kind of assignment advocated in the 
Target Zones proposal by Williamson: the government is 
supposed to dispense with monetary policy altogether 
and to assign fiscal policy to the domestic target. We 
will obviously comment later on the original results of 
our analysis. One general point we wish to stress from 
the outset is the importance of fiscal policy in a well 
designed policy package, especially if it is assigned 
to a wealth target.
In part two of the thesis chapters 5 and 6 apply our 
ideas to issues of policy coordination. Chapter 5 is 
merely a literature survey which mainly concentrates on
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those issues in the policy coordination debate that are 
relevant for an application of simple rules.
Chapter 6 is the substantive contribution. In a two- 
country setting we consider a disinflation experiment 
and we assess the relative performance of three 
alternative proposals, which assign the same instrument 
to the control of global, or average, inflation, but 
differ in their strategies of reduction of intercountry 
inflation differentials and of foreign wealth control. 
The first rule is the well known Williamson's Target 
Zones proposal. The second is a standard "monetarist" 
rule. The third is a two-country version of the Meade 
assignment. The analysis crucially differs from the one 
carried out in chapter 4 as it accounts for the 
international ripercussions of individual policy 
actions. Furthermore, it gives a detailed account of 
the influence of global disinflation policy on 
intercountry inflation differentials, which occurs 
through the international transfer of wealth determined 
by the fluctuation of world interest rates.
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CHAPTER 2
MONETARIST MACROECONOMIC POLICIES AND EXCHANGE RATE 
DETERMI NAT I ON : A CR I T IC AL SURVEY..__
1.Introduction
In this chapter we carry out a critical assessment of 
the main contributions to the theory of exchange rate 
determination under fixed "open loop" policy rules that 
could be labeled as "Monetarist" policies. We use this 
term to mean that the money supply, the level of public 
expenditure and their rates of change are regarded as 
exogenous.
2_.__The. basic monetary model
The monetary approach to the determination of a 
flexible exchange rate regards the exchange rate as an 
asset price1 , namely the price at which level agents 
are prepared to hold the outstanding stock of domestic 
money. Proponents of the monetary approach® rely upon 
the so called "small country assumption": neither
changes in domestic real output can affect relative 
prices in the international goods market, where 
homogeneous goods are sold, nor can variations in the 
domestic saving rate induce changes in the world real 
interest rate. In the financial markets assets
lSee Mussa (1977)
2Mus s a (1977), Bilson (1978), Frenkel (1976)
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denominated in different currencies are considered 
perfect substitutes; therefore the domestic interest 
rate,!,is tied to the world interest rate,!*,
1) i-i * = Ede ;
where Ede is the expected variation of the exchange 
rate. Interest rate differentials must be matched by 
the expected cost of holding domestic rather than 
foreign currency. Eq.l) has been referred to as 
uncovered interest parity condition3 .
In the goods market perfect competition and 
international arbitrage are necessary to assume the 
equivalence between national and foreign price levels 
expressed in the same currency.
2)ep£ = p
where p and p* are respectively the domestic and 
foreign price levels. Both variables can be re­
expressed in terms of the domestic and foreign money 
supplies and real money demands.
3) m/p = (y*1)exp(-kBi ) ;
4) (m/p) * = (yflcl)exp(-kBi*) ;
3Eq.l) implicitly assumes that agents are neutral 
towards the exchange rate and the default risk 
associated with foreign investment. Later this will be 
discussed in more detail.
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y and y*, domestic and foreign real outputs, are 
assumed to be fixed at the natural rate. Continuous 
clearing in the goods markets is due to perfect price 
flexibility. Substituting 1), 3), 4), into 2) we get :
5) e = (m/m*)(y*/y)uiexp(-kzEde) ;
The current exchange rate depends on the relative 
money supplies, the relative outputs, and expectations 
about future levels of the exchange rate. Under the 
rational expectations hypothesis expected variations of 
the exchange rate correspond to actual changes. 
Therefore from 5), imposing for simplicity that 
p* = y* = m* = 1 
and taking logs, yields'4:
6) e t = (m-p)t / (1 +k8 ) - y*(ka / l + k2 ) + et + 1 (k8/
/ l+k2 )
In a more general form
7)et +j = (®-p)t +j/(l+kg) - yt + j(ki/l + ke) +
+ e-t-^  (kE/l+ke )
Repeatedly substituting 7 into 6) and ruling out the 
possibility of unstable paths* we obtain:
8)et*d= (l+kB )“ :li:(m-p)<:*j(k1/l+k2 )J-
4This formulation is due to Hoffmann and Schlagenhauf 
(1983)
50n the rationale for imposing the transversality 
condition see Sargent and Wallace (1973)
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(ka/l+k2 )Syt.^ .j (ka. /1 +k2 ) J 
The exchange rate is expressed as a function of current 
and expected future values of the exogenous variables, 
y and m .
.3... C r i. t.i.c.i s m s.
Not surprisingly, the monetary model has been 
criticized on different grounds and this has led to 
further developments. First of all the Dornbusch model® 
accounts for the sluggish adjustment of the price level 
to demand shocks. Secondly, another strand of the
literature has re-established the "missing link" 
between the exchange rate and the current account. 
According to the proponents of the monetary model the 
current account does not matter at all for exchange 
rate determination. The monetarist school7 merely
regards the current/capital account flows as the 
difference between current levels of production and
consumption, where agents are supposed to make 
consumption/savings decisions on the grounds of the 
permanent income theory. For this approach to hold at 
the micro-level, agents neutrality towards the risk 
associated with future income must be assumed as well
6Dornbusch (1976) For an extension including the role 
of unanticipated disturbances see Wilson (1979)
7This is clearly stated in Frenkel and Johnson( 1976)
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as unlimited access to credit. Also, at the macro 
level, it is needed that temporary surpluses of 
domestic output on consumption can be always sold 
without any effect on relative prices. Furthermore it 
is necessary that current account deficits of whatever 
size are financed by foreign agents at a constant real 
interest rate. Some authors have turned to an 
alternative specification of the consumption function®, 
linking current consumption with current income and the 
stock of financial wealth. Since foreign assets held by 
domestic residents obviously are a component of 
financial wealth, it turns out that the equilibrium 
exchange rate cannot be determined unless the current 
account flow equals zero. Another reason for 
considering the exchange rate as jointly determined 
with the equilibrium level of the domestic holdings of 
foreign assets is that assets denominated in different 
currencies are not, in general, perfect substitutes, 
unless agents are neutral towards the risk associated 
with the determination of the future foreign exchange 
rate. Portfolio models of exchange rate determination®
8Kouri (1976) Dornbusch and Fischer (1980) Engel and 
Flood (1985)
9Branson (1979 and 1984), Eaton and Turnovsky (1983) 
Dri ski 11 (1981)
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focus on this aspect. They assume that interest rate 
differentials do not arise only to match expected 
exchange rate changes, but also as a compensation for 
the risk of holding foreign assets. Once again the 
exchange rate cannot be set independently from the 
current account: changes in the stock of foreign assets
will cause portfolio adjustment and instantaneous 
exchange rate movements.
In the next sections we shall give a more detailed 
account of these developments of the monetary model.
4.Sticky prices. wea.lth effec.ts and. impeffect capital
mpbility : a revijew of the literature .
At this stage we shall discuss in some detail the main 
theoretical contributions that embed the criticisms of 
the basic monetary approach we have outlined in the 
previous section. The first model to be discussed here 
is the Dornbusch, (1976) extension of the traditional 
F 1eming-Munde11 model. Secondly, we shall analyze the 
Dornbusch and Fischer (1980) model, relating wealth 
accumulation to domestic expenditure and the exchange 
rate. Finally, Branson's, (1984), portfolio model of 
exchange rate
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determination will be taken into account.
4.1.The Dornbusch Model
Dornbusch assumes that, although in the long run 
changes of the money supply are fully neutral, sluggish 
price adjustment leaves room for short term 
disequilibrium. Henceforth the observed exchange rate 
volatility and the deviations from purchasing power 
parity are linked to short term price stickiness in the 
aftermath of monetary shocks.
8)m-p = k ay - kei ;
9 ) i-i f = Ede;
10)Ede = de
Eq. 8), 9), 10) describe10 the equilibrium conditions
in the financial sector of the economy. Eq. 8) is a 
standard demand for money function, excluding financial 
wealth. It follows from eq.9) that Dornbusch assumes 
perfect capital mobility: deviations of the domestic 
interest rate from the international one can arise only 
as a compensation for expected exchange rate changes. 
It is also clear from equation 10) that expectations 
are assumed to be rational: the expected exchange rate
lODynamics are specified here in continuous time. 
Needless to say the model is loglinear.
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variation corresponds to its actual rate of change.
11) dp = G (D - y-)
12) D = a [ p (e - p ) - oi - 6s]
Eq. 11) describes price dynamics as a function of the 
gap between aggregate demand,D, and output,y " ,which is 
assumed to be fixed at its "natural" rate. In eq.12 
aggregate demand is positively affected by terms of 
trade,(e-p),the nominal interest rate and real 
taxation,s1 1 ,. Substituting eq. 8, 10, 12, in 9, 11 we 
obtain the system in state space form:
Xi = AX2 + b x 3
where X a ' = [dp, de], X2 ' = [p, e ] ,
Xs = ty", s, m-p,i *]
A = G<x(p + o/k2 ) Gap
l/k2 0
B = 0
-1
G(1 + aoka/k2 ) -€a6 Gao 
k a/k2 0 l/k2
The equilibrium values of dynamic endogenous variables, 
p and e, are: 
p_= -kay* + k2i^ + m
llln the original Dornbusch model fiscal policy was not 
explicitly taken into account. Nonetheless we make this 
assumption here as it has commonly been done in the 
literature originating from Dornbusch seminal work. See 
Branson and Buiter (1981)
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e_= [(ap)"1 - ka]y~ + [ke + o/p]i* + (6/p)s + m The
money supply has no long run effect on real variables, 
In equilibrium purchasing power parity holds after a 
monetary shock: dm = dp = d e . Fiscal policy permanently
alters aggregate demand and requires an offsetting
variation of the terms of trade. A fiscal expansion, 
e.g. a reduction of the tax rate, causes an exchange 
rate appreciation to be matched by a revaluation of the 
terms of trade. The absence of any long term link 
between p and s depends on the assumptions of perfect
capital mobility and no wealth effects in demand for
money. In the next chapter we shall present a more 
general model where fiscal policy does affect the price 
level. Changes in the natural rate of output require 
the adjustment of both p and e. The price variation is 
determined at the level which ensures equilibrium in 
the money market, being m and i=i* fixed, determined 
respectively by the government and the international 
financial markets. The exchange rate adjustment must be 
such that, given the price fall, the relative prices 
depreciation brings aggregate demand at the level which 
corresponds to the new equilibrium rate of output. A 
rise of the world interest rate lowers demand for money 
and causes a price increase. In order to keep aggregate
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demand in equilibrium e must depreciate. Furthermore, 
the negative impact of i* on D must be offset by a 
terms of trade devaluation, ensured by a further 
exchange rate rise.
Let's turn now to the analysis of price and 
exchange rate dynamics. As it is well known, rational 
expectations models can be stable and uniquely 
determined only if the number of unstable roots of the 
characteristic equation of the dynamic matrix is
matched by the number of non pre-determined variables, 
which are allowed to make discrete jumps in response to 
shocks12 . Therefore the Dornbusch model can be stable
if its characteristic equation has two roots of
different sign, a result which is actually ensured by 
the structure of the transition matrix, A. The two 
roots of the Characteristic equation (A-0I) = 0 are:
0. = -Ga(P+o/kE )/2 - (1/2) {Ga[p + o/kB]a + 4Gap/k8 }1/c 
0U = -€a(p+o/kE )/2 + (1/2){Ga[p+o/kE]2+4€ap/ke }1/B
12Blanchard Kahn, (1980)
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Exchange rate and price dynamics can then be described 
as follows13: 
pt = p_ + C0«k2exp(0.t ); 
et s e. + Cexp(0,t);
where p« and e„ stand for the equilibrium price level 
and exchange rate. C is a constant which can be 
defined as a function of p0-p-.
C = (Po-P-)/k20.
Once C is determined, it is trivial to compute the 
intial exchange rate overshooting (undershooting): 
e(0)-e_ = (Po-P-)/k20»
After a money supply increase p0<P« and e(0)>e«, since 
0.<O. Henceforth the actual amplitude of the initial 
exchange rate jump depends on the size of the exogenous 
shock, of the stable root and of the interest rate 
semielasticity in the money market. 0. is
13The general solution for this class of dynamic 
systems is:
p* -p .. = AU^exp ( 0„t) + CU»exp(0„t); 
e*-e«. = Aexp(0ut) + Cexp(0«t); 
where [Uu , 1] and [U», 1] are the eigenvector 
associated to the unstable and to the stable root, 
respectively 0U and 0.. C and A are arbitrary 
constants. Imposing the transversality condition we 
set A = 0 and choose to analyze the only stable dynamic 
path.
47
real, henceforth the dynamic path must be monotonic1* . 
The gap between the current and the equilibrium 
exchange rate is negatively related, at any point in 
time, to the gap between the current and the
equilibrium price level. It is quite apparent that
changes of the tax rate are instantaneously offset by
exchange rate jumps and do not involve any dynamics at 
all. But less restrictive assumptions about the degree 
of capital mobility and the inclusion of financial
wealth as an argument of demand for money would yield 
quite different results1*5.
We give the following interpretation of the
overshooting result. In the aftermath of unanticipated 
shocks, i.e. an increase of the money supply, the 
exchange rate immediately jumps, but the sluggish price 
adjustment prevents e from setting at its new long run 
equilibrium value. In fact the monetary shock causes 
disequilibrium in the money market and a fall of the 
domestic interest rate. From eq.9 it is clear that this 
fall is sustainable only if the expected exchange rate 
change is negative. This requires that the 
instantaneous exchange rate jump overshoots the long
14For a formal proof of this assertion see Gandolfo 
(1971)
15See Branson and Buiter (1981)
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run depreciation (de * dm). After the initial exchange 
rate overshooting the terms of trade devaluation and 
the fall of the interest rate gradually drive the price 
level upwards. This raises demand for money and brings 
the interest rate up to its previous level. 
Correspondingly, the exchange rate appreciates 
steadily. When purchasing power parity is restored the 
system is back to equilibrium. These concepts can be 
illustrated graphically (graph 1). Just before the 
monetary shock occurs the system is in equilibrium at 
point a. When m shifts from m0 to m* the new 
equilibrium position is set at point b, lying along the 
45 degrees line because in equilibrium: 
de/dm = dp/dm.
The AA and BB loci represent the combinations of e and 
p that ensure equilibrium in the goods and money 
markets, for a given set of values of the exogenous 
variables. In this case the position of AA and BB 
depends on the new level of the money supply, 
p0 = p(m0 ) is fixed, e(0) jumps on to the saddlepath 
associated with the new equilibrium point. Since then 
the combinations of e and p that feature the system's 
dynamics lie along the QQ line: the exchange rate
initially overshoots its long run depreciation and then
49
GRAPH 1
e
BB
e(0)
1
0 aa
P
50
constantly appreciates, the price level gradually
increases.
4 . 2 .Wealth effects , exchange rate__overshooting___and
current account  dynamics in the Dornbusch and Fischer
■odel
The model
Dornbusch and Fischer abandon the hypothesis of 
sluggish price adjustment and investigate the
connections among the current account, the 
international redistribution of wealth and the
variation of relative prices1 6 . We discuss their 
results by suitably modifying the Dornbusch model. 
8 b)m-p = k ay - k Ei + ka (W-p);
13)W = (l-Wi)m + w a (e + F)
9 ) i-i * = Ede;
10)Ede = de 
lib) D = y~
12b) D = a[X"* + (5(e-p) - oi - 6 s + x(e+F-p)J
14) dF = -x(W-p)
The stock of financial wealth, W, held by domestic 
residents is introduced in the demand for money 
function, eq.8 b. Wealth is assumed to be held in the
16The original model of Dornbusch and Fischer is set
out in implicit form. To simplify the exposition we
log-1 inearize it, at the cost of making some 
restrictive assumptions. Variables are expressed as 
deviations from equilibrium.
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form of foreign assets,F, and real money balances, 
eq.13. Following Driskill (1980) and Eaton and 
Turnovsky (1983) we have linearized W around 
equilibrium, w a being the initial share of foreign 
wealth on W aT.
Continuous equilibrium between demand,D, and supply,y^, 
is ensured by perfect price flexibility, eq.llb. Real 
wealth and a shift term representing shocks to foreign 
demand for domestic goods are included in aggregate 
demand. Quite surprisingly, Dornbusch and Fischer do 
not consider the influence of the interest rate on 
domestic demand. We have chosen to follow a more 
general specification of aggregate demand, as in lib. 
In this model savings are assumed to be a negative 
function of real financial wealth. Since no capital 
accumulation occurs, net savings can only take the form 
of foreign assets accumulation. Eq.14) is a typical 
partial adjustment dynamic equation, where agents 
gradually accumulate/decumulate assets according to the 
gap between current and "desired" levels of wealth.
17We have chosen to approximate wealth around 
equilibrium by a Cobb-Douglas function: W = H[Ma“ 
t,(eF)°]0 , where H is an arbitrary constant. Taking logs 
and reminding that if W is to be a good approximation 
to actual wealth we must set a/(l-a) = (eF/M)0 one may 
easily show that a = (eF/W)0
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Dornbusch and Fischer define eq.14) as the current 
account flow. To define 14 as the current account it
is necessary to make one strongly restrictive
assumption. To derive a proper description of the 
current account one should first define consumption 
according to the life-cycle theory: 
c = by* + x(W-p)
The stock of fixed capital is constant, therefore
savings, defined as s, only occur through foreign 
wealth accumulation, which is determined by the
difference between ouput and consumption and by the
service of foreign investment.
14a) dF = s = y* - c = (l-b)y* - x(w-p) + i*F
The only way to reconcile 14a) with 14) is to drop the
terms describing the influence on savings of output and 
foreign interest payments. Dornbusch and Fischer 
apparently do this and we shall follow them here, as 
this chapter only aims to review well known results, 
but we shall replace parameter Q, apparently selected 
ad hoc, with the propensity to spend out of wealth, x. 
Obviously, a correct specification of the current 
account would have led to alternative conclusions
concerning both comparative statics and the stability 
condition. In fact eq.14 implies that long run changes
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of foreign assets must leave domestic real wealth 
constant, whereas this would not necessarily apply 
under 14a. Furthermore, the inclusion of foreign 
interest payments would highlight the potential 
instability inherent to this class of models. This 
issue has been raised by Branson in a study to be 
reviewed in the next section. In chapter three we shall 
further discuss the subject in a more general model 
which accounts for wealth effects, imperfect capital 
mobility, flexible output and sluggish inflation.
In order to obtain the Dornbusch and Fischer's model 
in state-space form we shall proceed as follows. First 
of all we express the endogenous non dynamic variables, 
p and i, in terms of endogenous dynamic and exogenous 
variables, substituting eq.1 2 b , 13 into 8b and lib.
15)XaP = Kee +k 3F + jr4m - 6 s + X"‘ - y’Va;
16) i = {-K0m + jr6e + jttF + [kx - (l-ks )/arc* ]y" +
+ (l-k3 ) [X^-fis] }/xxke ;
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where
Jta = [P + T + o(l-ka)/k2];
JTa = [P + x - okaWi/k2] ;
*3 = [x - okaWi/kz];
rc* = [x + a (l-ka ) (l-wa ) /k2] ;
JUo = { 1  -  ( l - W a ) k a  -  ( l - k s ) l t 4 / j t a } =  { W j k a  + ( 1 “
- k a )[P + o (l-ka)wa/k2 ;
jte = { k3W a + (l-ka)lCB/lta } ;
JTt = { k aW a + ( l-ka )Ka/jTa } ;
JCa describes the feedback effects of price 
variations in aggregate demand. A price rise 
appreciates the real exchange rate, and lowers domestic 
demand because real wealth falls. But the reduction of
wealth weakens demand for money, so that the interest
rate falls and domestic demand is stimulated. On the 
other hand lower real money balances require a higher 
interest rate, which has a negative impact on demand. 
o(l-k3 )/ke shows the influence of the price level on 
the interest rate, via its effect on real wealth and 
real money balances; under the plausible assumption 
that ka< 1 it is obviously negative. ic0 describes the 
influence of financial wealth changes. An increase of F 
stimulates domestic consumption, but on the other hand 
raises demand for money and the interest rate. jre
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differs from jra because the exchange rate influences 
foreign demand as well as financial wealth1®. Obviously 
the price change necessary to offset variations of 
financial wealth and nominal exchange rate is less than 
proportional, x* shows that the an expansion of the 
money supply raises wealth and lowers the interest 
rate: its effect on aggregate demand is unambiguously 
positive. k +/k x <1, because the price level has a 
broader effect on aggregate demand than the money 
supply. ju0 , rce , jc-7 describe the influence of money, the 
nominal exchange rate and foreign wealth on the 
domestic interest rate. They include the direct impact 
of these variables on i and the one operating through 
the changes of the price level which are necessary to 
keep the goods market in equilibrium.
Let us now turn to the analysis of the system in state 
space form.
Substituting eq.10, 15, 16, into 9 and 14 we get:
X* = CXB + DXe
where X * ' = [de, dF], XB ‘ = [e, F], X6 ' = [y*. m, X", 
s]
18The sign of ire .0 cannot be defined a priori because, 
unlike Dornbusch and Fischer we introduce interest rate 
effects in aggregate demand.
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C — ft 3 / k 2 JT-7 /k2
~X {wa-ft2 /fta } -X {Wa-JTa/jTa }
D =
[ka- (l-k3 )/ait* ]/k2 - K a /kz (1-k3 )/ftak2 - (1-k3 ) 6/JTik2 -1 
T/aJTa -x(l-Wa- ft-a/fia) X/fta - X 6 / ft a 0
Variations of e,F and m positively affect financial 
wealth, exerting a negative pressure on desired wealth 
accumulation, proportional to their shares on W. For 
the goods market to clear the variation of nominal 
financial wealth must be offset by a movement of the
price level in the opposite direction.
Note that
Wi-Jts/jri = {waok3 /k2 - (l-wa ) (p + x ) }/rca ;
Wa-jr3/jra = {waok3 /k2 - (1 -Wi) x }/ t z x  ;
Unlike Dornbusch and Fischer we are not able to define 
unambiguously the effect of changes of e and F on W. 
This because we include the interest rate in aggregate 
demand and so doing we stress a weakness of the
original model. In fact it is difficult to find
theoretical or empirical arguments for excluding the
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interest rate from aggregate demand and we have just 
shown that this significantly alters the structure of 
the transition matrix. Nevertheless saddlepath 
stability obtains anyway, as in Dornbusch and Fischer. 
The two roots of the characteristic equation 
| C-0I| = 0 are :
0U = O . 5 [ JTs/ke -x ( W i -Xs/Ki ) ] +
+ 0.5{[jue/k2 -x ( W a -Kq /Ki ) ] B + 4 ( xP/ksi) J }~1 /S!
0S = O . 5 O e / k e -X (Wa-JCs/lCi ) ]-
-0.5{[rc6 /ke -x(w1-jr3 /rta)]2 + 4 (xPw1 /k2ita )}“:L/a
At any point in time, the relation between current and
equilibrium values of the endogenous dynamic variables
is defined as follows.
et = e, + Nexp(0.t );
Ft = F_ + Nu.exp(0.t ) ;
where [1 , u.] is the right eigenvector associated with
the stable root.
u» = (0,ke - rce )/icT is negative. This means that:
C = (F0 -F«.)/u. is negatively related to F 0 -F_.
Whenever a change in the exogenous variables occurs 
that requires a long term rise of foreign assets, the 
exchange rate must overshoot its equilibrium value. 0 . 
is real, therefore after the initial exchange rate jump
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the exchange rate path will be monotonic, with e and F
having opposite signs. When unexpected shocks occur,
current account surpluses will be associated with 
exchange rate appreciation and vice versa. This is 
shown more clearly with the aid of the familiar state- 
space diagram.
17)dF=0: e = { - [w* 7Ua-xa ] / [WiiTj-Jiz ] }F =
= { - [ ( W a -l)t + W a0 + W i O / k e ] / [ ( W j - 1 )X + W aP + W j O / k e
- P])F
18)de=0: e = -(jcT/ice )F =
= -{ [kaW a (0 + T ) + (l-ka)X]/[kaWa (0 + X ) + (1-ka )(P + x ) ]} F
18 represents locus ee in graphs 2,3,4. It is
negatively sloped because e and F exert the same kind 
of influence on demand for money1®, hence if e rises F 
must fall correspondingly. Points located above the ee
locus are associated with a devaluation because they
imply that demand for money is above the current level 
of real money balances and this requires an interest 
rate rise to equilibrate the money market.
The slope of the FF locus, described by eq.17, 
depends on the sign of 
[(Wj-l)i + w a P + Wio/kg] and
[ (W a - l) T  + W a p + W i O / k e  - 0].
19see discussion above
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If these two coefficients have the same sign FF is 
negatively sloped. If
[(wa- l )t + Wap + WaO/kB]>0 and [(w *-1)t + w ap + WiO/k8- 
- P]<0
FF is positively sloped80 . In this case, graph 2, a low 
level of financial assets, for a given exchange rate, 
triggers wealth accumulation and vice versa.
On the other hand, assuming that FF is negatively 
sloped, points below the FF locus are associated with 
foreign wealth decumulation, graph 3, when:
[(Wa-l)x + Wap + WaO/kE]<0
ee GRAPH 2
e
FF
20Dornbusch and Fischer consider this case only.
6$
GRAPH 3
e ee
FF
GRAPH 4e
FF
ee
Points below the FF are consistent with foreign wealth 
accumulation, graph 4, when 
.[(Wi-l)t + w a(3 + w ao/k2]>0
We are therefore left with three alternatives, but from 
the analysis of the roots of the characteristic 
equation we know that the system is saddlepath stable 
anyway. In each case an initial negative shock to F is 
associated with instantaneous exchange rate 
depreciation followed by gradual wealth accumulation 
and exchange rate appreciation towards the former 
equilibrium. It is clear from eq.16 that the shock to 
wealth lowers the interest rate. As in the Dornbusch 
model the jump of the exchange rate is then necessary 
to generate the expectation of a future appreciation, 
which compensates for the low level of the interest 
rate. But this is not the consequence of insufficient 
demand21: in fact the price level falls and restores 
equilibrium in the goods market. The lower interest 
rate is necessary for the money market to be in 
equilibrium at a higher level of real money balances. 
Note that only when
[(wa-l)x + w ap + w ao/ke]<0 (graph 3),
21as in the Dornbusch model.
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the devaluation is also necessary to restore wealth 
equilibrium. In this case the shock to F triggers a 
price fall which is so strong that real wealth actually 
rises. As a consequence agents decumulate financial 
assets. The devaluation is then necessary to stimulate 
demand and raise the price level, so that wealth 
eventually falls in real terms.
Comparative statics
e = m + (6 s - X * )/p +
+ { - k a [ w a p + ( wa - l ) x  + Wi O/ k2 ] + Wa / a J y VPWa  +
+ (ks»/p) [o/ks + P + t (1 - 1/Wi)]i*
F = - (6s - X*)/P - (ke/p)[o/k8 + (P + X )(1- 1/W*)]i*
- {k i [w iP + (Wi-l)i + WjO/k8] - w a/a}y*/pWj
The model is defined in such a way that in the short 
run the price level ensures that supply and demand for 
domestic goods match, the interest rate equilibrates 
the money market, whereas the exchange rate keeps the 
international financial markets in equilibrium by 
settling at the level that generates the expectation of 
the devaluation/revaluation necessary to compensate for 
differentials between domestic and foreign interest 
rates. But in the long run, when i=i*, the price level 
is assigned the task of ensuring equilibrium in the
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money markets and the exchange rate balances supply and 
demand for domestic goods. Foreign assets keep the 
level of real financial wealth at its desired value. 
Changes of the money supply are fully neutral: any
variation of m is completely offset by p and e in such 
a way that terms of trade and real wealth are 
unchanged. Since it is assumed that both the price 
level and the exchange rate are non pre-determined 
variables, the adjustment takes place instantaneously. 
An interest rate rise requires higher real money 
balances and therefore pushes up the price level. 
Furthermore, variations of both the interest rate and 
the price level depress aggregate demand. The 
adjustment of foreign assets and of the exchange rate 
must keep wealth constant and balance aggregate demand. 
One cannot define the sign of changes of F and e. We 
can only say that if the exchange rate appreciates the 
stock of foreign assets must increase. On the other 
hand, if the exchange rate is devalued foreign assets 
might either rise or fall. If, following Dornbusch and 
Fischer, we had ruled out interest rate effects from 
aggregate demand by setting o=0 , the story would have 
been partly different. In fact when o=0 F certainly
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increases. The exchange rate change is still 
undetermined, but less likely to be positive.
Output variations must be matched, on the demand side, 
by terms of trade adjustment, if W is to stay fixed. 
Output growth depresses the price level by raising real 
demand for money; this already corresponds to a terms 
of trade depreciation. However, equilibrium in the 
goods market is achieved by an exchange rate variation 
which ensures that relative prices actually adjust to 
the necessary level. If the price fall is bigger than 
the required overall terms of trade depreciation, the 
exchange rate must appreciate.Indeed, the sign of 
de/dy* cannot be defined a priori. The introduction of 
the interest rate in aggregate demand strengthens the 
price influence on D. By doing so it makes more likely 
that an output expansion appreciates the exchange rate. 
Once again the stock of foreign assets must adjust, 
offsetting the effect of movements of e and p on 
wealth. The change of F is indetermined, too. However 
one may rule out the possibility that both e and F 
increase, because in that case, at a lower level of 
real money balances, wealth would inevitably rise, but 
the peculiar structure of eq.14 constraints wealth to 
be constant.
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Foreign demand and fiscal policy shocks are offset by 
exchange rate variations. An increase of foreign demand 
appreciates the exchange rate whilst a fiscal 
contraction requires a devaluation. Variations of
domestic holdings of financial assets keep real wealth 
stable. F increases in the former case and falls in the 
latter.
A comparison with the Dornbusch "sticky prices" model 
immediately points out that, as far as comparative 
statics is concerned, no difference arises about the 
equilibrium values of the price level, whilst the 
exchange rate change after an interest rate shock might 
be of opposite sign. As we shall show in the next 
chapter, these results are substantially modified when: 
a)the assumption of perfect capital mobility is 
relaxed; b)a more proper description of the current
account is introduced. However, even under the
restrictive and debatable assumptions that Dornbusch 
and Fischer have made, the model shows that stationary 
steady state cannot be achieved unless wealth 
accumulation is nil. Furthermore, their model shows 
that wealth and exchange rate dynamics are strictly
interrelated.
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4.3.Portfolio equilibria and exchange rate and current 
account dynamics: the Branson Model.
The model
Branson model of exchange rate determination focusses 
on the impact of portfolio allocation on the exchange 
rate. Branson relaxes the restriction that assets 
denominated in different currencies are perfect 
substitutes. The assumption of perfect capital mobility 
implies that agents are neutral towards the risk 
associated with investment in foreign currency2 2 . But 
this can be considered just a special case in the 
theory of portfolio allocation. In general agents will 
perceive investment abroad as riskier than investment 
in domestic currency because of the default risk and 
because of uncertainty about the future exchange rate 
level; this perceived risk has to be compensated for by 
a differential between the rates of return on domestic 
and foreign assets. It is quite apparent that steady 
state equilibrium cannot be achieved unless the current 
account flow equals zero: a non-zero current account
balance would require portfolio reallocation and 
changes of the differential between rates of return on
22Eaton and Turnovsky(1983)
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domestic and foreign assets would be necessary to 
equilibriate demand and supply for each asset.
19)M = — 0* i -02 (i*+ Ede) + W;
20)B = 0S i -0*(i* + Ede) + W;
21) e + F = -0ei +0O (i f+ Ede) + W;
22)W = w aB + wz (e+F) + (l-wa-w2 )M;
Equations83 19-22 is a stylized representation of the 
financial sector of the economy. Agents are supposed to 
hold three assets: money, M, domestic bonds, B, assets 
denominated in foreign currency,F. Financial wealth, W, 
is a linear approximation to the sum of these three 
assets. At any point in time demand for each asset, 
described on the right hand side of eq.19-21, must 
equal the corresponding outstanding stock, whose amount 
is defined on the left hand side term of eq.19-21. 
Demand for each asset is homogeneous of degree one in 
wealth. Obviously demand for money is negatively
related to the rates of return on both foreign and
domestic assets. Note that the former includes the
exchange rate expected depreciation2* as well as the 
foreign interest rate, the latter to be treated as an
23we have loglinearized the original Branson model 
24Branson makes this assumption himself when he 
analyzes a model where expectations in the financial 
markets are assumed to berational.
68
exogenous variable. Demands for B and F are positively 
related to their own rates of return and are negatively 
affected by the rate of return on the other interest 
bearing asset. The model assumes that equilibrium in 
the financial markets obtains instantaneously. For
sake of simplicity we shall assume here that both
output and the price level are constant. Therefore, for 
the model to be complete we only need to define the 
process of wealth accumulation/decumulation. We assume 
that the government budget is balanced, therefore 
wealth dynamics can only occur through the capital 
account flowa B .
23)dF= X- + P(e-p) + i*F ;
Eq.23 states that in a flexible exchange rate regime
the current account balance is exactly matched by 
capital flows: a current account surplus corresponds to 
an increase in the country's foreign investment. The 
current account includes the trade balance, expressed 
as a function of terms of trade and a shift factor,X"1, 
as well as interest payments on foreign investment.
24)Ede = de
25Eq.23 is a loglinear approximation to the current 
account flow. A formal demonstration of this result is 
provided in Niehans (1978, pag.36)
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The familiar assumption of rational expectations 
completes the model.
In order to achieve the state-space form of the model 
we need to obtain a proper description of the exchange 
rate dynamics determined by portfolio allocation. Given 
that when two financial markets are in equilibrium the 
whole financial sector must be in equilibrium as well, 
we shall choose to analyze eq.19 and 21 and so obtain i 
and Ede in terms of e,F,B,M,l*.
From eq.19 and 21 we get:
XT = (0i08 +020 6 )-1EaE2Xe
where: X 7 1 = [i, Ede]; X B 1 = [(e+F), M, B, i*];
Ei«
Ez =
Thi s
25)Ede = {[0ew e+(l-wE )01 ]/[010o+02 06 ]}(e+F)
{-[0«(w1+wE ) + (l-w1-w2 )01 ]/[0i0o + 02 06 ] }M 
{w1 [0e-0a]/[010O+020e]}B - i*J
26)i = {[0ow 2 -(l-wE )01 ]/[010o+0206 ]}(e+F)
{[-0B(Wa+WE)+(l-Wa-WE )0e]/[0a0o+0E0e]}M
(Wi [0o + 0e] / [0a.0e + 020e] }B ;
0e 02
06 -0!
-w2 ( W i + W 2 ) -wa 02
l-w2 -(1-Wa-WE) -Wa -0e
system yields:
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Changes in the supplies of money and foreign assets 
affect e and i in two ways: a) the wealth effect, 
proportional to the equilibrium share of each asset; b) 
the substitution effect, defined as the variation of 
the differential between rates of return which is 
required for portfolio to be in equilibrium after the 
composition of wealth has changed. This effect is 
proportional to one minus the initial share of each 
asset on total wealth. In a one asset portfolio the 
substitution effect would be nil whilst the coefficient 
attached to the wealth effect would be one. Let us 
consider the case of an increse of (e+F). The change of 
W, w E (e+F), raises demand for money. For a given stock 
of money supply, equilibrium requires that both rates 
of return become higher. In the foreign assets market 
higher wealth requires higher rates of return on e+F. 
Turning to the analysis of the substitution effect, 
note that the variation of demand for foreign assets 
must be equal to [l-wE](e+F), wE (e+F) being already 
accounted for by the wealth effect. The higher stock of 
foreign assets will be willingly held if Ede rises. 
Equilibrium in the money market will require that the 
change of the differential between rates of return does 
not affect demand for money. As a result i must fall.
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In summary, an increase of foreign assets is positively 
related to Ede. The impact of e+F on i is ambiguous: 
the wealth effect will certainly push i up, but the 
substitution effect will make i move in the opposite 
direction. The wealth effect of a money supply 
expansion on demand for foreign assets requires that 
profitability of foreign assets falls. But this would 
raise demand for money, whereas the wealth effect 
requires it to be lower. Inevitably, the interest rate 
must go up. Henceforth, the wealth effect of a money 
supply increase is the fall of Ede and the rise of i. 
The substitution effect of M obviously requires that 
both rates of return fall, so that agents willingly 
hold a higher stock of money. Therefore a positive 
variation of M certainly lowers both Ede and i. A rise 
of B only causes wealth effects, both in the money and 
foreign assets market. Higher wealth raises demand for 
money, henceforth equilibrium can obtain only if 
returns on the other assets increase. In the foreign 
assets market lower relative profitability of e+F is 
needed as a compensation for the rise of W, therefore e 
must fall and i increase. The overall effect of B on i 
is unambiguously positive, whilst the impact on Ede 
depends on the the patterns of substitutability. If
72
0 6 >0 a domestic bonds are closer substitutes for foreign 
assets than for money and the impact of i is bigger in
the foreign asstes market than in the money market;
since the wealth effect in the money market is
proportional to 0 6 and to the wealth effect in the
foreign market is proportional to 0 a it is clear that 
if bonds are closer substitutes for e+F than for M the 
overall effect of dB on Ede has to be positive. A 
positive shock to the foreign interest rate is 
completely offset by an opposite variation of Ede, so 
that the overall rate of return on foreign assets stays 
constant.
The domestic interest rate is a non dynamic endogenous 
variable, therefore a full investigation of dynamics 
and comparative statics requires eq.23, 24, 25 only.
The state-space form of the model is defined as 
foilows.
Xs = E3X 1o + E4 X 1 1 
where :
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where 0* = [010B+0E0a]
E* =
-[0e(W1+W2 )+(l-Wi-We )01]/0* {W![06-0i]/0*} “I
0 0 FoL J
The roots of the characteristic equation are:
6. = 0.5{ [06w 2+(l-w2 )0aL]/[010o + 020e ] + i*} -
-0 . 5{ [0eW e+ ( l-w2 )01] e / [0i0o + 0E0e]8 +4(P-ifo) y- 1 /a
0U = 0 . 5 { [06W2+ ( l-w2 )0 x]/ [0x0o + 020e] + if} +
+ 0.5{ [0eW2+(l-Wa )01]2/[0i0B + 020«]2 +4 (p-ifo ) }~ 1/z
The system is saddlepath stable if (3>i*0 ; in other 
words the impact of a unit change of the exchange rate 
on the trade balance must be bigger than the change in 
returns on foreign investment caused by a unit 
variation of F. According to Branson this requirement 
is likely to be easily met in practice, given the
existing empirical evidence about interest rates and 
trade elasticities. We shall turn now to the analysis 
of exchange rate and foreign assets dynamics. At any 
point in time the relation between current and
equilibrium values of the endogenous dynamic variables
is defined as follows. 
et = e. + Cexp(0.t ) ;
Ft = F_ + Cu.exp(0„t) ;
where [1, u«] is the right eigenvector associated with
the stable root.
um = -p/(i*-0») is negative.
Hence C = (F0-F_)/u» is negatively related to F0-F_. 
This closely reminds the pattern of exchange rate 
dynamics outlined in the Dornbusch and Fischer's model. 
Whenever a shock occurs implying a long term increase 
of foreign assets the exchange rate instantaneously
depreciates.From then on the exchange rate steadily 
appreciates, while domestic holdings of foreign assets 
increase. Once again current account surpluses are 
associated with exchange rate appreciation. For
instance, let's consider the effect of a money supply 
increase. The loci representing combinations of e and 
F that yield de=dF=0 are the following:
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de=0:27)e = -F +■6 X ;
dF = 0 : 28 ) e = -(if£/P)F + GZ ;
where G a and Gz represent exogenous variables.
Both loci are negatively sloped.
The locus aa in graphs 5 and 6 describes eq.27. It is 
negatively sloped because a fall of foreign assets must 
be compensated for by an exchange rate devaluation, so 
that the valuation of wealth in domestic currency stays 
constant. A constant level of wealth is necessary if 
the financial markets are to be in equilibrium. Points 
above the aa locus represent a level of foreign wealth 
which is above equilibrium. This requires the 
expectation of a devaluation. The locus FF, which 
describes the combinations of e and F that are 
consistent with current account equilibrium, is 
negatively sloped because only an exchange rate 
depreciation may compensate for the fall of F; points 
above the FF are associated with a current account 
surplus and vice versa. The necessary and sufficient 
condition for saddlepath stability, p>if, implies that 
the locus de=0 is steeper. In other words, this means 
that if F is initially too low, the devaluation 
necessary to generate a current account surplus and
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restore the equilibrium value of foreign wealth must 
not raise the domestic valuation of foreign wealth 
above its equilibrium value. In fact, if the current 
account surplus may be generated only by a level of the
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exchange rate which raises the domestic of foreign 
wealth above equilibrium the surplus is associated with 
a further devaluation and the system becomes unstable. 
Agents in the financial markets cannot select an 
exchange rate jump which generates convergent dynamics, 
(graph 5). On the other hand, if p>i*, a devaluation 
may be consistent with a gradual process of wealth 
accumulation and exchange rate appreciation as long the 
initial level of (e+F) is below equilibrium. In this 
case, if the transversality condition holds, agents may 
choose the exchange rate jump which is consistent with 
convergent dynamics, (graph 5).
Moving from the analysis of instantaneous 
portfolio equilibrium to the discussion of the 
stability condition of the full model highlights the 
possibility that continuous equilibrium in the 
financial markets corresponds to global instability 
once wealth accumulation is taken into account. In the 
next chapter we will show how instability becomes more 
likely in a more general model of exchange rate 
determination.
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Comparative statics.
e = {(P-ifo)[0eW2+(l-w2 )0 1]/[0 105+0206 ]}-1-ifoif
-F0 i*/fl-i*0
{(p-ifo ) [06 (w1 + w 2 ) + ( 1 - w 1- w 2 ) 0 1 ] / [ 0 6w 2 + ( 1 - w z ) 0 1 ] } - 1 (- 
- ifM)
{ (P-ifo)wa [06-01]/[06w2+(l-w2 )01] }“ai*B 
- X*/((5-if0 )
F = { (P-ifo) [0ew a+(l-wB )0a]/[010ls + 0a0e] }-aPi*
+ F0i V p - i f o\
{(p-if0 )_1 [06(wi+w2 )+(l-w1-w2 )01]/[06w2+(l-w2 )0i]}((3 M )
{ ( M fo)-1W a [0e-01]/[06W2+(l-W2 )01]}-1 (-PB)
+ XV(P-i*o.)
The term (p-if0 ), whose sign is decisive for saddlepath 
stability, also determines the direction of changes in 
e and F after the exogenous variables have shifted. We 
shall analyze comparative statics under the assumption 
that p>if0 . A comparison with the Dornbusch and Fischer 
model is problematic, since the two models differ in so 
many aspects.However, it must be emphasized that, while 
in the Dornbusch and Fischer's model the current 
account would be in equilibrium when W equals its 
"target" value, the Branson's model requires e and F,
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and implicitly the stock of financial wealth, to adjust 
at a level which ensures that, for given values of p 
and 1*0 , the trade balance exactly offsets returns on 
foreign investment. Also, e+F must ensure that 
portfolio equilibrium obtains jointly with de=0. When 
discussing comparative statics we shall look first at 
the values of e and F required for exchange rate and
current account dynamics to be nil, then we shall 
consider the change in the composition of wealth
determined by the shifts of e and F.
A variation of the foreign interest rate has two 
effects. The first is to increase the relative
profitability of foreign assets, that should therefore 
increase2 6 . As a consequence current account
equilibrium requires exchange rate appreciation and a 
worsening of the terms of trade. The second effect is 
directly linked to the initial net position of the 
country. Therefore one cannot say a priori whether an 
increase of i* has a positive or negative effect on F 
and e. However the change in the valuation of foreign 
assets in domestic currency is positive:
26Note that while in the short term Ede ensures 
portfolio equilibrium, in the long run Ede=0 so that F 
must adjust.
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d (e + F ) = {[06w 8+(l-w8 )01]/[0i0B + 0806]> ~ ^ i ^ ;
An increase in domestic demand for foreign goods is 
matched by an exchange rate appreciation and a higher 
stock of foreign assets. Portfolio equilibrium
requires that the valuation of foreign assets stay 
constant because relative rates of returns on domestic 
and foreign assets have not changed.
A rise of the money supply causes an increase of F and 
an exchange rate appreciation, needed for the current 
account to be in equilibrium. The model exhibits a non­
neutrality, variations of M must alter portfolio 
composition and the differential between rates of 
return because, apart from induced changes of e+F, the 
supply of foreign bonds is fixed.
d (e+F)/dM = {1 + [wa (0«-0a )/06w 2+ (l-w2 )0a]}
The valuation of foreign wealth is positively linked to 
the level of the money supply; d(e+F)/dM will be more 
or less than unity according to the sign of 06~0i.ln 
equilibrium the higher stock of money will be held 
only if the domestic interest rate is lower. This 
means that demand for foreign assets will be pushed up
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and will have to be Batched by an increase of the
valuation of foreign wealth. To the extent that bonds
are better substitutes for money than for foreign 
assets, the fall of i will have smaller effects in the 
foreign assets market than in the money market, 
d(e+F)/dM <1. Non neutrality of the money supply 
directly originates from the assumption of imperfect 
capital mobility and from the explicit inclusion of the 
supply of bonds. Comparison with the Dornbusch and 
Fischer's results confirms such conclusion. In fact,
according to their model 
d (e+F)/dM = 1; 
di/dM=dF/dM=0.
The expansion of B requires a change of e+F in order to 
offset the effect of dB on e in the current account. 
The sign of d(e+F) depends on the patterns of
substitutability between assets. If 0«>0&, domestic 
bonds are closer substitutes for foreign assets than 
for money, d(e+F) must be negative. Given the 
constraint of portfolio equilibrium, current account 
equilibrium implies that, if 0e>0i, the exchange rate 
depreciates and domestic holdings of foreign assets are 
reduced.
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S ^ cti^ umb JLon
This chapter has reviewed the roost relevant 
developments of the theory of flexible exchange rates 
in a "monetarist" macropolicy framework. A huge amount 
of research has been devoted to the search for
plausible explanations of the exchange rate volatility 
observed during the 70s. A widely accepted contribution 
has been the Dornbusch sticky prices model. Further 
research, stressing the role of wealth effects and
imperfect capital mobility, has pointed at the 
connections between exchange rate and current account 
dynamics. The initially prevailing view that the 
exchange rate is "the relative price of two national 
monies"2,7 has been substantially amended. In the short 
run the exchange rate is still regarded as an asset 
price, although its level is set in order to clear 
financial markets where a wider bundle of assets than 
the two traditional money supplies matters. In the
longer term the exchange rate depends on economic 
fundamentals, i.e. terms of trade and domestic 
holdings of foreign assets which ensure that the
current account balance equals zero. Flexible exchange
27Mussa (1.97 7)
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rate models must embed the constraint that wealth 
accumulation/decumulation arising from trade imbalances 
cannot be indefinitely sustained. Despite these 
undeniable developments, the literature on the subject 
still lacks of attempts to build models sufficiently 
general to encompass sluggish price adjustment, 
imperfect capital mobility and wealth effects in 
consumption function20 . A more general model of this 
kind will be set out and analyzed in some detail in the 
next chapter.
28Smith (1988) and Engle and Flood (1985) made attempts 
to explore the subject but their results are not 
entirely satisfactory.
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CHAPTER 3.
MONETARIST MACROECONOMIC POLICY RULES IN A SMALL OPEN 
ECONOMY MODEL
1 . Introductio n .
This chapter presents a more general model of a small 
open economy where the policy makers adhere to an 
orthodox monetarist rule. In the models we have been 
analyzing so far the exchange rate is determined by the 
following factors: a) price dynamics; b) wealth
accumulation; c) the degree of capital mobility. It is 
also apparent that government intervention affects the 
exchange rate through fiscal and monetary policy. A 
great deal of research has focussed on some specific 
aspects of the points a), b), c) but attempts of
pulling together these three strands of the literature 
in a more general model of exchange rate determination 
are far less frequent1 and no attention is usually paid 
to the instability potentially arising when a textbook 
Dornbusch model is extended to account for the current 
account equation and a specification of aggregate 
demand that considers wealth effects. According to the 
models we have analyzed in the previous chapter dynamic 
stability either always obtains, as in Dornbusch and 
Dornbusch and Fischer, or depends on a restricted set
1 see Smith (1989)
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of parameters about whose "normal" values a widespread 
consensus in the economic profession seems to have 
emerged, as in Branson. In this chapter we shall show 
under which circumstances a model including the current 
account and wealth effects may be unstable. We shall 
include wealth effects by assuming a life-cycle
consumption function. Blanchard, (1985), has 
investigated the issue in a model with 
microfoundations8 . He shows that current account 
dynamics converge if the propensity to spend out of 
wealth is bigger than the rate of return on foreign
assets. Our conclusion is that this is a necessary but
not a sufficient condition for stability to hold. It 
will be shown that, if output is allowed to fluctuate, 
the impact of a change in domestic holdings of foreign 
wealth on the current account depends on the relative 
size of the corresponding variations of imports and of 
foreign interest payments. If a decrease in foreign 
wealth improves the current account the system is
stable. But this is not necessary for stability to
obtain. When a fall of foreign wealth worsens the
current account the exchange rate must devaluate in
order to bring about the required current account
2But he assumes that the exchange rate is fixed
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surplus. We will show that in this case stability 
obtains if the exchange rate devaluation does not raise 
output above its natural level.
The rest of the chapter is laid out as follows. The 
next section presents the behavioral equations of the 
model. In section 3 we discuss the reduced form of the 
model. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of 
stability. It will show how a more general model might 
be unstable and it will point out the parameters which 
are crucial for the determination of stability. 
Finally, in section 5 we point out that this more 
general model can have implications for comparative 
statics and exchange rate dynamics which are not 
accounted for by simpler models.
2.The model
In the model3 we consider the financial and the 
goods sectors of the economy, and the accumulation of 
foreign wealth.
First of all, we describe the financial sector.
1) a + F = 0[i* + da - (i — dp)];
3the model is loglinear
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where:
a = real exchange rate 
p = domestic prices
F = domestic holdings of foreign assets (denominated in 
foreign currency)
i = domestic interest rate
if= foreign interest rate
d = differential operator
In eq.l we consider the general case where assets 
denominated in different currencies are imperfect 
substitutes. In order to keep the model, as simple as 
possible we do not introduce the full portfolio 
specification of models a' la Branson. In particular we 
do not explicitly model demand for domestic bonds, nor 
we include the quantity of money in the definition of 
financial wealth. This inevitably causes a loss of 
generality: the model does not account for the long 
term influence that changes of the money supply have on 
real variables when agents hold a fixed stock of non
indexed domestic bonds, an effect discussed at length
in Branson (1984) and in Eaton and Turnovsky (1983). 
But on the other hand, a simple portfolio structure
enables one to explicitly model the dual role of money,
whose demand is determined by portfolio optimization as
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well as by the level of real income4 , and to keep the 
model enough small to be tractable analytically. In 
eq.l) we state that "real" demand for foreign assets is 
always equal to the real value in domestic currency of 
the outstanding stock of foreign assets. Demand for 
financial wealth is expressed as a positive function 
of: a) the differential between foreign and domestic 
real interest rates0 ; b) the expected rate of change of 
the real exchange rate, set equal to its actual rate of 
change under the familiar assumption of perfect 
foresight in the financial markets. Perfect flexibility 
of the exchange rate ensures continuous clearing in the 
market for foreign assets. The parameter 0 in eq.l) 
represents the impact that a change in the relative 
rates of return has on demand for foreign assets. A 
more general, non linear specification of 1) might be 
obtained referring to microeconomic models where agents 
optimize portfolio choices for given combinations of 
risk and return. More properly, 0 should be expressed 
as a function of the expected variances of relative 
prices as well as of the expected rates of return of
4Branson did not consider output fluctuations 
5We define i* as the real foreign interest rate because 
we assume for simplicity that the foreign price level 
is stable
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domestic and foreign assets. In order to maintain the 
linear form it is assumed that the variances of the 
terms of trade and of the exchange rate are constant. 
We also ignore the effect of changes of i and ir on 0. 
Eq.l) can be rearranged in the form:
2) da =(i-dp)-i* + (a+F)/0 ;
(a+F)/0 being the risk premium, that is, the 
compensation agents require for holding assets 
denominated in foreign currency. It depends positively 
on the outstanding stock of foreign assets and is 
negatively related to 0. The more sensitive is demand 
for foreign assets to changes in the relative returns 
on assets, the bigger is 0, so that the risk premium 
becomes less relevant. When 0 —^  ® agents in the 
financial markets are approximately risk neutral and 
eq.2) corresponds to the uncovered interest parity 
condition that is assumed to hold in the Dornbusch 
model.
3)m-p = k ay - kEi;
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Eq.3) is a standard demand for money function where m
is the domestic money supply and y represents output
deviations from the natural rate. a more general 
specification would have included real financial wealth 
as an argument of eq.l) and 3), but it would have 
introduced further complications and would have 
rendered the model difficult to treat analytically.
We then describe the goods sector
4) y = D ;
5) D = a[x* + pa + V ] ;
6) V= x(a+F) -o(i-dp) -6s;
he set of eq.4)-6) states that output, defined in terms 
of deviations from the natural rate, is always equal to 
aggregate demand, D. a is the familiar income 
multiplier, p describes the impact of the real exchange 
rate on the trade balance, foreign demand for domestic 
goods is determined by the terms of trade and an 
exogenous shift factor.x*. The country is assumed to
be small in the market for foreign inputs, so that
domestic demand does not influence foreign prices. On 
the other hand we assume that domestic firms face a 
downward sloped demand curve in the world markets;
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quantities of exported goods rise only if the real
exchange rate is devalued. V describes the individual
sources of domestic demand. Consumption decisions 
depend on disposable income, financial wealth and the 
real interest rate. Investment depends on the current
real interest rate, too. The description of domestic
demand is completed by the inclusion of a shift factor 
which represents domestic fiscal policy, in the form of 
an income tax rate.
Price stickiness is one of the sources of 
disequilibrium in the model®.
7) dp = €y + d m ;
In eq.7 we assume that domestic inflation responds to :
a) deviations of current output from the natural rate;
b)the rate of change of the money supply.
The price level is pre-determined but eq.7 implies that 
inflation instantaneously responds to shocks and embeds 
some kind of forward looking behaviour through the link 
with the money supply rate of growth, although this
6the second one being the sluggish adjustment of 
financial wealth
direct connection might be regarded as too simplistic7 . 
Although a more sophisticated representation of the 
sluggish adjustment of both prices and wages, possibly 
including forward looking behaviour, would have been 
desirable, the need of making algebraic analysis of the 
model as easy as possible has suggested the choice of 
eq.7). It has been argued elsewhere® that the selected 
form of price dynamics within the class of pre­
determined price equations is of second order 
importance. Therefore the choice of eq.7 should not 
undermine the relevance of our model. However a more 
satisfactory description of wage-price dynamics will be 
presented in the next chapters.
8) d m = 0 ;
In eq. 9 we assume that the government adopts a fixed 
money supply rule®.
7For a closed economy model where core inflation is a 
weighted average of backward and forward looking 
behaviour see Taylor (1979)
8Engel and Frankel (1984)
9This assumption bears no influence on the stability 
analysis, which is the main issue to be discussed in 
this chapter.
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Wealth accumulation is defined as follows.
9) dF= T + i*F0 + ifoF;
10) T = x"* + pa -yy;
In eq.9 we show that foreign wealth accumulation is 
equal to the current account balance. This, in turn, is 
determined by the trade balance, T, and by returns on 
foreign investment, that we have linearized around 
equilibrium in order to assess the effects of a foreign 
interest rate shock. if0 and F0 are the initial levels 
of the interest rate and of foreign wealth10 . The trade 
balance depends on foreign demand for domestic goods 
and on imports, which are linked to the level of 
output.
3.The reduced form of the model
We shall undertake the reduction of the model in steps. 
Substituting eq.5), 6), 7), into eq.3) and 4) we get
"reduced form" equations for the endogenous non dynamic
lOFor a similar description of the current account see 
Smith (1989)
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variables, y and i , in terms of the endogenous dynamic 
variables, a, F, p, and the forcing variables, m, s, 
i f , x * .
(11)y = x[x* +'(p+x)a + xF -6s -(o/k2 )(p-m)]
(12)i = (ka/k2 )rc[x* + (P*x)a + xF -6s]-
- (m-p)[1-Eao]{k2 [1-ao(G-ka/k2 )]}-l
i and y depend on foreign demand for domestic goods, 
the tax rate, real financial wealth and real money 
balances. The term 
k = a/[1-ao(6-ka/k2 )]
is the familiar total multiplier of the IS-LM model, 
where the real interest rate is taken into account 
instead of the nominal interest rate. l-ao(€-ka/kB ) 
shows the feedback effects of output changes on 
aggregate demand, which operate through the real 
interest rate. The term k a/k2 represents the impact of 
output changes on the nominal rate, determined in the 
money market. E measures the effect of output
variations on inflation. E and ki/k2 work in opposite
directions. An increase in output raises demand for
money and pushes up the interest rate. On the other
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hand higher inflation lowers the real interest rate and 
stimulates aggregate demand. The former effect should 
be considered an endogenous "controller" of output and 
inflation, the latter is unambiguously destabilizing11. 
Throughout the chapter we shall assume that 
(G-ka/ke )<0,
that is , an increase in output raises the real 
interest rate. It is now clear that increases of a, F, 
x* raise output and the interest rate, whereas higher 
taxes depress output and lower the interest rate. The 
influence of real money balances on i cannot be defined 
a priori. Suppose that monetary policy takes an 
expansionary stance. The real interest rate falls: 
d(i-dp)/dm=-[l-ao(G-ka/k2 )]- 1 .
This, in turn, stimulates output and raises real demand 
for money and the interest rate. The condition l-€ao<0 
means that if an increase of the money supply causes a 
more than proportional increment of inflation12 the 
expansion of output is so strong that eventually 
determines an increase of the interest rate.
Let us turn now to the reduced form of the full model.
H T h i s  issue has been investigated in the seminal work 
of Cagan(1956)
12We refer to the impact of the money supply on 
inflation because the stronger is this effect, the 
bigger the reduction of the real interest rate and the 
output expansion.
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Substituting eq.8, 10, 11, 12 into eq.7, 2, 9 we get:
11) d p = [Gxo/k2](m-p) + [ G x ( p + x ) ] a + [ G x x ] F - [ G x 6 ] s +
+ [Gx]x*
12)da = (p-m)/k2 [1-ao(G-k*/k2 )]
+ {0-1-[(G-k1/k2 )j:(P + x)]}a +
+ {(0-1 - (G-k1/ke )xx}F - 
- [(G-ka/k«)](x- - 6s) -i*
13)dF = (pxo)(p-m) + {p-px(p + x ) } a + [i^o-prctjF + [px6]s
+ [l-pjrlx* + F0i#
From eq.ll it is straightforward to argue that a 
depreciation of the exchange rate, an exogenous 
increase of foreign demand for domestic goods, an 
expansion of real money balances and of foreign wealth 
spur inflation, whereas fiscal policy has a 
deflationary impact.
Positive variations of a, F, x*, raise the real 
interest rate. This in turn, requires the expectation 
of a devaluation if demand and supply of foreign assets 
are to be in equilibrium (eq.12). On the other hand an 
expansion of real money balances and a fiscal
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contraction lower the real exchange rate and require 
the expectation of an appreciation.
From eq.13 it is clear that both a and F have a
positive direct impact on the current account, due to
the real exchange rate and to the foreign interest rate 
respectively. On the other hand a and F have an
indirect effect, which feeds through the propensity to
import. It would seem reasonable to assume that the
exports growth generated by a devaluation should be
stronger than the imports flow generated by the export- 
led growth of income. But the model accounts for a
second terms of trade effect on aggregate demand: the
capital gains, in real terms, on domestic holdings of 
foreign assets that would be caused by a devaluation of 
relative prices. This effect, too, weakens the total 
impact of a terms of trade devaluation on the current 
account. Nevertheless we shall assume that a
devaluation actually improves the current account
balance, as this seems to be now widely accepted in the
economic profession13. Furthermore, we have some
theoretical14 and empirical1® support to believe that x 
is rather small. In fact it seems to be generally
13See Vines et a l . (1989)
14Modigliani (1966) 
15Currie et a l . 1986
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accepted that wealth effects take a long time to 
significantly influence the economy16.
The size of pxx is very important for determining the 
effect on the current account of foreign assets 
changes. An increase of foreign assets expands 
aggregate demand and sucks in more imports, thereby 
worsening the current account. On the other hand higher 
interest payments on foreign investment improve it. 
Although one would expect that x>if0 , the net effect on 
wealth accumulation cannot be determined a priori 
because we have a presumption that prc<l. If pxx is big 
enough a negative deviation of F from equilibrium 
causes a reduction of imports greater than the 
corresponding fall of interest payments on foreign 
investment,henceforth the current account improves and 
F is pushed back to equilibrium. We will consider the 
sign of 
if0-incx
as undetermined, and indeed the discussion of stability 
will focus on this aspect.
16Engel and Flood, (1985)
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4 .Stability analysis
The analysis of the conditions which are necessary 
and sufficient for stability to obtain is rather 
complex once the standard framework of the second order 
dynamic system is abandoned and the model becomes third 
order.To facilitate the interpretation of the stability 
conditions of the full system we begin with the 
assumption that € = 0, therefore no price dynamics can 
occur when dm = 0. At this stage the model might be
regarded as a combination of two simpler models. In the 
first output is fixed and wealth and exchange rate 
dynamics interact because foreign and domestic assets 
are imperfect substitutes, as in the Branson model. In 
the second uncovered interest parity holds but output 
fluctuates. We shall discuss the stability conditions 
of these two simpler models separately, and then 
analyze their implications for the stability of the 
full model.
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4.1.The stability condition for the fixed price, fixed
output model
If dp = y = 0 the model becomes17 :
14) da = (a + F)/0 -i*
15) dF = (5a + i*0F + x~
E q .14 and 15 are indeed qualitatively identical to the
reduced form of the Branson model.
The roots of the characteristic equation of this system 
are :
9a = {-(i'o+1/0) - [(ifo + l / 0 ) 2 + 4 ( p - i * o )/0]}O.5 
0 2 = {-( i #o + l/0) + [(i f o + l / 0 )2 + 4 ( p - i f o ) / 0 ] } O . 5
For the system to be saddlepath stable we need (0- 
ifo )>0. This is exactly the stability condition derived 
for the Branson model. To grasp the economic intuition 
behind this result we shall make use of the familiar
17Note that in this case nominal and real exchange rate 
dynamics must coincide because p is fixed
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state space diagram.
da = 0: 16 a = -F + i*o/0
dF = 0: 17 a = -(i%/p)F - x*/0
The locus aa in graphs 1 and 2 describes eq.16. It is 
negatively sloped because a fall of foreign assets must 
be compensated for by an exchange rate depreciation, so 
that the valuation of wealth in domestic currency stays 
constant. This is the necessary condition for the 
financial market to be in equilibrium at da = 0 
The locus FF, describing the combinations of a and F 
which are consistent with current account equilibrium, 
is negatively sloped, too. This because after a fall of
F an exchange rate depreciation is necessary to balance
the current account. The economic interpretation of the 
stability condition may be stated as follows.
Suppose that the stock of foreign assets is 
initially below its equilibrium level. As a result a 
positive exchange rate jump will be necessary to 
generate the current account surplus which will restore
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the equilibrium level of foreign assets. For the 
current account to be in surplus it is necessary that 
the exchange rate jump sets the point representing the 
initial combination of a and F above the FF locus,
which means that the rise of exports must be stronger 
than the fall of returns on foreign investment. On the 
other hand, if the exchange rate depreciation is to be 
followed by a convergent exchange rate dynamics the
initial combination of a and F must lie below the aa
line: the domestic valuation of foreign wealth after
the jump must be lower than in equilibrium, so that the 
expectation of an exchange rate appreciation is 
necessary for the financial sector to be in 
equilibrium. If otherwise the initial devaluation would 
be followed by cumulative depreciation. For these two 
conditions to be satisfied it is necessary that the 
locus aa is steeper than the FF, that is, (p-i*o )>0. In 
this case, graph 1, a possibility exists for the 
initial exchange rate jump to determine a current 
account surplus and to be followed by an exchange rate 
appreciation, so that dynamics may converge1®. If the 
FF is steeper than the aa, graph 2, it is impossible
18This happens if the transversality condition holds
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for agents to select an initial exchange rate level 
such that dynamics converge: the model is unstable.
_4._2._T,he stabi 1 i ty condition for the fixed price ,
flexible output model under the P„s_sumpt.i.qn_ of perfect
_capital mobility
Let us turn now to the analysis of a model where p is 
fixed, uncovered interest parity holds and output 
fluctuations occur. Its reduced form is:
18) da = [ka/k2 ) jca ( p + x ) ] a + [ (k a/k2 ) % a x ] F + G a
19) dF = [p-pxa (p + x )]a + [if0-p^1t]F + Ga
where Ga and G2 represent the set of forcing variables 
we are not interested in for the moment.
Xa. = a / (1 + aoka/ka) corresponds to the jc coefficient 
analyzed above under the assumption that the price 
level is fixed.
The roots of the characteristic equation are 
0a = 0.5[L + (L2+4T)1/2 
02 = 0 5[L - (L2+4T)1/2
where L = {k*/k2 ) a (p + x )/jra } + ifD - px/Jti 
T = (ka/ka )a[p (x-i*0 ) - n f0 ]/iTi)
For the system to be saddlepath stable we need
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20)p(x-ifo ) - xifo>0,
but that is not guaranteed. At this stage the familiar 
state space diagram might be helpful. The loci 
representing combinations of a and F such that no terms 
of trade or wealth dynamics occur are defined as 
foilows
da=0: 21) a = - [x/(jl + x)]F + Ga
dF = 0 : 22) a = -{[ifo - pirax]/[p - prca (p+x)}F +G2
The locus aa represents combinations of a and F that
leave da= 0. Its slope is unambiguously negative. This 
can be explained as follows. When F is below 
equilibrium, the low level of wealth has a deflationary 
impact on aggregate demand, so that the real interest 
rate falls. This would require, for the financial 
markets to be in equilibrium, the expectation of an 
exchange rate appreciation. Therefore, in order to 
achieve da = 0, the exchange rate must depreciate to 
compensate for the negative impact of lower foreign 
wealth in aggregate demand. In fact, along the aa locus 
output is constant at the natural rate. Points to the
rjjgh „t„__pf a a are assoc ,.i at. e,.d with levels of output and
the real ijntjexest. rate which are above equilibrium. and
therefore a cumulative terms of jtr_a.de depreciation .
whij_s t „„.p.„Q„ i _n,.t.s to the „„„1 ef t__ of the, a a curve are
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associated wi.th continuous appreciation . Let us
consider now the locus FF, representing combinations of 
a and F that leave the current account in equilibrium. 
Its slope can be either positive or negative according 
to the sign of i*o-pax/xa . For the moment we assume 
that:
i * o -  piCiX < 0 .
The FF curve is positively sloped, graph 3. Shocks to F 
trigger a self stabilizing dynamic process of wealth 
accumulation because the variation of imports is 
bigger than the corresponding change of interest 
payments on foreign investment. In this case the model 
is saddlepath stable. After a negative shock to F 
output and the interest rate fall. This requires the 
expectation of an appreciation: the exchange rate must 
overshoot. However, the combination of a and F after 
the exchange rate jump must be represented by a point 
below the aa locus, so that the expectation of an 
appreciation is actually generated. As long as i*o~ 
pjuax < 0 this point will certainly be associated with a 
current account surplus. Therefore if agents in the 
financial markets choose the appropriate initial terms 
of trade jump the economy converges to equilibrium.
Let us now discuss the case where:
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i*o > VlJTaX
The FF locus Is negatively sloped. Combinations of F 
and a represented by points above the FF locus are 
associated with surpluses; points to fche left of FF 
correspond to deficits. After a fall of F the self- 
stabilizing mechanism embedded in the wealth 
accumulation process cannot work: the change of foreign 
payments originating from a deviation of foreign wealth
GRAPH 3
aa
FF
F
lOg
GRAPH 4
aa
a
FF
P
FFa
GRAPH 5
aa
1*7
from equilibrium always dominates the corresponding 
variation of imports. Only a terms of trade devaluation 
can generate a current account surplus and restore the 
equilibrium level of financial wealth. For F to move 
back into equilibrium the terms of trade jump must be 
such that the initial combination of F and a is 
represented by a point above the FF locus, thereby 
causing dF to be positive. But this initial point must 
also be located to the left of the aa locus, otherwise 
exchange rate dynamics would diverge. Hence stability 
requires that the aa is steeper than the F F . Graphs 4 
and 5 give a diagrammatic exposition of the two 
alternative outcomes.The algebraic condition ensuring 
that aa is steeper than FF is :
x/(0+x)>[i*o " yiTaX]/[P - UXa (P + x);
which corresponds to:
20)p(x-ifo ) - x i * o > 0 .
If i*0 > p ax only an exchange rate devaluation may
generate converging dynamics for wealth accumulation. 
But if condition 20 is not satisfied agents in the 
financial markets cannot select such a level of the 
exchange rate. If the initial overshooting is to be
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followed by an appreciation, wealth accumulation is 
negative. On the other hand, if the initial "jump" is 
to generate a current account surplus the initial 
combination of F and a must lie above the aa curve, 
which represents combination of foreign wealth and the 
real exchange rate such that output is constant. This 
implies that the improvement of the trade balance must 
be so strong that output will eventually expand and 
raise the interest rate. But in this case equilibrium 
in the financial markets will require a further
devaluation. Indeed the whole issue of stability 
eventually boils down to the requirement that after the 
necessary initial exchange rate jump the current
account surplus may be associated to an output level
which is below the natural rate despite the positive
influence of the devaluation, so that the interest rate 
falls and the exchange rate may gradually appreciate 
afterwards. But if the necessary depreciation raises 
output above the natural rate the model is unstable.
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4.3.The stability condition of the full model
We turn now to the stability analysis of the full 
model, which is inevitably more complex, the model 
being third order. The state space form of the model is 
defined as follows.
H = AZ + BG
where H' = [dp, da, dF] Z = [p, a, F] G = [X*, s, m,
if]
Ga x / jt 
(l/0)-(G-ki/k2 )ax/jr
i*0-pax/jr
B =
Gao/keX -Ga6/jt
l/k2rc < (G-ka/k2 ) a6/jr } + 1 /0
-yao/it pa6/x
The sign of the roots of the characteristic equation 
I A-6I| = 0 cannot be analytically determined anymore.
Ga/ k 0
l/k2rc -1
1-pa/x F0
A =
-Gao/k2x Ga(P+x)/x
l/k2jr {- (G-ka/k2 )a ( p + x ) /tc } + l/0
yao/x p-ya(p + x)/jc
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Nevertheless, looking at the coefficients of the 
characteristic equation it is possible to draw some 
meaningful conclusions. Having defined 
| A-6 Ig = 0a + bi0e + b20 + ba = 0 
it can be shown that
- b a  = 0 3 + CD 10 + C
D
09 I
I 3 1 1 ^ 3 8 2 ^ 3 8 8
b 2 0 3 0 2  +  0 3  0 a + 0 x 0 2  =  3 i i 3 s a  — 3 x a 3 a x  +  8 8 2 8 1 1
a  a  2  3  e  i + a 2 e ^ 3 3  — a  3  2 a  2  a
O
'
09 I
I 1t Al
If the determinant of the dynamic matrix is negative 
the system cannot be saddlepath stable. In fact, if 
|A|<0 the characteristic equation has either 1 or 3 
roots with negative real parts. Blanchard and Kahn 
(1980) have shown that for this class of models to be 
stable the number of non pre-determined variables must 
equal the number of roots with positive real parts. The 
model admits only one non pre-determined variable, 
henceforth saddlepath stability is precluded when 
|A|<0. In this case the model must be either unstable 
(two roots with positive real parts) or globally stable 
(three negative roots) and undetermined in its 
dynamics.
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Stability therefore requires:
23) | A| = [(p-i*o )/0 + ptx-i'o) - iif0 ]6a/jrke > 0
Quite strikingly 23 is a combination of the two 
conditions necessary for stability to hold in the 
simpler models discussed above. Under perfect capital 
mobility 23 and 22 would exactly coincide: stability 
would obtain if it were possible for a depreciation to
be consistent with a current account surplus and to be
followed by an appreciation. Under imperfect capital 
mobility this condition is somewhat relaxed if1®: 
p - if0 > 0
However we would not emphasize this aspect too much as 
0 should be very big relatively to p - if0 .
Provided that 23 holds, coefficient b2 might provide
some further information on the roots of the
characteristic equation.
19Note that if p-i*<0 the model cannot be saddlepatyh 
stable anyway. Straightforward manipulations show that 
in this case
P ( x - i f 0 ) - t i f = t (p - i * o )- P i * o <0
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b 2 = - [ G a / k 2jr] [ (i f o + 0 - 1 )a + p + x ]+
+ [ i f o-p + yap/jr ] 0-1+ [ (ka/k2-€ >/% ] [ x ( i * D~P ) + pi f o ] 
b 2 <0 rules out the possibility that the roots of the 
characteristic equation have the same sign. If b 2 <0 
t h e system is either unstable, when |A|<0, or 
saddlepath stable, when |A|>0. We maintain that ( k i/k2 
- G)>0. If | A| > 0 then i* o-P<0 and x ( i fQ -p) +pi*'0<0 or 
very close to 0. Therefore we would reasonably argue 
that b 2 <0 and the system is stable.
Concluding the discussion of the stability issue, 
it would seem appropriate to point out that standard 
models a' la Dornbusch are unable to highlight the risk 
of instability inherent to open economies where the 
policy rule follows the orthodox monetarist 
prescriptions. Nor can models a' la Dornbusch and 
Fischer give more helpful insights.lt is only when a 
proper description of the current account is introduced 
and output fluctuation are considered, that the 
potential instability can be properly assessed. The 
Branson model points at the real exchange rate trade 
balance elasticity and at the foreign interest rate as 
the determinants of stability. Blanchard model simply 
requires the propensity to spend out of wealth to be
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bigger than the foreign interest rate. Our results 
suggest alternative conclusions. The model may be 
unstable if, when foreign assets are below equilibrium, 
a depreciation is necessary to improve the current 
account because the import leakages determined by lower 
domestic demand are dominated by the fall of foreign 
interest payments. In this case stability requires that 
the necessary devaluation does not set output above the 
natural rate. However, a proper evaluation of the 
instability risk would require a thorough examination 
of empirical evidence about the key parameters.
5.Comparative statics and dynamic adjustment
Equilibrium values of the endogenous variables are 
obtained from the state space form of the model setting 
dp=da=dF=0.
Z= (-1)A-1G
p = m - {k2 6 ( p - i fo ) / 0 [ p ( t - i fo )+ (p-i fo )/0 -xi*0 ]}s +
+ (ke [(p -i*0 ) - T i * o - p F o ] / [ p ( T - i * o ) +  (p-i*o )/0 - t i fo ] } i f
+ { k e [(i*o )/0[P(T-i*o)+ (p-i*o )/0 -Ti*o]}X-
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a = -6i*0s/[P (x-if0 )+ (p-i*o )/0 -xif0 ]
- { o i f o + ( x + l / 0 ) F o / [ P ( x - i f o ) +  ( P -  i  * *>) /  0 - x i f 0 } i f  
- {  ( x - i * o  + l / 0 ) / [ p ( x - i * o  +. 1 / 0 )  - i f o ( P  + l / 0 ) ] } x ~
F = +6ps/[p(x-i*0 )+ <P-i*o)/« -xl£0]
+{op+(P+x+ l/0)Fo/[P(x-i*o )+ (p-iro )/0 -xif0 ])if 
+{(x+o/0)/[p(x-i*o)+ ('P“i*o ).o/0 -xif0]}x*
The money supply has no permanent effect on real 
variables. In equilibrium monetary shocks affect the 
price level only, leaving terms of trade and foreign 
assets unchanged. The initial terms of trade jump can 
been expressed as a function of the deviation of pre­
determined variables from their equilibrium values. 
a(0)-a_= Tj(p0-p-).+ T e ( F 0 - F„ )
where (x0-x_) is the initial deviation of each 
endogenous dynamic variable from its equilibrium 
value,a(0) is the level of the real exchange rate after 
its initial jump, [1, Tl, T2] is the left eigenvector 
associated with the unstable root of A. The system is 
too complex for an analytical determination of the 
signs of Tl and T2 to be carried out. The analysis of
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simpler models and numerical simulations20 have shown 
that when the money supply increases the terms of trade 
must initially overshoot. This result cannot be 
guaranteed for more complex models like the one we are 
dealing with. However, it must be emphasized that terms 
of trade deviations from equilibrium will necessarily 
generate wealth accumulation/decumulation which must be 
reversed later on, given that monetary shocks are 
neutral in the long run21 . This contradicts one of the 
basic and most widely accepted results of the Dornbusch 
model:the fact that after a monetary shock adjustment 
is monotonic and both the exchange rate and the price 
level smoothly adjust to their long run values. This is 
obviously due to to third order dynamics, taking into 
account the process of foreign wealth accumulation as 
well as price and terms of trade dynamics. Fiscal 
policy moves the equilibrium terms of trade and the 
stock of foreign assets in opposite directions2 2 .An 
increase in real taxation leads to a permanently higher 
stock of foreign assets. Current account equilibrium 
requires that higher interest payments on foreign debt 
must be matched by lower net exports. This implies a
20Smi th (1989)
21A similar result has been obtained by Driskill (1981) 
22As in Smith (1989)
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terms of trade revaluation. Once again the model 
contradicts the popular wisdom that after a fiscal 
contraction the terms of trade depreciation is 
necessary in order to keep aggregate demand in 
equilibrium. Higher real taxation will also permanently 
alters the interest rate differential because of the 
higher risk premium commanded by increased holdings of 
foreign assets; the lower 0 the more powerful is the 
effect of fiscal policy on i, with relevant 
implications for capital accumulation. Unfortunately 
these effects cannot be properly analyzed under the 
assumptions made here. In the money market the fall of 
i raises demand for money, so that in equilibrium the 
domestic price level is lower. After an exogenous rise 
of foreign demand domestic holdings of foreign assets 
rise and the exchange rate appreciates.The valuation of 
foreign wealth in domestic currency increases: 
a + F = i*0x V [ p ( T - i * 0 )+ (p-i*o)/0 - x i * 0 ]
As a consequence, the domestic interest rate must fall, 
because the risk premium is higher. In the goods market 
the terms of trade appreciation offsets the initial 
shock and the inflationary pressures originating from 
the rise of F and the fall of i.
An increase of the real foreign interest rate affects
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the financial markets and the current account, the 
latter effect being different from the former because 
it depends on the sign and amplitude of the initial 
stock of foreign assets, Fo. The portfolio reallocation 
following the foreign interest rate rise raises 
domestic holdings of foreign assets as well as interest 
payments on foreign investment, to be offset by a terms 
of trade revaluation. The domestic interest rate will 
change as well, in order to keep aggregate demand at 
its equilibrium level. Under perfect capital mobility 
di = di*. If capital is not perfectly mobile the change 
of i will in general be lower than the change in if . 
When the combination of parameters is very close to 
zero, in other words when the system is not very far 
from falling into the instability trap, it is possible 
that an increase in i* causes i to fall.This stresses 
the role of capital mobility in determining both the 
stability of the model and the equilibrium values of 
some of its variables, namely the domestic interest 
rate and the price level. To a certain extent a lower 
degree of capital mobility will isolate the economy's 
equilibrium position from shocks originating abroad. 
Also, the lower 0 the more powerful is the effect of 
fiscal policy on i, with relevant implications for
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capital accumulation. Unfortunately these effects 
cannot be properly analyzed under the assumptions made 
here. The "current account" effect of a foreign 
interest rate change depends on F0 . If the country is 
initially a net creditor domestic holdings of foreign 
assets increase and the exchange rate appreciates. The 
valuation of foreign wealth in domestic currency must 
rise:
d(a+F)/di*= 0FO .
As a consequence the risk premium rises and the 
domestic interest rate falls correspondingly. 
Equilibrium in the money market requires higher real 
money balances, so that the price level is lower. It is 
now clear that one cannot state a priori the overall 
impact of a foreign interest rate change on endogenous 
variables.
6. Conclusions
The model is an extremely simplified representation of 
an open economy under a monetarist policy rule. A 
fundamental weakness is the insufficient description of 
the stock accumulation process. The stock-flow 
mechanism operating through the current account is 
analyzed but no discussion is provided of "policy
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induced" accumulation of money and government bonds 
through fiscal imbalances. Also, the process of capital 
accumulation is kept out of the picture. However, these 
shortcomings are common to most of the literature on 
the field.
Basically the model highlights the implications 
for stability and comparative statics arising from the 
inclusion in the Dornbusch model of of imperfect 
capital mobility and wealth effects. Comparative 
statics shows that the standard Fleming-Mundel1- 
Dornbusch result about the effect of a permanent fiscal 
change is reversed once wealth effects and the current 
account identity are considered. In the long run a 
fiscal expansion depreciates the terms of trade in 
order to restore current account equilibrium at a lower 
level of returns from foreign investment. When a 
monetary "surprise" occurs the model shows that, if the 
money supply is to be neutral in the long run, the 
dynamic path towards equilibrium cannot be monotonic. 
Temporary current account imbalances must be reversed 
in the future. When a devaluation is needed to improve 
the current account, but at the same time this 
devaluation raises output above the natural rate, the 
model is unstable under the assumption of perfect
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capital mobility. On the other hand, the lower the 
degree of capital mobility the more likely is the 
system to be stable. The empirical relevance of these 
results is obviously questionable. Nevertheless, on 
theoretical grounds, the model casts serious doubts on 
the desirability of monetarist policies relying on a 
priori assumptions about the self stabilizing 
properties of the economic system.
But even assuming that the model is stable, the 
policy rule might not satisfactorily protect the 
economy from shocks originating abroad. In addition to 
the already well known result about the interdependence 
arising from short term price stickyness23 the model 
points at the foreign interest rate and at foreign 
demand for domestic goods as the transmission channels 
that enable foreign shocks to affect the equilibrium 
values of real domestic variables. The amplitude of the 
necessary shifts in the equilibrium position of the 
system is inherently connected to the stability 
condition. The lower p(x-i*)-xi* and the higher the 
degree of capital mobility, the wider the amplitude of 
the necessary adjustment of endogenous variables to 
foreign shocks.
230bstfeld, (1985)
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CHAPTER 4
SIMPLE POLICY RULES FOR THE OPEN ECONOMY: EVALUATING 
ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS .
1.Introduction
The design of macroeconomic stabilization policies 
has undergone a thorough revision over the last few 
years. After the collapse of monetarism as a philosophy 
of economic policy making, many in the economic 
profession have suggested the abandonment of open-loop 
rules in favour of more "interventionist" policies. 
However, an important legacy of monetarism is the 
emphasis on the importance of rules that stabilize the 
economy because they are known to the private sector 
and perceived as credible. The search for simple feed­
back rules that work better than open-loop policies and 
are credible because of the government's pre-commitment 
and because, being simple, are easy to understand and 
to monitor, has been an important feature of recent 
work in the field of macroeconomic policies. Several 
proposals have been advocated that are concerned with 
macroeconomic stabilization in open economies, all 
belonging to the class of "decoupled" control rules, 
that contemplate the assignment of each instrument to a 
specific target. They differ in the number of
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instruments and objectives and/or assign the same 
policy weapon to different targets.
The first rule we consider is akin to the standard 
"monetarist" policy, as it is concerned only with 
monetary control of domestic inflation. It involves a 
real interest rate feed-back on a nominal income 
target, instead of the traditional fixed rate of growth 
of the money supply.
The second rule adds fiscal control of a foreign 
wealth target to the assignment of monetary policy to 
the nominal income target.
The third rule reverses this assignment: fiscal
policy is concerned with the domestic target and 
monetary policy controls the foreign wealth target.
The fourth rule implements the "target zones" 
proposal as it has been spelled out in Willi amson 
(1987) and Edison, Miller, and Williamson (1987).
Attempts to make a comparative evaluation of some 
of these rules have already been carried out with the 
aid of large econometric models (Currie and Wren-Lewis, 
1988, Frenkel, Goldstein and Masson, 1988). But those 
simulations overlook a key feature of the working of 
the international economic system: the link between
cumulating current account imbalances, foreign interest
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payments and wealth effects in domestic demand. This
paper investigates this issue in the context of a small 
open economy. We shall also present some algebraic 
results about the dynamic stability of the economy
under each assignment and the permanent effects that
real and monetary shocks have on variables whose 
control is not contemplated in the proposals. Finally, 
numerical simulations of a small theoretical model will 
give some insights on the dynamic performance of the 
economy under the alternative assignments.
The main conclusions of the chapter are summarized 
as follows. First, the algebraic analysis of the model 
under each rule shows that the monetarist rule is prone 
to the same risk of instability discussed in the former 
chapter, whereas this does not happen under the other 
assignments. Second, when permanent real shocks hit the 
economy the necessary permanent variations of foreign 
wealth and the exchange rate are substantially larger 
under a monetarist policy. Assignments three and four, 
involving fiscal control of the domestic objective, are 
relatively more effective at stabilizing inflation, 
foreign wealth and the exchange rate, but involve 
significantly wider swings of the tax rate. Third, 
under each assignment disinflation policy requires an
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output loss, but the target zones regime also requires 
a permanent redistribution of foreign wealth and a 
corresponding permanent variation of the equilibrium 
exchange rate. Fourth, assignment two avoids the danger 
of instability inherent to a monetarist rule, 
substantially limits permanent changes of foreign 
wealth and the exchange rate, does not require wide 
swings of fiscal policy.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. 
Section 2 describes the small open economy model and 
the parameter values we use for the simulations. 
Section 3 discusses the rationale for each policy 
assignment. Section 4 presents the algebraic results 
and evaluates the dynamic performance of the economy.
2.THE MODEL
The structural equations combine three popular strands 
of the literature about open economy models which have 
developed in the 70's, mainly originating from the 
seminal works of Dornbusch (1976), Branson (1979) and 
Dornbusch and Fischer (1981). In fact it represents a 
more complex version1 of the model discussed in chapter
lUnlike the models discussed in the former chapters, 
the present one is defined in levels and not in logs. 
This because in the numerical simulations we make use 
of the plausible parameters presented in Currie et al.,
(1986), whose model is defined in levels.
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3. We follow Dornbusch in assuming that prices in the 
financial markets adjust to shocks much faster than 
prices in the goods markets, but we consider a more 
complex, albeit standard description of inflation
dynamics. On the other hand we emphasize, as Branson
and Dornbusch and Fischer do, the importance of the 
current account for determining the equilibrium
exchange rate: in fact we append the current account
equation to what would otherwise be a simple open
economy model of the Dornbusch type. As in chapter 3 we 
consider wealth effects in aggregate demand. The
country is assumed to be "small" in the market for 
imported goods, whilst world demand for domestic goods 
is represented by a downward sloped curve. World 
interest rates are not affected by domestic financial 
policies. We shall carry out numerical simulations of 
the model as an informative complement to the 
analytical results to be discussed in section 3. The 
plausible parameter values we use are mainly drawn from 
Currie et al.(1986)2
2Unlike the models discussed in the former chapters, 
the present one is defined in levels and not in logs. 
This because the plausible parameters presented in 
Currie et a l . are referred to a model which is 
specified in levels.
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Table 1: the model
(deviations from equilibrium) 
Numerical simulations 
Block 1
Output and inflation
1)dp = dw + dx;
lb)dx = da -€i[x - (p/l-p)aj;
2)dw = Gy + x ;
3)y = a [pa-H3 ]+xaF-aor-a6s+HH ; 
4 ) dx = <D ( dp-x ) ;
5 ) x = 0 € z + ® x + H 1 ;
Block 2
Wealth accumulation
7) aF = a0F + F0a;
8)dF = T + rfF ;
9) T = pa - py - Ha ;
Block 3
Exchange rate dynamics
10)Eda = da
11) Eda = r-r*;
Block 4
Policy assignments3
Assignment 1: a "monetarist" rule
12)dr = ki(y0dp + pQdy) + 0.5ka (yop + pQy);
Assignment 2: "Meade" rule
13) dr = ki(y0dp + pDdy) + 0.5ka (yop + pDy); 
14 ) ds = -k2dF;
Assignment 3: reversed "Meade" rule
15) ds = nj (y0dp + p0dy) + 0.5na.(yop + pQy);
16)dr = nzd F ;
Assignment 4: "target zones" rule
17) ds = na(yDdp + pQdy) + 0.5na (yop + pDy);
3variables are defined in levels, hence nominal income 
must be linearized around the initial equilibrium,
p0y 0 , Po = i , y D = ioo.
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Definition of variables
y = output deviations from the natural rate; 
a = real exchange rate;
F = net domestic holdings of foreign assets, 
denominated in foreign currency; 
r = real interest rate; 
s = income tax rate; 
p = index of consumption prices; 
w = index of domestic wages; 
x = domestic price of imports from abroad 
x = core inflation;
z = cumulated deviations of output from equilibrium;
T = trade balance
Hl = inflation shock, (supply side shock)
H2 = domestic demand shock 
H3= competitiveness shock
Parameter values
a = 1.35; o = 134; <t> = 0.5; 6 = = 0.005; I = 0.08; 6
= 80; rf = 0.05; a0 = 1; k* = 0.59; k 2 = 0.017; n a = 1; 
n2 = 0.01
The model is split into four main blocks. Block 1
describes price dynamics in the goods markets. The
general price level is a weighted average of domestic 
and imported foreign goods. The price of domestic goods 
is set as a mark-up on production costs. Inflation is a 
weighted average of wage inflation and the rate of
change of the domestic price of imports from abroad, 
(eq.l). (Miller,1985) As in Miller et a l . (1987) we
assume that the latter variable gradually adjusts to
low interdependence high interdependence 
0.3 
0 . 3
0 . 1
0 . 1
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exchange rate "surprises"; its dynamics follow a 
standard "error correction" mechanism.(eq .lb) Domestic 
wages are a pre-determined or "sluggish" variable, 
whose dynamic path is described as an augmented 
Phillips curve, (eq.2) (Miller,1985 ) Output deviations 
from the natural rate are entirely determined by 
demand, which depends on the real exchange rate, wealth 
effects, the real interest rate and fiscal 
policy.(e q .3) Parameter a is the familiar Kahnian 
Keynesian multiplier. The core, underlying rate of 
in flation gradually adjusts to the actual rate of 
change of the price level, (eq.4) Therefore current 
core inflation depends on cumulated past deviations of 
output from equilibrium (eq.6) and on the current 
domestic price of foreign imports.(e q .5)
Block 2 describes wealth accumulation. The only form of 
wealth we consider here are net domestic holdings of 
assets denominated in foreign currency. The reason we 
do this is that we wish to emphasize the link between 
current account imbalances, wealth effects and the 
process of dynamic adjustment under alternative policy 
rules. Wealth is assumed to be held in domestic 
currency by domestic residents. In eq.7 we consider a 
linear approximation to its real value in domestic
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currency. To some extent the initial value of F, F0 , 
affects the dynamic performance of the model; to assess 
this we have carried out several simulations where F0 
varies in a range of ±30% of national output. In the 
current account equation (eq.8) we consider both the 
service of foreign investment and the trade balance 
(eq.9), which is determined by the cyclical position of 
domestic output and by the real exchange rate. This 
definition of the current account follows the work of 
Currie et a l . (1986) and Smith (1989). The numerical
simulations will allow for different values of the 
trade balance elasticities.
Block 3 refers to financial markets. Exchange rate 
expectations are forward-looking: under the assumption 
of perfect foresight expected and actual exchange rate 
changes always coincide (eq.10). Needless to say, the 
exchange rate is the only "free" or non pre-determlned 
variable. We assume that assets denominated in domestic 
and foreign currency are perfect substitutes - (eq.11). 
Block 4 defines targets, instruments and alternative 
policy assignments.
In the next sections we shall assume that the 
government controls a short-term rate of interest with 
the aim of setting a real interest rate which is
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assigned to the preferred target for monetary policy, 
as in Mi 11e r ,(1985), and Edison Miller and Williamson,
(1987). Fiscal policy is concerned with setting a rate 
of income tax.
Monetary targets have for long been the 
intermediate target for the internal objective, but if 
disturbances in international capital markets or shifts 
in the velocity of circulation occur, the setting of a 
fixed path for the money stock will lead to undesired 
fluctuations in the real exchange rate and output even 
in the absence of domestic inflationary pressures. More 
recently money GDP targets, initially advocated by 
Meade, have found wide acceptance, despite the 
criticism that if a target path for nominal income is 
specified, the policy implies a one for one trade-off 
between inflation and deviations of output from the 
natural rate. According to Fischer (1988) this might be 
difficult to accept for the policy-maker if it were to 
be put explicitly. Nonetheless we define nominal income 
as the domestic target when numerical simulations are 
carried out; the control rule will include both a 
proportional and an integral term.
The policy instrument assigned to the external 
objective is targeted on a stock variable: net domestic
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holdings of foreign assets. We shall discuss this 
choice in the next section.
To make the comparative evaluation of the policy 
proposals easier, we have "normalized" the parameters 
of the government reaction function, so that the anti- 
inflationary and the current account stabilizing 
policies have the same impact on aggregate demand under 
each rule. Hence the effect of a unit deviation from 
equilibrium of nominal income is constrained to be: 
oka = 6n2 = Qa ;
Unit deviations from equilibrium of the foreign wealth 
target have the following impact on output4 :
|oka | = |bn2 | = |02 | ,
This procedure, which corresponds to the one followed 
by Edison, Miller and Williamson (1987), is obviously 
open to criticism because of its "naivete", but has the 
advantage of being easy to implement. The arguments for 
and against each of the proposed policy assignments are 
spelled out in some detail in the next section.
40nly the absolute value of the impact on output of 
wealth control can be normalized, as under assignments 
2 a low level of wealth triggers a tax rise whereas 
under assignment 3 the real interest rate is reduced
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Table 2: the simplified model (algebraic analysis)
(deviations from equilibrium)
Algebraic analysis
Block 1
Output and inflation
lc)dp = dw + pda;
2)dw = Ey + x ;
3)y=a[pa + Ha ]+xaF-aor-a6s+H2 ;
4 ) dx = ( dp-x ) ;
5b) x = jOEz + 4>pa + Ha ;
6) z = [y d 'r
Block 2
Wealth accumulation
7) aF = a0F + F0a;
8)dF = T + rfF;
9) T = pa - py + Ha ;
Block 3
Exchange rate dynamics
10)Eda = da
11 ) Eda = r-r£
Block 4
Policy assignments
Assignment 1: a "monetarist" rule
12b ) r = k xx;
Assignment 2: "Meade" rule
13b)r = k ax;
14)s = -k2F;
Assignment 3: reversed "Meade" rule
1 5 b ) s = n a^
16)r = n2F ;
Assignment 4: "target zones" rule
1 7 b ) s = n ax
In order to keep the model tractable when carrying 
out the algebraic analysis of the stability conditions
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under alternative assignments we have decided to make 
some useful simplifications. Domestic core inflation 
has been selected as the internal target, and the 
policy feed-back has been limited to the proportional 
term, although this implies that long run stability of 
the price level cannot be achieved. But one should also 
bear in mind that keeping the price level stable might 
require wide fluctuations and prolonged persistence of 
disequi1ibria so that a more "accomodative" policy rule 
like the one proposed here might turn out to be 
preferable. Edison,Mi 11er and Williamson, (1987), adopt 
a nominal income rule but choose to endogenize the 
money GDP path in order to dampen fluctuations, so that 
the target is revised at each period by taking into 
account past deviations of output and inflation from 
their desired values; as a result inflation control 
allows for substantial permanent deviations of the 
price level from its initial value. We do not follow 
their strategy because it would render the model 
analytically intractable. Hence we shall describe the 
policy assignments by means of eq.l2b), 13b), 15b) and 
17b), instead of eq.12), 13), 15) and 17).
As a further simplification we have assumed that 
the domestic price of foreign goods instantaneously
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adjusts to exchange rate shocks. Hence® eq. 1) is 
replaced with eq.lc.)dp = dw + pda.
3.Proposals for macroeconomic stabilization in open 
economies.
To some extent the debate on macroeconomic
stabilization has been concerned with the choice 
between fully optimal policies and simple feedback 
rules. We have chosen not to implement a fully 
optimizing rule. Optimal policies are shock contingent 
and usually have a complex dynamic structure, often 
difficult to understand and to implement. But 
exceedingly complex rules might raise serious problems 
of credibility (Fischer,1988). Furthermore, the 
literature on dynamic inconsistency, following the 
seminal work of Kydland and Prescott has stressed the 
importance of pre-commitment in the conduct of 
stabilization policy. Over the last few years more work 
has been devoted to the search for simple, linear 
feedback rules which, albeit sub-optimal, may be more 
easily understood and implemented, thereby enhancing 
the sustainability of the policy stabilization process. 
In this context simplicity means that the policy rule 
must have a simple dynamic structure and that it should
5this definition follows Miller(1985)
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respond to a restricted set of variables. Within this 
class fall the so called "decoupled" control rules
which assign each instrument to a single target
variable (Vines et al . , 1983) Following this approach,
we will explore the implications that some existing
proposals for policy stabilization have in terms of: a) 
the stability of the system; b) the permanent effects 
of shocks on some variables which are not directly 
controlled but whose evolution might well be object of 
legitimate concern for governments. In general no 
simple feed-back rule will dominate the others for all 
the shocks, however this exercise might be useful in 
the search for rules that perform reasonably well and 
are robust.(Edison, Miller, Williamson, 1987).
The first proposal we consider (eq.12), suggests 
that governments should focus on the internal 
objective, neglecting the evolution of the current 
account, whose balance is merely regarded as the result 
of saving-consumption decisions of the private sector. 
This proposal is deeply rooted in the monetary approach 
to the balance of payments®. Typically, its advocates 
assert that, as long as the budget is balanced, 
governments should not be concerned with external
6Frenkel and Johnson (1976)
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disequi1ibria simply because the private sector will 
not run a permanent deficit. We label this proposal as 
"monetarist", although it departs from the standard 
monetarist orthodoxy by setting a closed loop rule, 
because it is restricted to the use of monetary policy 
only and completely overlooks fiscal policy as a viable 
instrument for stabilization purpose. This approach 
seems open to criticism for two main reasons. First of 
all, external deficits increase the consumption of 
current generations at the expenses of the future ones 
(Cooper, 1985). It might be legitimate for governments 
to ensure that such a transfer is consistent with the 
collective preferences of the public (Boughton, 1988). 
Secondly, the danger of withdrawal on short notice 
might turn external debt into a serious threat to 
national independence (Dornbusch and Park,1988).
The second proposal, (eq.13 and 14), has been 
advocated, in a broad form, by Genberg-Svoboda (1988),
Boughton (1989) and the Cambridge Group working with
Meade. It combines monetary control of the domestic 
objective with the assignment of fiscal feedback to the 
current account. We see two intuitions underlying this 
assignment. The first is that neglecting the current
account balance is dangerous, partly because of the
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reasons stated above, partly because in the long run 
cumulating external imbalances require a real exchange 
rate adjustment and this is likely to complicate the 
task of controlling domestic inflation. The second is 
that fiscal policy has a comparative advantage over 
monetary policy when controlling the current account. 
Boughton (1989) has argued that whenever monetary 
policy becomes expansionary in order to depreciate the 
exchange rate and improve the trade balance, the gains 
from the terms of trade devaluation are at least partly 
offset by the higher volume of imports which is the 
direct consequence of the positive stimulus that lower 
interest rates exert on domestic demand.
To assess the relevance of this claim we have chosen to 
consider an alternative rule: fiscal control of
domestic inflation and assignment of monetary policy to 
the external objective, (assignment 3, eq.15 and 16)
From the above discussion it should now be clear why 
we chose to set the stock of foreign wealth as the 
external target instead of the current account balance. 
By stating an explicit target for F the government 
unambiguously determines the choice to be a net 
creditor or debtor country, and the preferred pattern 
of intertemporal allocation of future national
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consumption. It will also become clear that the 
government thereby unambiguously determines the long 
term exchange rate.
Finally, assignment 4, (eq.17), describes
stabilization policy under a "target zones" regime. 
Advocates of this proposal have suggested that fiscal 
policy should target domestic inflation, whereas 
monetary policy should be left as a "reserve weapon" 
against speculative bubbles in the foreign exchange 
markets. Edison, Miller and Williamson (1987) evaluated 
this proposal in a two-country model, but their 
exercise suffered from two serious shortcomings. First, 
they did not model the current account, nor did they 
allow for wealth effects. Secondly, they considered an 
inflationary shock only, completely overlooking the 
implications of "real" shocks.
4.EVALUATING THE ALTERNATIVE POLICY ASSIGNMENTS
We follow the work of Frenkel, Goldstein and 
Masson (1989) and Edison, Miller, Williamson, (1987), 
by not ranking the performance of each assignment 
according to a formal utility function of the 
government, requiring explicit weights for the 
deviations from equilibrium of some key variables.
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Instead we have chosen to stress some apparent 
strengths and weaknesses of each assignment. This is 
done by means o f :
a) the algebraic analysis of a simplified version of 
the model set out in section 1;
b) numerical simulations of the full model
5.STABILITY ANALYSIS
In this section we are interested in showing the manner 
in which the choice of the policy assignment has 
implications for the dynamic stability of the model. We 
wish to emphasize that in general dynamic stability is 
not independent from the government reaction function 
and that it should not be taken for granted. Therefore 
we shall explore the stability conditions for each 
assignment in turn.
The general state-space form of the system is:
dX = A aX + B AG ;
X = [z ,F ,a] ; dX = [dz.dF.da]; G = [Ha , H2 , Ha ]
X, the vector of the endogenous dynamic variables, 
includes past deviations of output from equilibrium, 
foreign wealth and the real exchange rate. G is the 
vector representing the shocks, namely an inflation
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shock, a domestic demand shock and a shock concerning a 
fall of foreign demand for domestic goods. The 
subscripts i relate to each assignment.
The dynamic system is obtained by substituting eg.2), 
3), 5), 6), 7), 9), 10) and the selected policy
equations into eq. lc), 8),11). Obviously, the 
structure of A± and B ± changes with the policy 
assignment and is to be specified below.
It is well known that in the class of models we 
consider stability is ensured and dynamics are 
unambiguously determined when the number of unstable 
roots is equal to the number of non pre-determined 
variables (Blanchard and Kahn, 1980). Since the
exchange rate is the only non pre-determined variable
the model allows for, it is necessary (although not
sufficient) that7 |A A |> 0. We shall focus on this 
condition in order to assess the influence that each 
rule has on |Ai|.B
7 1A | = 0 1 *0 2 * 0 3 where 0A are the roots of the
characteristic equation; hence if one root only is to 
be positive |A|>0. But this does not rule out global 
instability : ir the three roots are positive |A|>0.
8We shall not discuss other conditions that might be 
sufficient for the system to be stable because one 
might easily show that under the rules considered here 
it is always possible to choose parameters of the 
government reaction function which ensure that the 
trace af A* is negative. In that case at least one of 
the three roots must be negative, but given that ]Aa |>0 
the stable roots must be 2. Alternatively, the policy
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5.1"Monetarist" rule (assignment 1)
Under this assignment the real interest rate is 
targeted on the internal objective and fiscal policy is 
not activated. The dynamic system is third order and 
the economic interpretation of the stability condition 
is rather difficult. Therefore we shall undertake the 
analysis of stability in stages.
Eq.5b defines core inflation. Since we have assumed 
that the price of foreign imports instantaneously 
adjusts to exchange rate "surprises"®, core inflation 
is immediately affected by exchange rate jumps. As a 
preliminary step we assume that the core,, underlying 
rate of inflation is determined only by cumulated past 
deviations of output from equilibrium: 
x = <DGz
In this case the transition matrix has the following 
structure10:
mix should guarantee that the coefficient b2 of the 
characteristic equation |A4 - 01| = 0 = 03 + bi0z + b20 
+ b3 is negative. In fact b2 = 0a02+0i03+0203 . If it is 
negative at least one negative root must exist, ruling 
out the possibility of three unstable roots.
9Note that we make this assumption only to make the 
model simple enough to be analytically tractable. 
lOWe remind the reader that Q* describes the policy 
induced impact on output of a 1$ deviation of inflation 
from target. As defined in section 2 we have 
"normalized" coefficients k* and na so that fiscal and 
monetary policy exert the same impact on output.
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A a- -afixOG ax a (P + x F 0 )
p a O i ® G  i* - yax p - y a (p + x F 0 )
Q ^ e / o 0 0
Cumulated past deviations of output from the natural 
rate drive the rate of core inflation and trigger the 
policy feedback, in the form of an interest rate 
change. Whenever interest rates at home and abroad 
differ real exchange rate dynamics occur. The exchange 
rate affects the current account in two ways. First, it 
determines foreign demand for domestic goods: a
depreciation raises net exports and improves the 
current account. Secondly, it has an influence on 
aggregate demand as it alters the valuation of foreign 
wealth in domestic currency. From eq.7 it is clear that 
a depreciation raises domestic demand and worsens the 
current account when the initial stock of foreign 
wealth is positive and vice versa. We shall assume 
throughout the chapter that the overall influence of a 
depreciation on the current account is positive. We 
shall also make the plausible assumption that the
absolute value of the wealth effect of the real
exchange rate is smaller than the terms of trade
influence on domestic demand. This guarantees that even
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when the initial stock of foreign assets is negative a 
depreciation expands domestic demand. An increase of 
the stock of foreign wealth raises both foreign
interest payments and domestic demand for foreign
goods. The global effect of a change of F on the
current account cannot be determined a priori.
It should be now clear that the structure of the 
transition matrix under this assignment is very similar 
to the one discussed in the former chapter, under a 
standard monetarist rule.
The stability condition relating to the simplified 
system described by matrix A" is:
5.1.1) | A a. * | = [afia<I)G/o] {P (x-i*) - xi*F0 )
An intuitive interpretation of 5.1.1 can be given as
follows. When i*>yax',
that is, when a loss of foreign assets worsens the 
current account, the devaluation of the terms of trade 
is necessary to generate a current account surplus and 
to restore the equilibrium stock of foreign wealth. In 
the domestic goods market the loss of wealth weakens 
demand and output, whereas the devaluation exerts the 
opposite effect. If the depreciation dominates the
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effect of the loss of wealth and raises output above 
the natural rate the model becomes unstable. In fact 
the output expansion triggers a rise in inflation. 
This, in turn, will cause an increase of the domestic 
interest rate and a further depreciation11. In this 
case wealth and the exchange rate will take an 
ever increasing path. The stability condition simply 
requires that the necessary depreciation is associated 
to a current account surplus and to a level of output 
which is below the natural rate.
From the transition matrix one may derive the 
combinations of a and F which leave output and the 
current account in equilibrium1 2 .
5.1.2) y = 0: a = -[x/(p + xFc )]F
5.1.3) dF = 0: a = — {(i£-yax)/[p-ya(p + xF0 )]}F
llcfr.eq.ll 
12Holding z constant
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in Graph 1 the locus yy represents the combinations of 
wealth and the exchange rate which leave output at the 
natural rate (eq.5.1.2). The locus FF represents the
yy
GRAPH 1
combinations of wealth and the exchange rate which are 
consistent with current account equilibrium13. 
Stability requires that the initial combination of 
wealth and the exchange rate is set above the FF (so 
that wealth is accumulated) and below the yy (so that 
output is below the natural rate). This may happen only 
if the slope of the FF is smaller than the slope of the
yy:
5.1.4 [t /(P + tFo ) ]>(if~yaT)/[p-pa(p + tF0 )]
5.1.4 holds when the stability condition 5.1.1 is 
sati sf ied.
On the other hand, when i*<paT, that is, when a loss of 
foreign wealth improves the current account, the 
depreciation is no longer necessary to restore the 
equilibrium level of wealth and it is always possible 
for the initial combination of wealth and the exchange 
rate to be consistent with a current account surplus 
and a recession in the goods market. In fact 5.1.1
13Under the assumption that if>viax
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implies that when i*<pax saddlepath stability is 
guaranteed14 .
Let us turn now to the analysis of the system, under 
the assumption that: 
ju = <!>€z + <Dpa
The transition matrix becomes:
Ai = -aflame ax a(p + xF0 - Q a®p)
yaOafl>G i* - pax p-pa(p + xF0 - Oa®p)
QaOG/o 0 O aC)p/o
Inflation instantaneously responds to exchange rate 
"surprises" and triggers an interest rate feed-back. 
This, in turn, affects output, the current account and 
interest rate dynamics. A first fundamental difference 
between A a* and is that the direct link between the 
interest rate and the exchange rate substantially 
dampens the expansionary effect of a devaluation on 
output because the depreciation is followed by a 
monetary contraction. Furthermore, the interest rate 
feedback has a positive effect on the current account,
14To show this is straightforward. Assume that i* = 
pax-j, where j is a positive integer. In this case the 
stability condition becomes: x[p - pa(P + xF0 )] + j(P + 
xF0 )>0
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as the flow of imports associated to the devaluation is 
reduced. On the other hand the rise of the real 
interest rate has a destabilizing effect on exchange 
rate dynamics: after the initial exchange rate jump the 
monetary contraction requires the expectation of a 
further devaluation, if the financial markets are to be 
in equilibrium. Quite strikingly, the stability 
condition associated to the Ai is identical to the 
5.1.1:
5 . 1 . 1 b ) | Aa. | = [aO^OE/o]{p(x-ir ) - xi*F0 }
Condition 5.1.1b shows that the stabilizing influence 
of the interest rate on output and the current account 
is exactly offset by the effect of the interest rate 
rise on exchange rate dynamics.
If a negative shock occurs to F the policy feedback is 
activated only to the extent that the change in 
domestic expenditure drives inflation away from the 
desired path, regardless of the need of achieving long 
run equilibrium in the stock of wealth. If the 
reduction of imports associated to the loss of wealth 
is dominated by the fall of foreign interest payments, 
only an exchange rate depreciation can restore wealth 
equilibrium. Condition 5.1.1b shows that the policy 
feed-back has no influence on stability. Instead the
150
system can be stable If, before taking into account the 
interest rate feedback associated to an exchange rate 
change, the devaluation which is necessary to generate 
a current account surplus is consistent with a level of 
output which is below the natural rate.
5.2.Meade assignment, (assignment 2)
This rule differs from the monetarist assignment 
because it sets an explicit wealth target for fiscal 
policy.
Under the simplifying assumption that 
k = <DGz
the transition matrix has the following structure:
Fiscal policy strengthens the contractionary effect of 
a loss of foreign assets on output. The loci describing 
combinations of wealth and the exchange rate which 
ensure current account and output equilibrium are 
defined as follows:
A 2
yafia<DG i* - pa(x + fi2 )
-aQaOG
QaGE/o 0 0
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5.2.5) y = 0: a = -[(x+02 )/(P + x F0 )]F
5.2.6) dF = 0 : a = - { [ i *-p  a ( x + QZ ) ] / [ p - p a  (P + x F 0 ) ] } F
Fiscal policy increases the absolute size of the slope 
of the locus which represents equilibrium in the goods 
market and correspondingly reduces the slope of the 
locus representing current account equilibrium. If 
fiscal control is sufficiently strong stability is 
ensured. In fact stability requires:
5.2.7)|AZ-| = [aQa(D6/o] <P(x-if ) -xi* + Pfl2 }>0 
If 5.2.7 holds
[ ( i + 0 2 ) / ( P + x F o ) ] > [ i * - p a ( x + 0 a ) ] / [ p - p a ( p  + x F 0 )]
We get the same result under the assumption that: 
jt = <D£z + Opa
In this case the transition matrix becomes:
-afiiOG a(x +Q2 ) a(p + xF0 - OaGp)
paQiO£ if-pa(x +02 ) p-pa(p + xF0 - fii^p)
()aOG/o 0 Q xfl>p/o
But the stability condition is identical to the 5.2.7.
A sufficiently strong fiscal control prevents 
instability, because the fi2p term can dominate the 
unstable effects which might arise when only monetary 
policy is activated. Under this assignment the fiscal 
instrument is assigned the task of strengthening the 
impact that changes in domestic holdings of foreign 
assets have on domestic demand. This is now 
unambiguously enhanced relatively to the destabilizing 
role of interest payments in the current account.
5.3.Reversed "Meade" assignment (assignment 3)
Under this rule fiscal policy controls the internal 
objective and the monetary instrument is assigned to a 
foreign wealth target.
a ( x  - fl2 ) a ( p  + x F 0 - Q i ® p )
i* - p a ( x  - 0 2 ) p - p a ( p  + x F 0 -
Q 2 /o 0
A 3 =
Monetary control of foreign wealth exploits the 
exchange rate swings determined by differentials 
between the domestic and foreign interest rates. But in
doing so it also has a "perverse" influence on the 
current account. Suppose the stock of foreign assets is 
initially too low. The domestic real interest rate is 
then reduced in order to bring about a depreciation.
This certainly raises foreign demand for domestic goods 
but also sucks in more imports, as the monetary stance 
is expansionary. The condition which is necessary for
stability to hold, |AS |>0, is always guaranteed, as:
|A3 | = aQa<D6pn2/o
In order to assess Boughton's warning about the risk of 
instability under this assignment we shall analyze the 
stability condition under the assumption that the
government does not control inflation but sets a
foreign wealth target. In this case the system has the
following state-space form:
dF = [if - ya(x - Q2 )]F + [p-pa(p + xF0 )]a + Gj
da = (fi2/o)F + G2
where Ga and G2 represent the forcing variables we are 
not interested in at the moment. The roots of the
characteristic equation are:
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ea = 0.5{[i* - pa(x - fi2 )]}+
0'.5{[i* - pa(x - 02 )]2+4fi2/o [p-pa(p + xF0 )]}1/e
= 0 . 5{[ i * - p a (x - Q2 )]}-
0 . 5 { [ i * - pa(x - fl2 ) ] 2 + 402/a[p-pa(p + xF0 )]}1/2
If a devaluation improves the current account10 the 
system is saddlepath stable. The destabilizing 
influence of the policy feedback on domestic demand 
does not affect stability because it is always possible 
that an appropriate exchange rate jump generates 
convergent wealth and exchange rate dynamics. We show 
this with the aid of the familiar state-space diagram 
(graph 2). Along the the aa locus domestic and foreign 
interest rates are equal. It is vertical on the foreign 
wealth target, as exchange rate changes do not cause 
any interest rate feed-back. When foreign assets are 
above equilibrium the real interest rate is increased, 
hence equilibrium in the international financial 
markets requires an exchange rate depreciation. The FF 
curve represents combinations of foreign wealth and the
15But the rationale for this assignment relies on the 
presumption that a devaluation improves the current 
account
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GRAPH 2
a
aa
FF
1 5f
exchange rate which yield current account equilibrium. 
It is negatively sloped under the assumption that a 
loss of foreign assets worsens the current account 
because the corresponding reduction of the interest 
rate expands domestic demand and dominates the negative 
wealth effect caused by the fall of F ie. Points above 
the FF are associated with a current account surplus 
and vice versa. Suppose that foreign wealth falls 
below target. Monetary policy takes an expansionary 
stance and this requires the expectation of a 
devaluation if the international financial markets are 
to be in equilibrium. As a result the exchange rate 
must depreciate. Graph 2 shows that if a devaluation 
improves the current account the initial exchange rate 
jump can generate the current account surplus necessary 
to restore the equilibrium level of foreign wealth. 
Thus, the gradual accumulation of foreign assets is 
followed by the increase of the real interest rate and 
by the exchange rate appreciation.
16This assumption is by no means necessary to show that 
stability obtains. We make it here as this case is more 
akin to Boughton's example.
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5.4.Target zones regime, (assignment 4)
Fiscal policy is assigned to the domestic target and 
monetary policy is not activated.
- a Q a <J>E a (p + x F 0 - fiaOp)
pafl^OE if-yax p - p a (p + x F 0 - Q a ® p )
0 0 0
|A4 | = 0 as a direct consequence of a policy assignment
designed to prevent real exchange rate dynamics. But 
one may solve the characteristic equation and determine 
algebraically the signs of the 3 roots: |A4-9I|=0 if
0 [ 02 -(i* - pax -aQa<DE)0 -ifaQa<DE] = 0  
which implies:
01 = 0;
02 = 0 . 5 { i *-pax-aQafl>E + [ ( i *-pax -af)a<I>E ) 2 + 4i f a0ad>E ]-1 > ;
0S = 0 . 5 { i£-pax-afia<DE-[ ( i f-pax-afia<DE ) 2 + 4i *afia<DE ] /2 } ;
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It is clear that 9e>0, 83<0. Therefore the model is 
always saddlepath stable.
Given the structure that this assignment imposes upon 
the dynamic matrix, exchange rate dynamics can never 
occur so that the possibility of undershooting or 
overshooting is ruled out. Nevertheless the exchange 
rate is an endogenous variable because the model 
includes the current account equation. Stability 
requires that the real exchange rate initially jump 
onto its long run value. The intuitive explanation of 
this conclusion is very simple indeed: whenever the
nature of a shock is such that in the long run domestic 
holdings of foreign assets must change, the exchange 
rate must adjust correspondingly in order to ensure 
that the system converges to current account 
equilibrium at this new long run level of wealth. A 
comparison with assignment 3 suggests that when fiscal 
policy is assigned to the domestic objective monetary 
control of a foreign wealth target is not necessary to 
ensure stability, provided that the real exchange rate 
is allowed to adjust once and for all in the face of 
permanent variations of foreign wealth.
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5.5.Summarizing remarks
From the analysis carried out so far it emerges
quite clearly that dynamic instability might well occur
in open economy models which include wealth effects and 
the current account. The danger of instability is a 
consequence of the presence of foreign investment/debt 
service in the current account: if i* = 0 the condition 
|Ai|>0 would always obtain. The choice of the policy
rule has important implications. Under a "monetarist" 
assignment the system might turn out to be inherently 
unstable, independently from the strength of the policy 
feedback. But adding fiscal control of the external 
objective might have a quite favorable effect. On the 
other hand, if the authorities exert fiscal control on 
domestic inflation (assignments 3 and 4) the model is 
saddlepath stable. If the government adheres to a 
target zones rule the exchange rate target cannot be
considered as exogenous: when permanent changes of
foreign wealth occur the terms of trade must be 
initially adjusted to that level which will ensure 
current account equilibrium in the long run.
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6 .Comparative statics and simulation of the dynamic
adjustment to equilibrium.
6 .1. Introduction
The policy rules outlined above probably imply 
different dynamic adjustment paths in response to 
shocks. To a certain extent this is also true for the 
required permanent changes of some endogenous 
variables. This section gives a detailed analysis of 
these differences. The dynamic performance of the model 
under each policy regime and the long run changes of z, 
F and a after permanent shocks are evaluated by means 
of numerical simulations. We shall also present some 
algebraic results concerning the theoretical 
determination of these long run changes. The procedure 
for computing the long run values of the endogenous 
variables under assignments 1, 2 and 3 substantially
differs from the one which is necessary when we discuss 
assignment 4. This solution method is original and has 
the merit of highlighting the interaction between 
dynamics and long term equilibrium under a target zones 
regime.
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Assignments 1-3.
Since the general representation of the system in 
state-space form is
dX = AiX + B aG ; 
the equilibrium set of endogenous variables is 
X = A 1"1B iG
The structure of the B± matrices, related to 
forcing variables vector, is the following:
a
-pa
0
a
pa
0
a
pa
0
a
1 -pa 
0
a
1 - pa 
0
a
1 -pa 
0
-afij 
paOa 
ft 1 /o
— a ft a 
pafti
fta/O
-aft a 
pafti 
0
the
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Assignment 4
Under assignment 4 |A*| = 0, therefore A*-1 can no
longer be computed. But the long run solution can then 
be found as follows. Consider
6.1.1)dz = -aftaOGz + ax F + a(p + x F 0 - fta<I>p)a +a(H2-H3 )
6 . 1.2)dF = yaftiOGz +[if-pax ]F +[p-pa(p + xF0 - 
- ftaOp)]a+ -paHz -(l-pa)Hs +paQ10£H1
This is the dynamic structure of the model under a 
target zones regime, as no exchange rate dynamics may 
occur because real interest rates are equalized across 
countries. However, the exchange rate must be regarded 
as an endogenous variable. The analysis of stability 
has shown that under this regime the characteristic 
equation has one unstable root and equilibrium is a 
saddlepoint. In this class of models stability requires 
that the number of unstable roots is matched by the 
number of non pre-determined variables. Since both F 
and z are pre-determined, dynamics may converge only if
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the exchange rate is initially set at a level
consistent with stability. Intuitively, it should be
clear that only an exchange rate jump may ensure
current account equilibrium when permanent changes of
foreign wealth occur. The following discussion will 
provide a more formal argument.
To find the long run values of z, F ans a one should 
take into account that, as Dixit and B1anchard-Kahn 
have shown,
6.1.3)a(0) - a„ = va (z0 - z„) + v2 (F0 - F„)
where [-1, Vi, v2 ] is the left eigenvector associated
to the unstable root and a(0) is the exchange rate 
level after the "jump" required by the transversality 
condition. Condition (3.2.3) shows that the initial
exchange rate overshooting is a function of initial 
deviations of pre-determined variables from 
equilibrium. But when a target zones regime is 
enforced in a deterministic setting temporary 
deviations of the exchange rate from equilibrium cannot 
occur. Hence a(0) = a„ and
6.1.4)F_ - F0 = -(v a/v2 )(z_ - z0 ).
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By redefining the dynamic variables in terms of
deviations from equilibrium one may substitute for F in
6.1.1) and 6.1.2) from the 6.1.4. At that stage, having
imposed dz = dF = 0, it becomes straightforward to find
the long run values of a, z and F. It is clear that a „ , 
F „ , z_ are jointly determined. On one hand the real 
exchange rate must adjust to changes in F to balance 
the current account. On the other, since the process 
of expectations formation forces the exchange rate to 
jump before the dynamic adjustment begins and this jump 
affects both wealth accumulation and output, F_ and z«, 
cannot be determined independently from aw . A clear 
example of how this mechanism works is provided in
section 6.2.
Under a target zones regime the structure the B4 matrix 
has the following structure:
a
pa
0
a
1 -pa 
0
-aOa
paOa
0
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6.2.Disinflationary policy
We assume that initially core inflation is 10% higher 
than its desired value.
6.2.1.Long run values
Assignments 1-3
Except that under a target zones regime, disinflation 
has no effect on foreign wealth and the exchange rate; 
the total output loss required to bring down inflation 
amounts tolv:
Z.-Zo = -Ha/®6 = -40%.
17This is a standard result in the literature since the 
work of Buiter and Miller(1982)
Assignment 4
Comparative statics of the simplified model yields: 
a_ = -[Ha/tDG] [ (i*/P)*(Vi/vB )] / {l + (Vi/v2Oa<l>G) [ x-
-if (P+xF0- 0a4)p)/p]} <0
F- = [Hi/ OG ] * ( v a /v 2 ) /{l + (v1/ v 2(110 6 ) [ x  - i*(p + xF0-
-0 a<Dp)/p] } >0
z« =- [Hi/«D6 ] / { 1 + (Vi/veQa06) [x - i * ( p +xFo-na0p )/p ] ) <0
We get to these conclusions about the long run effects 
of the disinflationary policy because:
Vi/v2 =(02 + afia<DG)/paQiOG + [p-ya(P + xF0 - ]02
is positive; 
x > if ie
(p+xFo-na0 y )/p <1 if Fo<0 or fiscal control is 
sufficiently strong.
Under a target zones regime, when fiscal policy 
controls domestic inflation and monetary policy is not 
activated, disinflation determines permanent changes of 
F and a. The fiscal contraction, necessary to control 
domestic inflation, reduces domestic demand for foreign 
goods and causes a permanent accumulation of foreign
180n the rationale for assuming x > i* see Blanchard 
(1985)
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wealth. If the current account is to be in equilibrium 
in the long run, a permanent exchange rate appreciation 
is required. Assignment 4 causes a permanent wealth 
redistribution because, unlike the other rules, it does 
not determine an exchange rate undershooting during the 
recession which is necessary to curb inflation. Under 
the other rules exchange rate swings prevent the 
domestic output loss from permanently affecting foreign 
wealth. By contrast, under a target zones regime the 
exchange rate simply jumps onto the new equilibrium 
value, which accounts for the current account surpluses 
accumulated during the disinflation. Another 
interesting feature of this regime is that the 
permanent terms of trade appreciation reduces the 
necessary output loss.
168
Table 3. Permanent effects of a disinflationary policy 
under a target zones regiwe when nominal incoie Is the 
doaestlc target
low interdependence high interdependence
z -39,6% -38.3%
F +3.5% +10%
a -1.2% -2%
The numerical simulations confirm our algebraic 
analysis and imply that the size of the wealth transfer 
is positively related to the trade elasticities, mainly 
to the income elasticity. Although we do not make great 
claim of realism, this result suggests that the wealth 
redistribution might be substantial. In a way one might 
argue that a deflationary policy under this assignment 
turns out to be another kind of beggar-thy-neighbor 
policy, as the renounce to temporarily "export" 
inflation abroad by means of a terms of trade 
appreciation1® is matched by the permanent increase of 
national disposable income obtained by raising
domestic holdings of foreign wealth. Further research 
should investigate whether this outcome would be more
19But the country carrying forward the disinflation 
ends up with an appreciated currency anyway.
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or less likely to induce retaliatory policies from the 
commercial partners of the country than the fluctuation 
of the real exchange rate.
6.2.2.Dynani cs
Let us turn now to an analysis of the dynamic 
performance of the model under the alternative rules. 
When monetary policy is activated (assignments 1,2,3) 
the real exchange rate initially appreciates. Later on 
it gradually depreciates toward its equilibrium value. 
Comparing assignment 1 and 2 we observe that the latter 
requires a more moderate initial jump of the exchange 
rate, probably because the fiscal control, by 
depressing domestic demand in order to achieve the 
wealth target, has a favorable side-effect on the 
domestic objective. Relatively to the performance of 
assignment 1 fluctuations of financial wealth are 
dampened. If the model is simulated assuming lower 
values of the trade balance elasticities wider
fluctuations of the exchange rate and the monetary
instrument occur under both rules.
Under assignment 3 the disinflation policy works 
as follows. The fiscal contraction reduces output,
turning the current account into surplus. External
170
equilibrium requires a temporary exchange rate 
appreciation, which is achieved by increasing the 
domestic real interest rate. Again, as in the case of 
assignment 2, exchange rate, fiscal and monetary policy 
exert a contractionary stimulus, but with a different 
mix, fiscal policy being more strongly activated than 
monetary policy. Also, the terms of trade appreciation 
necessary to control the current account is milder than 
the revaluation required to bring down inflation under 
assignments 1 and 2. If the trade balance elasticities 
are low, the exchange rate deviations from equilibrium 
are relatively smaller, whereas under assignments 1 and 
2 they turned out to be enhanced. This probably happens 
because the positive influence of the fiscal 
contraction on the current account is weaker, so that 
the necessary rise of the domestic interest rate is 
milder.One might argue that assignment 3 has the 
appealing implication of imposing less deflationary 
pressure upon the sector open to international 
competition relatively to the one producing non-traded 
goods. Boughton1s claim that under this rule current 
account control would be relatively more difficult than 
in the case of assignment 2 does not seem confirmed: 
wealth fluctuations are less wide than under assignment
171
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2. But this probably happens because the fiscal 
contraction necessary to bring inflation down helps in 
keeping wealth close to the target and not by own 
virtue of the monetary policy rule.
Finally, table 4 presents the cumulated
deviations of policy instruments from equilibrium. We 
include the exchange rate because under assignments 1,2 
and 3 terms of trade fluctuations are exploited for the 
purpose of targets stabilization. The implied costs in 
terms of interest rate and relative prices 
disequi1ibria are gradually reduced when moving from 
assignment 1 to 4. The opposite conclusion holds when 
one considers tax deviations from equilibrium. Compared 
to assignment 1 rule 2 cuts down exchange rate 
deviations from equilibrium by approximately one third 
and requires a substantially more moderate use of the 
monetary instrument, -50%. This at the cost of a rather 
limited use of the fiscal weapon. By contrast, 
assignment of fiscal policy to the domestic target 
requires fluctuations of the tax rate which are far 
wider than those necessary to control the current 
account. When weighing the relative merits of each rule 
account for this should be made. It has been rightly 
claimed that disinflation policies exploiting the
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appreciation of the exchange rate might heavily alter 
the patterns of international trade, but on the other 
hand one should bear in mind that the alternative 
involving fiscal control of the domestic objective 
might imply substantial deviations of the tax rate from 
the desired equilibrium level. Graph 3 shows that 
assignments 3 and 4 require a tax rate hike that can be 
as high as 8% and this might simply be not feasible. 
Furthermore an evaluation of assignment 4 would require 
taking into account the permanent changes of wealth and 
the exchange rate that become necessary under this 
rule.
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Table __4.___ Di..s.in.f.lat.i..on pqlicy:___ cuiulated squared
deviations from equilibrium of policy instruments
(percentage values)
low interdependence
2 3
46.13 5.64
20.16 263.5
599.1 238.57
high interdependence
Ass ignm 
r 
s 
a
As s ignm 
r 
s 
a
81 . 95 
0
948
1
94.76
0
632 . 15
2
15 . 23 
19.78 
454.36
3
10 . 68 
115.02 
348 . 2
4
0
266
0
4
0
256 . 5 
0
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 of domestic demand
We consider a 5% permanent20 rise of domestic demand in 
real terms.
Long run effects
Assignment 1
z »  = { - p i V [ P ( x  - i * )  -  t  i  * F0 ] }HZ 
F_ = - p H2 / [ p ( x  - i *) - i i f F0 ] 
a„, = i f'Hz / [ p ( i  - i f ) -  x i f F0 ]
Policy control is activated only to the extent that 
excess demand raises inflation, regardless of the 
current account, which turns into a deficit. 
Eventually, the real exchange rate must depreciate in 
order to ensure external equilibrium. Wealth effects in 
aggregate demand will compensate for the initial shock.
d F _ / d x  = p( P - i * F 0 ) / [ P ( T  - i r ) - t i ^ F o ] *
20Assuming permanent instead of temporary shocks is 
obviously arbitrary. It relates to the debate between 
those who take the view that economic variables are 
driven by stochastic trends and those who believe that 
economic variables are better described by unexpected 
shocks around a deterministic trend.
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If the model is to be stable (P -ifFo )>0i hence 
dF_/dx>0; the stronger are wealth effects in aggregate 
demand the smaller is the necessary loss of financial 
assets.
da_/dx =-if (P -ifF0 )/[p(x -if ) - xi*Fo ]2<0
Stronger wealth effects require a smaller 
devaluation of the real exchange rate. In terms of 
domestic output the foreign wealth transfer is very 
likely to be stronger than the initial expansion of 
domestic demand. Simulation results show that under 
this assignment the transfer of foreign wealth can be 
huge, but it substantially decreases when wealth 
effects are stronger. The sign and magnitude of F0 may 
have a significant effect on F_ via the change in the 
valuation of F in domestic currency. If Fo<0 the 
required long run exchange rate devaluation raises the 
value of external debt and, by exerting a negative 
wealth effect, reduces the necessary loss of foreign 
assets. By contrast, when Fo>0, the depreciation raises 
the valuation of financial wealth in domestic currency,
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exerting a "perverse" impact on the current account and
Assignment 2
Assignment of fiscal control to the external 
equilibrium substantially changes the picture.
z „ = {- p i *7 [ 3 ( x -if ) - u fF0 + P02 ] }H2
F_ = -PH*/[P(x -i£ ) - tifF0 + p02]
a .  = i f H 2 /[(3(x - i * )  - x i f F 0 + p 0 2 ]
To the extent that fiscal control is sufficiently 
strong, the wealth redistribution and the exchange rate 
devaluation are drastically reduced. Fiscal policy acts 
far more quickly than wealth effects in curbing the 
excess of domestic demand2 1 .
The dynamic performance of the model improves, too. 
Under a "monetarist" rule the model exhibits prolonged
21However, under this rule, as well as under 
assignments 3 and 4, only a permanent increase of the 
tax rate may compensate for the permanent shock to 
aggregate demand. One might expect that including the 
government budget constraint in the model, the 
prolonged fiscal contraction would reduce domestic 
holdings of government debt, so that eventually this 
negative wealth effect would keep aggregate demand in 
equi1ibrium.
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persistence and huge swings in the exchange rate. 
Excess demand impinges on core inflation and this 
stimulates a monetary contraction; as a result the 
terms of trade must appreciate initially, about 8% when 
interdependence is high, 20% when it is limited. 
However, equilibrium requires a permanent depreciation, 
which occurs slowly over time, along with the 
decumulation of foreign assets. The strength of the 
initial appreciation is clearly determined by the need 
to achieve a cumulated output loss, necessary to pin 
down inflation in spite of the permanent devaluation of 
the exchange rate. Both the output loss and the 
exchange rate swings are caused by the weakness of 
wealth effects and the absence of fiscal control. By 
contrast, under assignment 2 wealth and exchange rate 
swings are very limited, convergence is certainly 
faster.
T.able 3. S.im.ulatj.on results .
Long run effects of a domestic demand shock (x = 0.15)
Assignment 1 Assignment 2
Fo z F a z F a
(high interdependence)
-30% -5 . 8% -35% + 6.8% -0 . 5% -2 . 6% + 0 . 5%
-10% -6 . 1% -38% + 7.8% -0 . 5% -2 . 6% + 0 . 5%
+ 10% -6 . 5% -40% + 8.0% -0 . 5% -2 . 6% + 0 . 5%
+ 30% -7 . 0% -42% + 8.1% -0 . 5% -2 . 6% + 0 . 5%
(deviations from initial equilibrium; z and F are 
"normalized" with respect to equilibrium output)
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Assignment 3
When monetary policy is assigned to a wealth target and 
fiscal policy controls domestic inflation
z_ = Hz/QiOE
F_ = 0
a„ = 0
In contrast to assignment 2 permanent changes of wealth 
and the exchange rate do not occur2 2 . Initially excess 
demand spurs inflation and raises imports. The policy 
response involves a fiscal contraction and the fall of 
the domestic interest rate. The latter is necessary to 
bring about a temporary exchange rate devaluation and a 
reduction of the current account deficit. The early
22this happens because monetary policy is assigned to 
the wealth target. Suppose that perfect capital 
mobility holds. In this case the domestic interest rate 
is tied to the foreign one, therefore F_=0, otherwise 
the interest rate differential would trigger exchange 
rate dynamics.
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stages of the cycle show Inflationary growth and a very 
moderate current account deficit, followed by a 
recession and wealth accumulation.
Assignment 4
a_ = H 2 [(i*/ P )*va/v2 ] /{aQiOG + [va/ve ][x _ i*(p + ^F0
- QiOpJ/p]}
F„ = -H2 (va/v2 ) /{aQ!<D6 + [va/v2 ][x _ ir (p + xF0 -
- Qa«Dp)/p]}
z_ = +H2/{aQa(DE + [va/v2 ][x _ if (P + xF0 - O a®p)/p]}
Domestic holdings of foreign assets decrease, the 
exchange rate depreciates and cumulated excess demand 
is positive. In fact simulations show that these 
permanent changes are negligible, always below 1 % , with 
the exchange rate variation being very close to zero. 
Dispensing with monetary policy altogether only 
marginally affects the fluctuations of inflation and 
output, with the desirable result of achieving almost 
complete exchange rate stability. But of course the 
cost is more fiscal flexibility than under assignments 
1 and 2
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Fluctuations of policy instruments
The analysis of cumulated deviations from equilibrium 
of the policy instruments shows that assignments 2 and 
4 respectively dominate assignments 1 and 4. When 
interdependence is low assignment 4 seems to be 
preferable, whereas when interdependence is high the 
choice between rules 2 and 4 should depend on the 
relative cost associated to fluctuations of the tax 
rate and of the terms of trade. Note that monetary 
control of the wealth target complicates the task of 
fiscal policy: assignment 4 causes less fiscal
intervention than assignment 3. This is even more true 
when interdependence is high, simply because in that 
case the interactions between the current account and 
aggregate demand become stronger.
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Table 6. Shock to domestic demand:__cumulated squared
deyiatipns from equi 1 ibrium of pol icy instruments
(percentage values)
Assignments 
low interdependence
1 2 3 4
r 11.1 7.05 0.31 0
s 0 18.32 13.6 9.8
a 2100 55.6 1.14 0
high interdependence
1 2 3 4
r 8.51 0.98 2.38 0
s 0 5.78 21.37 9.2
a 1960 10.1 7.36 0
6.4.A fall of foreign demand for domestic goods
We consider a permanent reduction of foreign demand for 
domestic goods equivalent to 5% of domestic output.
191
Assignment 1
z_ = {-(y/€) (i*-x ) / [ P (x -if ) - tifFc ]}Ha
F_ = F0x H3/[P(‘c -i*) - u fF0 ]
a„ = (if-x )Ha/[p(x -if ) - xifF0 ]
In equilibrium permanent changes of F and a are
necessary to balance the current account. The exchange 
rate must depreciate.The variation of domestic holdings 
of foreign assets depends on the wealth effect of the 
devaluation. If the country is initially a net debtor
the devaluation reduces domestic demand, holdings of
foreign assets increase. On the other hand, when Fo>0 
domestic demand rises after the depreciation, hence F_
must be lower. If the model is stable t >ir , hence 
cumulated output deviations from equilibrium are 
negative. The exchange rate devaluation necessary to 
equilibriate supply and demand for exports has a
positive effect on core inflation, which must be
compensated by a cumulated output loss. If z_ holds 
core inflation down at its target level, F_ must
balance aggregate demand. Domestic holdings of foreign
192
assets are not affected by the temporary slump in 
foreign demand for domestic goods; instead they depend 
on the wealth effect of the devaluation.
Assignment 2
z- = { - ( y / € ) ( i * - x  - 0 2 ) / [ p ( x  -i*) + p 0 2 - x i f F 0 ] } ( - H 3 )
F. = - F 0 x H 3 / [ P ( x  -i*) + P Q 2 - x i * F 0 ]
a_ = - ( i * - x  -fi2 ) H 3 / [ p ( x -!*■) + p Q B - x i f F 0 ]
Once again fiscal policy limits the effect of permanent
real shocks on the country's foreign investment. Table 
3 shows that fiscal control of the current account can 
be quite effective in limiting permanent wealth 
transfers.
As far as dynamics are concerned, assignments 1 and 2 
do not substantially differ. The initial exchange rate 
jump undershoots its long run value. After that, the 
dynamic path of a and F is monotonic. On the other hand 
output exhibits something of a cycle, but without huge 
swings. However persistence is limited when fiscal 
policy controls the current account.
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Table 7;simulation results
Long run effects of a fall of foreign demand for
domestic exports.
Assignment 1 Assignment 2
(high interdependence)
-30% -11.1% 9.0% +13.1% -12.5% 0.3% +14.8%
-10% -12.1% 3.0% +14.2% -12.5% 0.1% +14.8%
+10% -13.2% -3.3% +15.5% -12.5% -0.1% +14.8%
+30% -14.4% -11.3% -17.0% -12.5% -0.3% +14.9%
(low interdependence)
-30% -6.2% 18.0% +28.0% -8.1% +0.7% +36.0%
-10% -7.1% 7.1% +33.0% -8.2% +0.2% +36.0%
+10% -9.0% -8.9% +41.0% -8.2% -0.2% +37.0%
+30% -10.9% -27,8% +49.0% -8.3% -0.7% +37.0%
(percentage deviations from initial equilibrium; z and 
F are "normalized" with respect to equilibrium output)
Assignment 3
z_ = (QiOp-xFo)(-H3 )/oQiOGp
F_ = 0 
a. = Ha/P
F does not change and the exchange rate depreciation 
offsets the initial fall of foreign demand for domestic 
goods. Cumulated deviations of output from equilibrium 
depend on the size of the devaluation. If the exchange
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rate had no wealth effects z would be certainly 
negative. Simulations confirm these results. Dynamic 
paths of output, inflation, wealth and the exchange 
rate do not significantly differ from those observed 
under assignments 1 and 2.
Assignment 4
a« = -Hs*[(i<'-ax )*va/v2 /{apQa<D€ + [va/v2][x-
- i *  (p + tF0 - Oa<Du) ] }
F. = -H3 *(x F0 “ fli1>li)*(Vi/v2) /{afia0>6 + [va/v2][x 
- i f (P + xFo -0a<l>p)/p]}
z„ = H3* (XFo - QaGp)/{aOaOE + [V a/v 2][x _ if (P + XFo 
-Qa<Dp ) /P ] }
The exchange rate depreciates. When Fo<0 the cumulated 
deviations of output from the natural rate are
negative. When Fo>0 they are still negative if the
wealth effect of a devaluation is dominated by the
fiscal contraction required to control inflation. Net 
domestic holdings of foreign assets are a negative 
function of cumulated deviations of output from the
natural rate, hence they must be positive in
equilibrium. Simulations confirm these algebraic 
results. The dynamic path of output and the policy
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instrument, the tax rate, are nearly identical to the 
case of assignment 3.
The analysis of cumulated deviations from equilibrium 
of the policy instruments shows that assignment 2 
dominates assignment 1 and assignment 4 is preferable 
to assignment 3. Once again the choice between rules 2 
and 4 should be determined by the government's 
preference between tax and exchange rate fluctuations.
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T.able 8. A negative shock to foreign domestic demand:
cumulated squared deviations from equilibrium of policy 
instruients (percentage values)
Assignments 
low interdependence
1 2 3 4
r 3.4 0.68 0.23 0
s 0 2.52 11.5 10.8
a 128.3 5.35 9.77 0
high interdependence
1 2 3 4
r 3.2 1.5 1.02 0
s 0 2.15 10.47 2 3.1
a 355 40.2 33.72 0
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7 .Conclusions
This chapter has analyzed alternative policy 
assignments in a theoretical model of a small open 
economy. We summarize here the properties of each 
regime.
Assignment 1. The paper stresses two fundamental 
weaknesses of a "monetarist" rule. First, our algebraic 
results show that monetary control of the internal 
objective does not prevent the risk of dynamic 
instability arising from the interaction between wealth 
effects in aggregate demand and foreign interest 
payments in the current account. Secondly, under this 
rule permanent real shocks cause uncontrolled transfers 
of foreign wealth and require large adjustments of the 
real exchange rate; this is particularly true when the 
shock affects domestic demand.
Assignment 2. By defining a foreign wealth target, the 
Meade assignment avoids the risk of instability. Also, 
it requires far lower international transfers of wealth 
in the face of "real" shocks. Furthermore, it 
significantly improves the overall dynamic performance
202
of the model: the "Meade" rule always requires smaller 
deviations from equilibrium than the "monetarist" rule. 
Assignments 3 and 4. Under the reversed "Meade"
assignment the exchange rate fluctuations necessary to 
bring down inflation are substantially reduced. If the 
target zones regime is enforced they do not occur at 
all. But these two rules shift the burden of
adjustment on the fiscal instruments, requiring
revisions of the tax rate which might be difficult to 
implement.
When real shocks occur monetary control of the current 
account does not improve on assignment 4. Fiscal
control of the domestic objective coupled with an
exchange rate adjustment which occurs once and for all
seems to be quite effective. To some extent this result
confirms Boughton's skepticism about the effectiveness 
of monetary control of the external objective: one step 
changes of the exchange rate seem to be more efficient. 
Nevertheless, the target zones proposal, ultimate 
object of Boughton's criticism, still retains validity, 
being supported by the rather favorable results 
obtained under rule 4.
Under a target zones regime disinflation has permanent 
effects on foreign wealth and the exchange rate: this
203
outcome is inevitable if governments wish to avoid
exchange rate cycles.„„But we stress tha. t u  ndejr this
regime disinflation policy at home rni^ ght generate
international conflict. as it implies a permanent loss
of financial wealth_and disposable income for.___the
commercial partners of the country.
Our results suggest that the inclusion of fiscal 
control in a policy package prevents instability, no
matter whether this instrument is assigned to the
internal or the external objective. Furthermore, 
combined use of two weapons substantially improves on a 
purely "monetarist" rule. But we do not account for the 
possible existence of institutional lags in the 
implementation of the fiscal feedback. This is a 
widespread criticism to the use of such instrument and
some commentators have argued that fiscal control 
should be assigned to slow moving variables. Obviously 
this will be more or less true according to the 
institutional context of each country, but should 
fiscal policy be actually considered an instrument not 
very flexible, then the desirability of assignments 
like the Meade proposal, already shown to be 
considerable, would be further enhanced.
204
PART II
SIMPLE RULES FOR POLICY COORDINATION
CHAPTER 5
M acroeconoilc policy and interdependence: the debate on
international policy coordination
Introduction
Part two of the thesis deals with the issue of 
policy coordination. The next chapter will investigate 
the performance of alternative simple rules for policy 
coordination in a two-country model which includes the 
current account. In this chapter we review the 
literature on coordination and we do not claim to have 
made any original contribution. However, the present 
discussion will serve as a general introduction to the 
issues to be discussed in chapter 6.
The rest of the chapter is laid out as follows. 
Section one deals with the issue of interdependence 
under a flexible exchange rate regime. Section two is a 
brief review of the game-theoretic approach to policy 
coordination. Section three is a background to our own 
work and is concerned with alternative proposals which 
involve simple policy rules.
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l.Why i s_ cooperation needed.___ The recognition of
interdependence
In part one of the thesis we have shown that
macroeconomic policies may have substantial spill-over 
effects abroad. Under monetarist policies changes of
the monetary rule, albeit neutral in the long run, may 
have prolonged effects on the real exchange rate and on 
the current account. This happens because when prices 
in the goods sector are sticky forward-looking
expectations in the financial markets cause exchange
rate overshooting. If the domestic economy is not 
"small" this affects both international trade and the 
foreign rate of inflation. Secondly, unilateral fiscal 
policy shifts entail a permanent change in the net 
external position of each country and permanently alter 
the real exchange rate and the .trade balance. The 
alternative policy rules we have considered still 
involve substantial spill-over effects. Foreign wealth 
targeting may ensure long term stability of the real 
exchange rate and of trade flows, but it does not 
prevent exchange rates swings. In fact rules requiring 
the opening of a differential between domestic and 
foreign interest rates cause exchange rate dynamics and
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so doing affect inflation abroad. On the other hand, 
the assignment of fiscal policy to inflation control 
may require permanent wealth transfers across 
countries1 .
But if countries are interdependent, decentralized 
policymaking may cause undesired effects abroad and 
generate conflict among countries. Typically, 
uncoordinated policies might result in mutually 
inconsistent exchange rate and balance of payments 
targets and eventually determine a generalized 
reduction of welfare. Advocates of international 
coordination suggest that governments commit themselves 
to alter their policies in order to achieve some common 
goal, for instance the reconciliation of mutually 
inconsistent targets, or to help each government to 
achieve its own objectives, on the grounds that this 
would be beneficial for all coordinating countries.
"The point is that by internalizing the 
spill-overs of individual policy 
actions, coordination widens the area of 
discretion for all participants to 
approach wore closely their objectives"®
IThis issue will be discussed at great length in the 
next chapter
2See Artis and Ostry (1986)
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Assessing the gains from coordination has been the 
focus of the literature following the game-theoretic 
approach to the analysis of policy coordination. It is 
to a brief review of such literature that we now turn.
2 . Strategic int..ex.jd.ep..en.de_ncie and policy coordination
Applications of the game-theoretic approach to the 
issue of policy coordination have rapidly grown in 
number and relevance over the last few years. Both game 
theory and the economic theory of externalities and 
market failures show that decentralized decision making 
can generate outcomes which are outside the set of 
Pareto-optimal outcomes that may be potentially
attained through cooperative solutions. The game-
theoretic approach to policy coordination aims to
assess how outcomes generated by decentralized policy 
actions differ from the outcomes which might prevail 
under cooperative behaviour. We shall consider static 
games first.
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Static games
In a number of seminal papers Hamada (1974, 1976, 
1979) investigated the strategic interdependence among 
national policy makers under different exchange rate 
regimes. He contrasted non-cooperative outcomes, of the 
Nash or Stackelberg type, with those which might be 
achieved through cooperation. In the typical 
description of policy formation, the behaviour of each 
government is described by a reaction curve, showing 
how it will alter one of his policy instruments in 
response to a change in the other country' policy.
Changes of exogenous variables, such as "real shocks", 
determine a shift of the curve. Each government is
assumed to maximize a utility function, typically
quadratic. The game is a variable sum game, otherwise 
no benefit from cooperation, as opposed to 
decentralized policy action, would arise in principle. 
This is obtained by making the plausible assumption 
that policymakers have more targets than instruments. 
Hamada points out that gains from coordination do exist 
as cooperation prevents governments from designing 
mutually inconsistent policies. For instance he shows
that under a fixed exchange rate regime, if countries 
have one instrument, the level of domestic credit, and
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two targets, domestic output and the level of foreign 
reserves, a non-cooperative solution leads to over- 
contractionary policies, as both countries attempt to 
build up reserves by generating current account 
surpluses. He shows that the size of the gains from 
coordination crucially depend on the governments' 
utility functions and on the signs of the spill-over 
effects. Later research has focussed on the outcomes 
occurring under a flexible exchange rate regime. Two 
complementary studies carried out by Canzoneri and Gray 
and Oudiz and Sachs show that the cooperative outcome 
dominates the non-cooperative one. Once more the 
outcome depends on the signs of the spill-over effects 
and on the preferences of the government. Canzoneri 
and Gray argue that if governments assign preeminence 
to short run output gains and the transmission of 
monetary policy is negative, which means that a 
monetary expansion in the home country depreciates the 
exchange rate, raises domestic output and has a 
contractionary effect abroad, the Nash equilibrium is 
associated with over-expansionary monetary policy as 
each country pursues beggar-thy neighbor policies by 
depreciating the exchange rate but no one succeed. On 
the other hand, Oudiz and Sachs, (1985) get to the
conclusion that the Nash equilibrium is over- 
contractionary if governments are mainly concerned with 
reducing inflation in the short run and try to export 
inflation by simply appreciating the exchange rate. To 
clarify the issue further we analyze in detail the 
model which yields the over-contractionary outcome 
under flexible exchange rates3 . The model is defined as 
foilows.
1)m -p = kay - k 2i ;
2 ) y = a p (e + pf-p) -oi;
3 ) pc = (1-y )p + y (e + pf-p );
4 ) i = i f ;
5)mf -pf = k ayf - k2if ;
6)y* = -aP(e+pf-p) -oif ;
7)pcf = (1-U)P* - y(-e + p*-p) ; 
where :
m - p = log of real money balances, 
y = log of real output, 
e = log of the nominal exchange rate 
pc = log of consumer price
There are two symmetric countries. Foreign 
variables are denoted by the superscript f. The model 
is standard and we may be brief in commenting it. It is
3this model has been outlined in McKibbin and Sachs 
(1986) and in McKibbin (1988)
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composed of an IS curve, eq.2 and 6, and an LM curve, 
eq.2 and 5. Capital is perfectly mobile, eq.4. In
equations 3 and 7 we describe the deflator of domestic 
consumption for each country, where y is the share 
of imports in domestic consumption. Output prices are 
fixed and normalized at 
P = P* = Po>0.
p0 may also be considered as an initial price shock. 
Exchange rate expectations are static. We solve the 
model to determine the signs of the spill-over effects.
8)y = 0am - 02m f -(0a - 02 )po ,
9)y*' = 0imf - 02m -(0a - 02 )Po5
10)e = (m -mf )/2Pka
1 1 ) p c = Po + y ( m - m * ) / 2 p k z
12)pcf = Po - y(m-m*)/2pkz 
where:
0a = (2oka + k c )/2ka(oka.+ k 2 )
02 = kz/2ka(oka + k2 )
Spill-over effects are negative: the appreciation of
the domestic real exchange rate raises output abroad. 
We can easily see why it happens. The monetary 
contraction at home raises the domestic interest rate, 
but this is inconsistent with the uncovered interest 
parity condition, eq.4. Equilibrium requires that the
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exchange rate appreciates, depressing output at home 
and raising it abroad, so that interest rates are 
equalized across countries.
Given the assumption that p and p* are fixed, consumer 
price deflation can only be pursued by appreciating the 
exchange rate. From eq.10 we see that deflation is 
achieved only if the monetary stance is more 
contractionary at home than abroad.
Comparison of coefficients 0* and 02 highlights another 
key feature of the model. When the two countries adopt 
the same policy stance, the negative spill-overs 
originated by domestic policy tend to offset the impact 
of foreign policy on foreign output and vice versa, but 
since 0a>02 the domestic impulse will dominate in each 
country4 .
To analyze the implications of the game we must 
introduce the familiar loss function, which is assumed 
identical for the two policy-makers.
13)U = y2 + x(pc )2
14)U * = (y*)2 + x(pc*)2
4This point is important for determining what happens 
when countries choose to adopt an identical policy, as 
discussed below. In principle, the existence of 
negative spillovers might more than offset the 
influence of domestic policy in each country.
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where x is the importance attached to the consumer 
deflator relatively to output.
Under a Nash equilibrium® each policy-maker minimizes 
the loss function taking as given the behaviour of the 
other government. By differentiating the 13) the 
domestic government should set:
15) y(dy/dm) = -xpc (dpc/dm);
substituting eq. 8 and 11 in the 15 yields the reaction 
function of the domestic government:
1 6 ) m = 2 i m f + E 2P o s 
where:
2» = [0a02 + (xp/2Pk2 )z ]/[(0i ) 2 + (xp/2pkz )2 ]
= [01 (0 a - 0a) ~ (Xp/2pk2 )z ]/[(01 )z + (TU/23k2 )2 ]
The Nash equilibrium obtains when m = m*. The
implications for output and the price level are as 
follows.If m = m*' then:
m = - 0 z ) - (xp/2(3k2 ) ]/0a (0a. - 02 )po < 0
Pc = P<=* = Po
y = yf = - (xp/2pk20 a )p0
5The Nash equilibrium is the only form of non- 
cooperative outcome that we discuss here. A more 
general treatment of the subject would involve at least 
the analysis of the Stackelberg equilibrium, where one 
country acts as a leader and is assumed to take into 
account the reactions of the other country when setting 
its own policy.
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The non-cooperative outcome implies a loss of output 
for both countries, and neither country manages to 
achieve a fall of consumption prices. In fact in the 
symmetric case, as the two countries pursue the same 
policy, neither can succeed in appreciating the
exchange rate.
In discussing the cooperative case we assume that a 
"global planner" undertakes the optimization, so as to 
"internalize" in the optimization process the 
externalities of the independent policy decisions. Each 
country is assigned the same weight®. When policy­
makers do not cooperate and the Nash equilibrium
prevails, each government has the perception that: 
dy/dm = 0a and dpc/dm = (xp/2pk2 )
whereas the true derivatives are
dy/dm = 0a- 02 >0 and dpc/dm 0
A deflationary policy can only be implemented by 
appreciating the exchange rate, but this outcome is 
prevented because the two countries have the same 
target, so pc cannot be deflated. Thus the optimal
6Therefore we ignore the bargaining process which might 
eventually yield a cooperative outcome giving different 
weights to each country
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policy involves "accomodation" of the initial price 
shock, so as to avoid output losses’7: 
m = m f = p0
In principle, the case for coordination might seem 
straightforward. But this result is open to an obvious 
criticism. The implementation of coordinated policies 
would require binding rules and appropriate penalties, 
otherwise each country would be better off "cheating" 
on the agreement. The incentive for an individual 
country free-ride on the behaviour of others and to 
renege on cooperative agreements lays at the roots of 
the so called "enforcement problem"® which has been 
regarded as one of the major obstacles to policy 
coordination, due to the absence of supranational 
authorities capable of enforcing cooperative 
agreements. A way out which is common to game theory, 
is the design of appropriate threat strategies. Some 
scholars® have taken the view that the emphasis on 
moral hazard problems has perhaps been excessive: in a 
multi-period context, the early gains from reneging on 
the cooperative policy must be contrasted against the
7Note that the cooperative outcome generated by the 
model implies that a fixed exchange rate regime is 
Pareto-efficient, but different, more general models 
would imply alternative conclusions.
8Franke1 (1989)
9See Frankel (1989) and Hughes Hallett (1987)
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future welfare losses caused by the likely retaliation 
from partner countries. On the other hand, Currie and 
Levine (1987) pointed out that the commonly used threat 
of reversing to a Nash non-cooperative behaviour might 
not constitute a credible deterrent, as it might amount 
to a threat to fully destabilize the system. As a 
consequence, a strong incentive might emerge for each 
country to renege first. The results emerging from the 
literature are somewhat mixed, however the debate on 
the free-rider problem has stressed the importance of a 
multi-period setting for a proper assessment of the 
gains from and the obstacles to policy coordination. 
Indeed, a few conclusions emerging from the literature 
following the static -games approach must be 
reconsidered when economic actors, both governments and 
the private sector, take into account the future 
implications of current behaviour 
Dynamic games
We turn now to the analysis of dynamic games. The 
introduction of dynamics substantially alters the 
nature of the game being played. This brings two 
important points of realism into a static game. The 
first is that the pay-offs of non-cooperative, beggar- 
thy-neighbor policies may look very different in a
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multi-period game. For instance, if the initial 
exchange rate appreciation is to be followed by a long 
run depreciation10 the early inflation gains will be 
reversed in the future, as inflation is reimported 
through a depreciating exchange rate11 . To the extent 
that forward-looking governments realize the longer 
term implications of their actions, beggar-thy-neighbor 
policies lose appeal and, by the same token, gains from 
cooperation are reduced. Secondly, when the governments 
which undertake the intertemporal optimization process 
face a forward-looking private sector, the issue of 
time inconsistency arises. Rogoff (1985b) has argued 
that policy coordination can be counterproductive if it 
undermines the credibility of governments' commitment 
to control inflation. He draws on the work of Barro, 
which we have already reviewed in chapter 1. The Barro 
model is built on the assumption that government and 
wage setters have different objectives. The government 
is more keen to reduce real wages through monetary 
"surprises" in order to achieve a relatively higher
lOindeed this is the final outcome one would predict on 
the grounds of models which include the current account 
(cfr. chapters two and three
llsee Buiter and Miller, (1982), for a formal 
demonstration of the long run ineffectiveness of 
exchange rate appreciations on the total output cost 
necessary to permanently curb inflation.
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output target. The wage setters have a relatively 
higher wage target and are then prepared to accept 
lower output. If the wage setters realize that the 
government has an incentive to "reoptimize" and shift 
the policy towards a more expansionary stance, then 
they will try to anticipate future "surprises" by 
setting from the start a higher wage rate. Thus, an 
inflationary bias is regarded as inherent to the 
interaction between government and wage setters as long 
as their objectives differ and both adopt a forward- 
looking behaviour. In the open economy, the government 
incentive to exploit the short run rigidity of nominal 
wages is weakened by the inflationary consequences of 
the depreciation that would follow the monetary shock. 
Forward-looking wage setters realize this and lower 
their claims, as they perceive that the government is 
now less likely to alter its policy. But if countries 
cooperate, and cooperation takes the form of a fixed 
exchange rate, then the inflationary bias is likely to 
reappear, as wage setters perceive that governments 
might also agree to jointly adopt unexpected 
expansionary policies. As a result inflation under 
cooperation might be higher than inflation under 
decentralized policy making. The logic of the argument
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is indeed quite simple. If an inflationary bias is 
inherent to the closed economy because government 
policies are time-inconsistent, the deflationary bias 
inherent to the sort of Nash equilibria prevailing in 
the open economy under flexible exchange rates has the 
desirable feature of offsetting it, by reducing the 
governments' incentive to reoptimize their policies. To 
make this point Rogoff appealed to a standard result 
from game theory: in a multi-player game cooperation 
between a subset of players may make matters worse for 
those cooperating if the remaining players adopt a non- 
cooperative behaviour. But Rogoff's result might not be 
robust to extensions of the model. For instance Carraro 
and Giavazzi (1988) show that under no circumstances 
policy coordination may decrease welfare in a two- 
economy model with three sectors for each economy, 
namely governments, firms and wage setters. Van der 
Ploeg (1988) has analyzed the same issue in a two 
country general equilibrium model which allows, in 
contrast with most of the literature on policy 
coordination, for a long run trade-off between output 
and inflation that is caused by the presence of 
distortionary taxes. This assumption has the desirable 
feature of enabling one to assess the gains from
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coordination when some long run "conflict of interest" 
might potentially arise. In fact, most of the 
literature is concerned with models where output and 
inflation are independent in the long run, so that in 
equilibrium output is always set at the natural rate 
and each country achieves its own inflation target by 
letting the exchange rate free to fluctuate. He shows 
that a "world planner" would obtain no tax distortions 
and optimal quantities of money. But in a
decentralized economy this outcome cannot be attained. 
Coordinated, time inconsistent policies avoid tax 
distortions but do not achieve the optimal level of 
real money balances because governments lack of 
credibility and, just as in Rogoff's case, cooperation 
raises the governments' incentive to renege on the 
private sector. His conclusion is that without pre­
commitment policy coordination reduces welfare. The
theoretical results on this issue may then look
somewhat inconclusive. However, this strand of the 
literature has the merit of stressing the importance of 
reputation. In fact the adoption of cooperative 
reputational policies may solve the Rogoff conundrum as 
in this case cooperation is extended from a subset of 
players, the two governments, to the whole set of
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players. In fact reputational policies may be thought 
of as policies where governments and the private sector 
cooperate, with the government acting as a leader1 2 . 
Currie and Levine (1987b) investigate the gains from 
coordination with or without pre-commitment. They set 
up a two-country model, with three players, the two 
governments and one private sector, assumed to be 
forward-looking. In this context policies are 
classified by whether they are designed cooperatively 
and whether policies they are reputational or non- 
reputational. Reputational policies rely on pre­
commitment, non-reputationa1 policies are designed in 
such a way that the government has no incentive to re­
optimize in the future The results about the relative 
desirability of a non-reputational coordinated policy 
versus a non-reputational non-coordinated policy was 
inconclusive, as the ranking of the two policies 
crucially depended on the nature of the shock. 
Cooperation without reputation decreased welfare in the 
case of aggregate supply disturbances, but performed 
better under demand shocks. The worst performance was 
achieved under a non-cooperative reputational policy, 
which also seemed to be prone to instability. This was
12Currie and Levine (1987b)
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confirmed in a later paper13 which assessed the 
empirical relevance of this issue. Under reputational 
policies governments rely heavily on the effect of 
announcing future policy actions. To the extent that 
these announcements are believed, policies become 
effective before the governments actually move their 
instruments. With discounting this has the advantage of 
reducing the welfare loss. Under flexible exchange 
rates, reputational monetary policies typically exploit 
the exchange rate, as the expected interest rate path 
affects the spot exchange rate. But if governments 
pursue the same policy without cooperating the 
announcement effects tend to offset each other and the 
final outcome is over-deflationary or over- 
expansionary. Currie, Levine and Vidalis found that for 
some discount parameters of the welfare function the 
system would become unstable. By contrast, cooperative 
reputational policies markedly improve welfare on all 
the alternatives, because they enable governments to 
exploit the benefits of reputation and to avoid the 
welfare losses deriving from the setting of mutually 
inconsistent targets14. Their main conclusion therefore
13Currie, Levine and Vidalis, (1987)
14We have already shown that in the closed economy 
reputational policies generally dominate non- 
reputational time consistent policies. The trouble with
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is that benefits from coordination and reputation 
should be considered as mutually interdependent. 
Governments may exploit the benefits from reputation 
only if they coordinate. But substantial gains from 
coordination may only arise when policies are 
reputational. Currie and Levine also address the 
important issue of the sustainability of cooperative
policies. Cooperative agreements may prove
unsustainable because governments may find advantageous 
to renege on the private sector and because either 
government might have an incentive to renege on the
other. The cost of reneging on the agreed policy
obviously is the loss of reputation. Sustainability
requires that the welfare loss associate to the 
cooperative policy is lower, for each country at each 
point in time than that implied by the non-cooperative 
policies. Currie Levine and Vidalis find that the 
cooperative reputational policy is generally 
sustainable, but that the incentive to renege may arise 
when the gains from the cooperative reputational policy 
are small. Furthermore, they show that introducing 
stochastic noise the incentive to renege is eliminated,
non-cooperative reputational policies is that the 
mutual inconsistency of policies reduces the "gains 
from reputation"
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as the gains from switching to policies that exploit 
the previous commitment must be contrasted with the 
poorer future policy performance, deriving from the 
loss of reputation, in the the face of disturbances 
currently unknown.
Empirical evidence
The empirical evidence about the gains from 
cooperation is rather mixed and supports the view that 
gains do exist but are not large. Oudiz and Sachs 
(1984) estimated governments "revealed preference 
function" (for the U.S., Japan and Germany) by assuming 
that observed policy outcomes corresponded the optimal 
uncoordinated policies and then used policy multipliers 
from large scale econometric models of the world 
economy to assess whether coordination would increase 
welfare. Gains were found to be rather small, between 
1% and 2% of GNP. However, the revealed preference 
function seemed rather implausible, since it implied 
that the U.S. was indifferent to a current account 
balance. Under this circumstance one should not be 
surprised of finding that the gains from cooperation 
are small. Since Oudiz and Sachs assumed that each 
country had two instruments, fiscal and monetary 
policy, the U.S. was in the position of achieving its
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targets independently, as it was supposed to have two 
targets only, output and inflation. Furthermore, the 
study did not assess the importance of the 
sustainability of the uncoordinated policies, which 
implied the accumulation of a huge external debt for 
the U.S.. Ishii, McKibbin and Sachs (1985) applied the 
results of dynamic game theory to a five region model. 
They used OECD projections for macroeconomic policies 
to generate a future baseline and found that 
coordinated optimization leads to substantial gains. 
Currie, Levine and Vidalis, (1987), found that the 
gains from coordination increase with the persistence 
of disturbances. Recent work from Hughes Hallett 
produced worrying evidence that the gains from 
coordination are asymmetrically distributed among the 
G5 and that attempts to alter this outcome would also 
reduce the overall gains. Typically, conflict arises 
among countries on how to share the burden of 
adjustment. The Hughes Hallett result implies that 
cooperative solutions might be difficult to find as the 
uneven distribution of gains becomes politically not 
sustainable1® .
15See Currie, Holtham and Hughes Hallett (1988)
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Conclusions
Whatever the theoretical results about the gains 
from coordination, the call for some kind of 
cooperation in the design of macroeconomic policies has 
impressively gained consensus because of the difficulty 
governments are having in implementing their own 
policies independently.
One limit of the literature we have reviewed in this 
section is that one cannot contrast the desirability of 
sub-optimal coordinated policies against decentralized 
sub-optimal policy action. But non optimizing behaviour 
is likely to be the rule rather than the exception in 
the practical design of macroeconomic policies. 
Furthermore, fully optimizing rules are exceedingly 
complex. As Currie and Levine (1987a) point out, there 
must be considerable doubt as to whether the degree of 
complexity is realistic. The obvious alternative, 
rather than run the risk of considerable simplification 
at the stage of implementation, whith the risk of
adverse results, is to build in the requirement of
simplicity from the outset1®. Currie, Levine and
Gaines, (1989), have developed a methodology for 
exploring the issues of reputation and sustainability
16See Currie and Levine (1985a)
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in the context of simple policy rules. Their work bears 
many similarities to that of Currie, Levine and 
Vidalis, (1987). They argue that policy-makers may 
substantially enhance credibility in the eyes of a 
skeptical private sector by adopting policy rules which 
are simple. In this context simplicity means17 that 
rules have a simple dynamic structure and respond to a 
restricted range of variables. But if the policy rule 
is constrained to be "simple", then Currie, Levine and 
Gaines show that substantial gains accrue from pursuing 
simple coordinated reputational policies instead of 
simple coordinated non-reputational policies. However, 
this result does not seem entirely convincing, as there 
should be no incentive for governments to pursue a 
simple policy when it cannot bring any benefit in terms 
of reputation and credibility. Governments willing to 
renege on the private sector would then have an 
incentive to switch to fully optimal time inconsistent 
rules. The comparison between cooperative reputational 
and non-cooperative reputational simple rules is 
probably more relevant: the welfare loss under
cooperative rules is substantially lower. Cooperative 
agreements appear to be sustainable when policy is
17See Currie, Holtham and Hughes Hallett (1988)
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restricted to the domain of simple policy rules, 
whereas if governments switch to non-cooperative non- 
reputational rules the incentive to renege becomes 
substantial.
Some theoretical support would therefore seem to exist 
for simplicity in the design of coordinated policies. 
It is to the discussion of proposals which involve 
simple coordinated policy rules that we now turn. 
3.Si!ple rules for policy coordination
Several simple rules for policy coordination have been 
put forward over the last few years. In this brief 
review we shall focus on three proposals:
1)the McKinnon proposal for a return to a fixed 
exchange rate regime;
2)the target zones proposal, as it has been put forward 
by Williamson;
3)the simple rules separately advocated by the 
"Cambridge Group", working with Meade1®, by Boughton 
(1989), and by Genberg and Svoboda (1988). We consider 
these three proposals as part of the same strand of 
literature because, despite some non negligible 
differences, they share a strong emphasis on the need
18Vines et al. (1989)
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for direct current account targeting and allow for 
temporary fluctuations of real exchange rates.
The rules reviewed in this section are designed with 
the obvious aim of internalizing, for each coordinating 
country, the externalities of individual policy 
actions. They differ because their proponents do not 
share the same view about the working of an economic 
system1®, or apparently imply different welfare 
functions2 0 , or attach a different "cost" to the use of 
the same policy instrument2 1 .
19Contrast for example the purchasing power parity 
approach followed by McKinnon with the fundamental real 
exchange rate approach of Miller-Williamson 
20Boughton overlooks the trade distortions potentially 
caused by real exchange rate fluctuations, whereas this 
is a primary source of concern for both Williamson and 
McKinnon.
21Meade and his associates criticize Williamson's 
assignment of fiscal policy to the domestic objective 
for two reasons. First, they point ou that in many 
countries fiscal policy is not sufficiently flexible to 
be used for inflation control. Secondly, they argue 
that this assignment might cause adverse cost-push 
effects in the labour market.
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The McKinnon proposal
McKinnon has for long advocated the return to a 
system of fixed exchange rates, which he regards as the 
necessary condition for ensuring the survival of a free 
trade regime. We have already discussed at some length 
the reasons of his dissatisfaction with a regime of 
unmanaged float and will not repeat them here. He 
points at the working of the international monetary 
system during the late 19th century as an example both 
for a reform of the international monetary system and 
for international policy coordination2 2 . In his view, 
but many would probably disagree23 , that regime worked 
reasonably well because countries pursued coordinated 
policies in defence of international gold parities. 
Without actually returning to a gold standard, McKinnon 
would advocate the sort of monetary cooperation needed 
to ensure fixed nominal parities and roughly the same 
rate of inflation across countries. Following
Dornbusch, we may summarize his view in a few key 
propositions :
22McKinnon, (1988)
23For example Eichengreen (1985) argues that Central 
Banks sterilized gold flows more often than intervening 
to reinforce their impact on the domestic market. 
Furthermore, interest rates tended to move together, 
whereas the "rules of the game" would have implied the 
widening of differentials.
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-The doctrine predicting that variations of exchange 
rates may achieve current account equilibrium is a 
false one: gains in competitiveness trigger an increase 
of domestic real expenditure which offsets the initial 
improvement of the current account. He recommends sound 
fiscal policies as a mean for ensuring current account 
equilibrium.
-The purchasing power parity theory is a good guide to 
equilibrium exchange rates. This approach involves the 
identification of the level of nominal exchange rates 
that would equalize across countries the price levels 
of internationally tradable goods during a period of 
substantial equilibrium of trade flows24 .
-Currency substitution shocks are the key determinant 
of exchange rate instability.
Therefore nominal parities should be fixed according to 
Purchasing Power Parity and the aggregate monetary base 
of the three main industrial countries should be 
managed so as to ensure price stability in the world 
economy. Each country would then follow a domestic 
credit target and stabilize the exchange rate by means 
of symmetric, unsterilized intervention.The mechanism 
which should prevent diverging inflation rates among
24For a more detailed exposition see McKinnon and Ohno,
(1987)
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countries does involve control of a domestic monetary 
aggregate, but a key role is played by the longer run 
effect on expectations formed in the face of such a 
currency union and by the impact on trade and 
employment of the temporary appreciation of terms of 
trade. Nominal exchange rates being fixed, inflation 
differentials will change real exchange rates in ways 
which shift demand from countries experiencing high 
levels of inflation to countries whose price level 
grows more slowly.
Criticisms of the McKinnon proposal
l)The first obvious criticism is concerned with 
McKinnon's belief that variations of the real exchange 
rate cannot achieve current account equilibrium. 
Meade2® general equilibrium analysis has shown that the 
correct policy mix for balancing a current account 
deficit involves a combination of depreciated real 
exchange rates and a cut in domestic absorption. Our 
analysis in the former chapters has confirmed that a 
devaluation is effective in bringing the net external 
position of a country into equilibrium, as long as it 
does not excessively stimulate domestic inflation
25Meade (1951)
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2)A second criticism is concerned with the reliance on 
the Purchasing Power Parity. Current account models of 
the exchange rate that follow the seminal work of 
Branson, which we have already discussed at some 
length, show that macroeconomic equilibrium may obtain 
at different levels of the real exchange rate. 
According to this approach, the real exchange rate 
ensures current account equilibrium for given output 
levels and a given net external position. An increase 
in net domestic holdings of foreign assets raises 
domestic demand for goods relatively to foreign demand 
and this causes a terms of trade appreciation. 
Furthermore, exchange rate flexibility may be needed to 
accomodate the differential inflation which stems from 
divergent rates of productivity growth2 6 . Another 
important objection to the McKinnon approach is that if 
tradables in the industrial economies are imperfect 
substitutes it makes very little sense to look for 
exchange rates that ensure Purchasing Power Parity.
3)Last but not least comes the skepticism about the 
presumption that currency substitution is the main 
source of interest rate instability. In analogy with
26See Dornbusch (1988) for a clear example of how 
differences in productivity growth may substantially 
complicate the task of equalizing inflation rates 
across countries.
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the celebrated analysis of Poole (1970), we would argue 
that exchange rate pegging might be heavily sub-optimal 
if real disturbances arise. For example, if an
inflationary shock occurs which is not due to
inopportune money supply expansion, an "accomodative" 
policy allowing for a higher price level but no
permanently higher inflation might be desirable. But 
this policy would put a strong deflationary pressure on 
the trade sector under a fixed exchange rate regime2 7 . 
Indeed some degree of managed exchange rate flexibility 
might be helpful in limiting the negative effects of 
adverse "real" shocks on output and inflation.
The Target Zones Proposal
Williamson points out two reasons of dissatisfaction 
with a regime of unmanaged float. The first is that it 
leaves room for too much exchange rate volatility, due 
to the inherent instability of the international 
financial markets. The second is that it does not place 
enough pressure on countries to cooperate their 
economic policies2®. On the other hand Williamson, 
unlike McKinnon, would not advocate a return to a fixed 
exchange rate regime. In fact he believes that a
27Wi11iamson (1988) raises this criticism
28We would rather take the view that a regime of
unmanaged float is often the result of policy conflict.
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flexible, but not unmanaged, exchange rate performs a 
desirable function in allowing the reconciliation of 
differential inflation rates. Even more important in 
his view is the possibility, that a flexible exchange 
rate does guarantee, to adjust the terms of trade when 
this is necessary to obtain current account 
equilibrium. Another reason for advocating exchange 
rate flexibility is that it allows a moderate degree of 
temporarily anticyclical policies whenever the economic 
conditions of each individual country should require 
it. Finally Williamson sees a role for a flexible 
exchange rate as an instrument for temporarily 
accomodating speculative pressures which it would be 
too costly to offset through exchange rate 
intervention. He believes that the "announcement" of 
the exchange rate target and the publicly known 
commitment of governments to cooperate to achieve it 
would reduce uncertainty about the formation of 
expectations and the short term volatility of exchange 
rates. In his own words:
"The target zones proposal envisages a limited 
number of the major countries negotiating a set 
of mutually consistent targets for their 
exchange rates ........  The aim would be to set
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exchange rate targets at fundamental equilibrium 
exchange rates, that is , at the real values 
that on average in the medium term are expected 
to reconcile the internal and external 
balance...... The participating countries would
be expected to conduct their macroeconomic
policies with a view t o ......preventing their
(real) exchange rates going outside a broad zone 
o f .±10* around the target."*®
As it is defined above, the target zones proposal 
leaves many interrogatives. An obvious weakness of the 
target zones proposal is the absence of a "nominal 
anchor" for the conduct of domestic anti-inflationary 
policy. This objection arises because, given the 
commitment of monetary policy to the protection of the 
target zone and the flexibility of the nominal exchange 
rate, some other policy instrument is needed to achieve 
the domestic target.
Williamson accepts such criticism and does not 
underestimate the importance of policy coordination for 
guaranteeing the sustainability of a target zones 
regime. As a guideline for implementing a coordinated
29Wi11iamson, (1987)
237
policy he has put forward the following three 
propositions.
-The average level of world interest rates should be 
assigned the control of aggregate nominal income 
-Interest rates differentials should aim at limiting 
currency deviations from their targets.
-National fiscal policies should be designed with 
the aim to achieve nominal income targets. This version 
of the target zones proposal has been slightly modified 
by Miller and Williamson, (1987), who suggest that 
fiscal policy in each country should be assigned to 
domestic demand rather than nominal income.
Boughton (1989) has strongly criticized the 
proposal. He points out that under a flexible exchange 
rate fiscal policy has a comparative advantage over 
monetary policy in controlling the current account, 
because any attempt to improve the current account by 
depreciating the exchange rate would cause a spur of 
domestic demand and suck in more imports, whereas the 
effect of a fiscal contraction would be unambiguously 
positive. On the other hand monetary policy would seem 
to be more effective in controlling the domestic 
target, because a fiscal policy shift would push the 
interest rate in the same direction so that the
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necessary exchange rate variation might in principle
offset the fiscal stimulus3 0 . In our view Boughton's
criticism might be correct for the conduct of policy in
the short term. In fact it should not be necessary to
rely on monetary policy for the determination of the
equilibrium target. As we shall see in the next chapter
Edison, Miller and Williamson, (1987) have shown with
the aid of a small two country model that control of
domestic targets might be achieved assigning fiscal
policy to the domestic target and leaving monetary
policy with the task of equalizing interest rates
across countries as long as destabilizing speculative
attacks to the exchange rate do not occur. To the
extent that this policy involved only temporary current
account fluctuations and no permanent international
redistribution of wealth, that is, no revision of the
fundamental exchange rate would be necessary,
Williamson would not advocate monetary control of the
current account.
"A (current account) deficit of one year that is 
offset by a surplus one year or two later has no 
enduring effects on consumption, investment, 
inflation or any other variable of welfare
30Indeed Boughton criticism is a combination of the 
well known conclusion of Fleming Mundell about the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy under perfect capital 
mobility and of the equally well known Laursen-Metzler 
effect.
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significance. On the contrary, short-run 
variations in the current account provide a 
valuable shock absorber: it is only when they 
cumulate over the medium term that one needs to 
be troubled with the sustainability and 
optimality of borrowing from or lending to the 
rest of the world"®1
The most obvious weakness of the Williamson proposal is
the perhaps excessive reliance on fiscal policy. This
is in fact a rather inflexible instrument, which
governments seem to find more difficult to adjust to
changes of the economic climate than monetary policy.
As Williamson himself has stressed3 2 , coordination of
national fiscal policies has so far been the area where
recent attempts of implementing coordination in
practice has failed so far. This is not to mean that
the fiscal instrument should not play a role in a
policy mix aiming at macroeconomic stabilization.
Indeed, this thesis stresses the importance of fiscal
policy for stabilizing an open economy, but the fiscal
instrument might be geared toward targets which may be
regarded as a source of concern in the longer run. It
is to these proposals that we now turn.
31Williamson (1989) 
32Wi11iamson , ( 1988)
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Alternative proposals involving fiscal control of the 
current account.
In this section we consider the so-called "IMF view"33 
and a proposal outlined by the "Group of Cambridge" 
working with Meade. To some extent these two proposals 
might look pretty similar, but some important 
differences will emerge during the review.
The "IMF view has been articulated in two 
contributions, put forward by Genberg and Svoboda
(1988) and Boughton, (1989). Both share the view that:
" as a general rule, expenditure changing 
policies have the most direct and quantitatively 
strong influence on the current account. 
Expenditure-switching policies, in contrast, 
affect the exchange rate significantly but have 
only a limited impact on the current
account....... fiscal policy has a comparative
advantage over monetary policy as an instrument 
for current account adjustment as opposed to 
domestic aggregate demand stabilization . "a‘*
Genberg and Svoboda are mainly concerned with the 
correction of current account imbalances. They note, 
correctly in our view, that there is no predictable 
link between the exchange rate and the current account 
balance unless one takes into account the full set of 
relevant variables. In other words, they stress the
33We mutuate this definition from Currie et al.1989 
34Genberg and Svoboda (1988)
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importance of a general equilibrium analysis for the 
determination of the current account balance. In their 
view the current level of the exchange rate merely 
reflects the current and expected values of the 
relevant variables, including the policy mix. This 
framework is closely related to the monetary approach 
under the assumption of rational expectations. They 
implicitly assume that the correct policy mix may be 
sufficient for achieving current account balance and 
overlook the possibility that exchange rate swings may 
derive from shifts in portfolio preferences. In this 
context they argue in favour of the assignment of 
fiscal policy to current account control on the grounds 
of the comparative advantage that this instrument 
supposedly has over monetary policy3 0 . As far as policy 
coordination is concerned, their main prescription is 
that governments should implement "sound" fiscal 
policies. If national fiscal policies follow diverging 
paths and this has undesirable consequences for the 
global economy as well as for each individual economy, 
they conclude that the best remedy is to redress such 
policies, instead of pursuing exchange rate adjustments 
by means of monetary policy. One is left to suppose
35 although different models might yield opposite 
results
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that they simply regard the attainment of each 
country's internal target as a matter best tackled 
under decentralized policy action.
Boughton1s paper is concerned with a more general
"blueprint" for macroeconomic stabilization. In his
view the main source of governments' concern for a
balanced current account rests on the intergenerational
transfers of disposable income that current account
imbalances imply. He stresses that the impact of
monetary policy on the current account balance is
ambiguous and advocates fiscal control of the external
target. This implies that governments should agree
about desired external balances, which should not be
necessarily zero, and assign domestic fiscal policies
to this target. Given this assignment, and given that
monetary policy has little or no impact on the current
account, Boughton argues that each country should
pursue its own internal target independently by means
of monetary control This would obviously imply that
exchange rate swings would become tolerable since they
would not be associates with external imbalances.:
"the international coordination of monetary 
policy is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
attaining the targets, fiscal policy 
coordination, however, is necessary and, if 
monetary policy is aimed correctly at internal 
balance, sufficient as well."
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One difficulty with this proposal is that, while 
advocating a reasonable solution to the control of 
trade imbalances it would leave plenty of room for 
conflict arising from the international transmission of 
inflation (or deflation) through the exchange rate. 
Under this regime nothing would prevent the world 
economy from being locked into sub-optimal Nash 
equilibria of the kind discussed in Hamada. A second 
difficulty is that changes in the real exchange rate 
level re-allocate resources between tradables and non­
tradables, and this has important implications too, as 
excessive appreciation might fuel calls for 
protectionism, one of the evils coordination should 
primarily avoid. Finally, as Vines (1989) pointed out, 
there is nothing in Boughton's proposal which is meant 
to reduce exchange rate volatility3®
The "group of Cambridge"37 is not directly
concerned with the issue of policy coordination, as 
they focus on macroeconomic policy design in a single 
country. Nevertheless their approach is of interest
here, as it bears relevant implications for the
definition of targets. They point at a wealth target as
36This criticism would apply to the paper of Genberg 
and Svoboda, too.
37Vines et al.(1989)
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an important element in policy design. We have already 
discussed this at some length in chapter 1, it is 
interesting to note here that they stress the 
importance of allowing for current account deficits as 
they enable a country to achieve its overall wealth 
target. For example, it might be acceptable for a 
country to run a current account deficit as long as it 
is meant to finance a build up of its productive 
capital, so that the expected income stream may be used 
to service the current deficit3®. One major caveat is 
that wealth targets would have to be coordinated as 
long as they imply an international redistribution of 
wealth. In the context of this thesis, where output is 
assumed to be constant and no capital accumulation
takes place, setting a wealth target is tantamount to 
setting a foreign wealth target. Also, given that 
output is constant in the long run, a foreign wealth 
target would necessarily imply a long term real 
exchange rate target. Thus, the position of the "Group
of Cambridge" has substantially different implications
from the "IMF view", because neither Genberg and
Svoboda nor Boughton are too concerned with this
38This argument has been used very recently, in the 
face of the external deficits run by the U.S. and the 
UK
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aspect, as they simply stress the importance of 
achieving current account balance at whatever level of 
the exchange rate. Meade and his associates recommend 
the combined assignment of fiscal and monetary policy 
to both the domestic and external target, although they 
recognize that fiscal policy has a comparative 
advantage over monetary policy in controlling the 
current account. This might imply that, for each
assignment, the relative strength in using an
instrument should depend on the comparative advantage
of the instrument itself. In the next chapter we shall
assess the performance of a simplified version of this 
proposal involving "decoupled" control rules, which is 
spelled out as follows:
-coordinated use of monetary policy, so as to enable 
each country to achieve its domestic target. At the 
world level monetary policy is assigned to a global 
nominal income target, as in the Williamson proposal. 
Real interest rate differentials are assigned to 
nominal income differentials. This combined strategy 
ensures that countries do not pursue independent 
policies which might turn out to be excessively 
inflationary or deflationary.
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-Differentials in the stance of national fiscal 
policies will be assigned to an internationally agreed 
wealth target. Countries whose current net external 
position is above target are required to expand, 
whereas countries whose current level of foreign wealth 
are below target are required to contract.
One might object that under this assignment the 
definition of the level of the exchange rate is left to 
"market forces" and that this might leave room for
foreign exchange instability. But the announcement of a 
long run target for wealth and the real exchange rate 
might provide an "anchor" preventing the current 
exchange rate from drifting away. Furthermore,
coordinated intervention and a limited degree of
flexibility of the monetary instrument3® might
significantly reduce the danger of destabilizing 
speculation.
Empirical evidence
The empirical evidence on the relative performance 
of the alternative proposals is still scarce. A recent 
study by Taylor (1988) stresses the negative 
consequences of a regime of fixed exchange rates and 
provides some indirect support for the "IMF view".
39The target zones proposal shares these features, too
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Taylor estimates a 7 country model where forward- 
looking expectations drive the exchange rate and 
influence the labour market as in Taylor's model of 
sticky wages (1980), long run output is set at the 
natural rate, fiscal policy is exogenous. Taylor argues 
that, under a wide set of disturbances, independently 
set interest rate rules which aim at controlling a 
domestic target, in the form of either a price level or 
a nominal income target, would perform better than a 
fixed exchange rate regime where monetary policy is 
constrained to maintain nominal parities. Under this 
second rule interest rates in all countries move 
simultaneously as average inflation raises above target 
and the real exchange rate fluctuations, determined 
only by the differential rates of inflation, avoid 
persistent differentials in the national rates of 
inflation. The reason why decentralized monetary policy 
performs better is quickly spelled out. Suppose that in 
one country inflation unexpectedly rises. Under a fixed 
exchange rate regime the domestic interest rate is 
raised only when and to the extent that world inflation 
goes up. The policy feedback is therefore slow and weak 
in the domestic country and unnecessarily affects the 
foreign economies. The real exchange rate swing caused
248
by the inflation differential affects the individual 
economies with a delay, due to the j-curve effect. As a 
consequence, the proper deflationary feedback in the
domestic economy operates too late. Symmetrically, the 
foreign economies face an unnecessary deflation in the 
initial phase of the cycle. Real exchange rate
fluctuations are higher under the flexible exchange 
rate regime, but swings of trade flows are not. This is
very much in line with Boughton's argument that
monetary policy has negligible effects on the current
account, although it does influence profitability in 
the traded goods sector. Taylor's study seems open to 
an important criticism: it does not account for the
wealth redistribution which takes place through current 
account imbalances4 0 . In fact these effects might prove 
quite important. In the next chapter we shall simulate 
a small theoretical model which is analytically very 
similar to Taylor's model, as both are derived from 
Carlozzi and Taylor, (1985). It will be shown that
decentralized monetary policy as advocated by Taylor
may cause huge current account swings and even overall 
instability.
40but the majority of large scale econometric models 
shares this shortcoming
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Frenkel Goldstein and Masson (1988) simulate a 
model where exchange rate expectations correctly 
anticipate the policy stance. They first try to assess 
whether decentralized policy action without sharp 
shifts would have improved the macroeconomic 
performance. To do this they simply "smooth" over time 
the paths of policy variables4 1 . The outcome is that 
smoothness of targets would have actually increased. 
Frenkel, Goldstein and Masson argue that this should 
not surprise, as actual policies were indeed not 
exogenous during the simulation period but responded to 
such exogenous shocks as the oil price rise, therefore 
smoothing was already embedded in the historical data. 
They find that the target zones proposal is effective 
in limiting current account imbalances as fiscal policy 
stabilizes domestic targets, but at the cost of large 
budget deficits. By contrast, the exchange rate paths 
are smoothed only to a limited extent and at the cost 
of strong interest rate swings. But this result might 
be due to an unconvincing feature of their simulation 
approach: Frenkel, Goldstein and Masson assume that 
future shocks are correctly anticipated, and so is the 
policy feedback. Perhaps their results would have been
41They simply consider five-year moving averages for 
each policy instrument.
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markedly different if it had been assumed that foreign 
exchange markets may anticipate the state contingent 
policy response but not the shock. Another criticism 
comes from Williamson, who has pointed out that, 
despite the introduction of rational expectations, the 
model fails to account for the beneficial role of 
exchange rate targeting on "bubbles" and "fads", 
despite the fact that this is one of the main goals of
the target zones proposal. Furthermore, they do not
discuss the evolution of the global economy, but we 
have theoretical reasons to believe that the 
coordinated world monetary policy advocated by 
Williamson is likely to improve on the actual path of 
the global economy, as it reflects non-cooperative 
policy decisions. Also it is not entirely clear how the 
monetary policy rule is applied. They state that 
uncovered interest parity holds among the 
industrialized countries, but that a fiscal expansion 
appreciates the exchange rate4 2 . It is only at this
stage that monetary policy is activated to keep the
exchange rate close to the target. But this is not the 
kind of policy that advocates of the target zone 
proposal have suggested. In fact, Edison, Miller and
42Frenkel Goldstein and Masson (1988) page 33
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Williamson (1987) simulate a small theoretical model 
where uncovered interest parity holds and real interest 
rates are equalized across countries in the face of 
changes of the fiscal policy stance, so that no 
exchange rate dynamics occur in absence of "fads"4 3 . 
One would expect this result to be replicated in the 
simulations carried out by Frenkel, Goldstein and
Masson.
Currie and Wren-Lewis (1989) investigated two 
alternative rules, the target zones proposal and the 
"Boughton" assignment by simulating the GEM model for 
the 7 major countries. They define a welfare function 
which includes output, inflation, fiscal policy and the 
exchange rate. They then optimize the values of the
parameters to be included in the feed-back rules. One 
major criticisms of this procedure is that it selects 
the strength of the policy feedback under the
assumption that shocks are known4 4 . This is likely to 
introduce a bias in favour of the feedback policies 
over the historical paths, but should not affect the 
comparison between alternative assignments. The target 
zones rule turned out to perform better than the
43In the next chapter we will discuss the Edison Miller 
Williamson paper at great length 
44see Williamson, 1988
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Boughton assignment. One major difficulty with the 
latter assignment was that the exchange rate 
flexibility induced by monetary control of the domestic 
target affected the current account with considerable 
delay, due to the J-curve effect. The delayed response 
of fiscal policy to exchange rate swings would then 
influence the domestic target in a way that would 
complicate the task of monetary policy and introduce 
greater overall variability of the targets. But one 
might argue that if the fiscal policy feedback had been 
calibrated more carefully in order to account for the 
J-curve effect the Boughton assignment might have
performed significantly better. Currie and Wren-Lewis 
point out that the preferable outcome associated with 
the Target zones proposal depends crucially on the 
arguments of the welfare function, which includes the 
exchange rate but does not consider the current
account. When the current account is an argument of the 
welfare function the Boughton assignment performs 
better at least for a few countries. Williamson's 
counterargument is that in principle there are no 
strong reasons for assigning a welfare cost to current 
account swings, as long as they are temporary4 0 ,
45This might not be true when these swings are large 
and their correction becomes very difficult, so that
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because they will be easily accomodated by the 
financial markets. What the Currie and Wren-Lewis 
experiment fails to tell us is whether the target zones 
proposal is able to prevent undesired wealth transfers 
across countries, as the GEM model does not account for 
wealth effects. If target zones implied this outcome,
at least under a certain range of shocks, then the
balance might shift in favour of the Boughton rule, 
whose design prevents wealth redistribution. This issue 
will be investigated in the next chapter.
4.Conclusions
In this chapter we have been concerned with several
issues which have emerged in the debate on policy
coordination. In the context of a growing 
interdependence of national economies it may be 
advantageous for governments to pursue their goals 
cooperatively instead of acting independently, as 
decentralized policy action may yield outcomes which 
lay out the set of Pareto-efficient outcomes. The game- 
theoretic approach has stressed the potential gains 
from coordination, but has also emphasized the 
importance of reputation if cooperation is to actually 
improve welfare. Time inconsistent coordinated optimal
the incentive to renege on previous commitments 
increases.
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policies without pre-commitment are likely to be 
counterproductive in a context where the private sector 
is forward-looking. This conclusion has given support 
to advocates of simple policy rules, which are easily 
understood and monitored. Several proposals have been 
put forward over the last few years. To some extent, an 
empirical evaluation of the performance of these rules 
has already been carried out, with the aid of large
econometric models. This pragmatic approach may be
illuminating, but often it falls short of pinpointing 
the theoretical determinants of the behavior of the 
economy and of the reasons why one proposal should be 
preferred. Furthermore, wealth effects are often 
neglected, despite their importance for determining 
long run equilibria, both in large econometric models 
and in the simpler models which aim to provide an 
analytical discussion of the issue. In the next chapter 
we will simulate a small theoretical model where 
international transfers of wealth occurring through the 
balance of payments are explicitly modelled. In this
framework we shall assess the performance of
alternative simple rules for policy coordination.
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CHAPTER 6
TARGET ZONES AND WEALTH EFFECTS: CURRENT ACCOUNT 
IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE POLICY ASSIGNMENTS
1.INTRODUCTION.
Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods exchange 
rate system, currencies of the most advanced world 
economies have more or less freely fluctuated. But 
floating has been accompanied by large swings of real 
exchange rates and trade flows. As a result there have 
been calls for some sort of policy coordination.
One of the most influential policy coordination 
proposals is that of a system of target zones 
(Williamson,1987): the proposal has been presented as a 
device for avoiding real exchange rate "misalignments", 
which are defined (Williamson, 1985) as "persistent 
departures of the exchange rate from its long run 
equilibrium level". It has been claimed (Edison, 
Miller, Wi11iamson,1987, henceforth EMW) that such real 
exchange rate targeting also requires some degree of 
coordination of fiscal policy if control of inflation 
is to be achieved at the same time. In this system 
monetary policy in each country is assigned to the real 
exchange rate target. and coordinated fiscal policy is 
assigned to reducing the inflationary imbalance among
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countries. EMW have examined their proposals by means 
of simulating a small theoretical model.
However their work suffers from a serious
shortcoming: although their exchange rate target is
stated to be determined with the aim of achieving 
balance of payments equilibrium (Williamson and Miller, 
1987), no account is in fact given in their model of 
the way in which the current account would evolve as a 
consequence of the policies they advocate. In this 
chapter we study that question and show that such 
current account behaviour has potentially worrying
implications for their scheme. We do this by analyzing
an extended version of the EMW simulation experiment, 
in which we explicitly model the current account 
equation and introduce wealth effects in the aggregate 
demand function.
The second objective of this chapter is to focus on 
another problematic aspect of the EMW proposal which 
has so far received scant attention. They assign 
monetary policy to the control of average world
inflation. Under this regime average world interest 
rates would be raised if global inflation rose above 
its global target. Skepticism has already been 
expressed about the possibility of enforcing this
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uniformity (Fischer, 1987), but there is another 
potentially very serious problem: this policy rule has 
implications for the reduction of national imbalances 
which have probably been greatly underestimated. EMW 
regard control of world and national targets as two 
problems to be solved independently. In fact this may 
no longer be possible when the behaviour of the current 
account is brought into the picture. It is well known 
that fluctuating interest rates redistribute wealth 
among debtor and creditor countries and cause current 
account disequilibrium. But the EMW global anti- 
inflation policy would do just this and would, we 
argue, probably make the task of reducing national 
divergence far more complicated, if foreign investment 
were to be considered a source of active concern for 
national governments.(Louvre agreement,1987)
The chapter has a third objective, since it is 
our intention not merely to criticize. An alternative 
set of rules for control of national imbalances is also 
presented. In this scheme interest rate differentials 
are assigned to inflation divergences and coordinated 
fiscal policy stances are assigned to control of an 
agreed international distribution of financial wealth. 
In this second framework surplus countries would be
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required to carry out a fiscal expans i on whereas
countries running a deficit would be required to carry
out a fiscal c o n t r a c t i o n . This policy assignment is not 
entirely novel, it bears some resemblance to the work 
of Boughton ( 1988 ) and to a proposal by Vines et al .
(1989). But this is the first time it has been fully 
spelled out. The reason we do this is that we are
sympathetic to the general thrust of EMW policy
c o ordination proposals, but wish to find a way to
overcome the p otentially rather severe problems
associated with the particular details of their 
proposals .
The rest of the chapter is laid out as f o l l ows.In 
section 2 we describe the technical details of the
model. In sections 3,4 and 5 we present the results 
obtained simulating three alternative policy 
assignments .
2. THE M O D E L .
Model structure and parameter values entir e l y
correspond to those of EMW, who follow Carlozzi and 
Taylor (1985) except that wealth effects in a g g r egate 
demand and the current account. On the other hand the
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model is a straigh t f o r w a r d  extension in a two country 
setting of the model set out in chapter 4 1 .
It is assumed that the world economy is composed 
of two national units, the home and foreign economy, 
identical in size and structure. Since the two 
economies are isomorfic, it becomes possible and 
a nalytically convenient to split the model into two 
blocks, (Aoki,1981), referred to as "world averages" 
and "national differences".
= (x^+xf )/2 ; x d = x h - x f ; 
where the subscripts h,f,a,d are meant to relate 
variable x respe c t i v e l y  to the home economy, the world 
averages, the national differences. This split
highlights the two conceptual tasks inherent with 
international policy coordination: a) targets
definition for the world economy, which is not 
affected by exchange rates or current account 
imbalances; b) control of national imbalances, with 
the t ransmission of d isturbances operating through the 
exchange rate and the current account. Furthermore, the
lTwo differences exist. The first is that, for reasons 
which are to be made clear later, we do not consider 
the wealth effects of exchange rate changes. The second 
is that variables are now defined in logs, in order to 
enable a direct comparison with the model set out in 
Edison Miller W i l l iamson (1987).
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definition of world averages and national differences 
enables one to greatly simplify the analysis by solving 
for the two blocks independently. However, as we 
shall see, this is possible only up to a certain 
degree of model complexity: it will become nec e s s a r y  to 
solve for the two blocks jointly once a proper 
treatment of the current account is introduced.
TABLE 1: THE MODEL
1.The Home Economy
y h = - p r h + sh + icy* + 6c + 0 F ;
dPh = 0>yh + zh + d x h ;
Zh = € ( d p h - zh ) ;
d x h = EE {d c } + (3 (E c - x h ) ;
2.The Foreign Economy
y £ = - p r £ + sf + x y h - 6c - 0F;
dPf = O y f + z f + d x f ;
d z f = 6 ( d p f - z f ) ;
d x f = -EE{dc) + |3(-Ec - x*>) ;
3 . Exchange Rate and Wealth Dynamics 
E{dc} = dc ;
E {d c } = rh - r £ ;
dF = T + r*F + F*r£ ,
T = 2 x a c - i 2 (yh - y f ) ;
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TABLE 2: THE MODEL SPLIT INTO BLOCKS
1.Block 1: World Averages
la) y n = - y r a + s a + rryn ;
2a) d p a = <Dyn + z a ;
3a) d z a = E (d p a- z a ) ;
2.Block 2: World Differences
Id) y d = - y r d + s d - x y d + 26c +20F;
2d) d p d = <Dyd + z d + dx ;
3d) d z d = € ( d p d - zd ) ;
4d) dx = 2EE{dc) + (3(2£c - x) ;
5) E {d c } = {dc} ;
6) E {d c } = r d ;
7) dF = T + r**F + F * r f .
8) r f = rB - 0 . 5 r d
9) T = 2 x a c - x 2y d ;
Dynamic paths for the Target variables 
11a) d m a = o i z n - o 2y n ; 
lib) d m d = o az d - o 2y d ;
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TABLE 3: THREE ALTERNATIVE POLICY ASSIGNMENTS
The EMW assignment
12) d r a = a a[d m a - d p a _ d y a ] + a2 [ma _ p B _ y a ];
13) d s d = Q a [d m d - d p d _ d y d ] + fi2 [md - p d - y d ] ;
The "monetarist" assignment
14) d r a = a i [ d m a - d p n - dy«J + a 2 [ma - p B - y a ];
15) d r d = Q 3 [d m d - d p d - d y d ] + f)4 [md - p d - y d ] ;
The "Meade" assignment
16) d r a = a a [d m a - d p a - d y a ] + a 2 [ma - p B - y a ];
17) d r d = 0 3 [dmd - d p d - d y d ] + 0 4 [md - p d  ^ - y d ];
18) d s d = O s d F ;
D E F I N I T I O N  OF VARIABLES (DEVIATIONS FROM 
EQUILIBRIUM)
y = real output, measured relative to the "natural 
rate" (in logs) 
r = short term real interest rate ; 
c = real exchange rate ;
s = index of fiscal stance (scaled to have a unit 
effect on y) 
p = consumer price index (logs)
z = core inflation (a moving average of p) ;
x = the markup of prices on wages (equivalent to 
the cost of foreign inputs for a unit of 
domestic output); 
m = nominal income target ;
F = net domestic holdings of foreign assets,
defined in foreign currency ;
T = trade balance ; 
d = differential operator ;
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PARAMETER VALUES
p = 1 . 2 ; 0 = 0 . 2 5  ; 6 = 3 = l ; (D = 0 . 25 ;
0 = 0.08 t
O a = -0 .25 ; o2 = 0.5 ; a a = --0.83 ; a £> = -0.42
fla = 1 ;
02 = 0.5 ; 03 = -0.83 ; 04 = --0.42 ; 0o = 1 ;
= 0.25
r f * = 0. 05 ;
1 ow interdependence hieh in t erdependence
71 0.1 0.3
5 = 0 . 1 0 . 3
Xi = 0.06 0.224
T b = 0 . 048 0 . 188
Ta and t 2 have been derived from 6 and ir assuming:
i a =6 [ 1-b (1-t)+ x2 ] and x 8 = jc [ 1-b (1-t) ] / ( 1-ju ) ,
where b = 0.8 is the marginal p r o p ensity to consume 
out of income and t=0.3 is the tax rate.
In the block relating to world averages output is
driven by demand, namely monet a r y  and fiscal p o licy
(eq.lB ). Consumer price inflation (eq.2a ) corr e s p o n d s
to wage inflation, which depends on current output
deviations from the natural rate and on core inflation.
Core inflation dynamics (eq.3m ), driven by a partial
adjustment mechanism, is linked with current consumer
price inflation. National divergences differ from
world averages because of wealth effects and excha n g e
rates, defined as the amount of domestic currency for a
unit of foreign currency. F o l l o w i n g  Smith (1988) and
Currie (1986), we have excluded r e v a luation effects
caused by real exchange rates on financial w e a l t h  by
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assuming that it is held in foreign currency by 
domestic residents. Agents in the financial markets are 
assumed to form expectations rationally and to have 
full access to the relevant information. T h e refore the 
expected v a r i ation of the exchange rate corresponds to 
its actual rate of c h a n g e .(e q .5 d )
Due to the assumption of perfect s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  
between assets d enominated in different currencies, the 
rate of change of the real exchange rate is set equal 
to the difference between home and foreign real
interest r a t e s ( e q . 6 d ) . As in E M W , the dynamic equations 
of national consumer price divergences (eq.3d and 4 d ) 
account for the gradual adjustment of prices to 
exchange rate "surprises".
Wealth r e d i s tribution between the two countries 
takes place through the current account f l o w . ( e q . 7 d ) 
This was not present in the original EMW model and 
therefore it needs to described in more detail. We do 
not consider alternative forms of wealth as we wish to 
emphasize the link existing between wealth effects and 
current account imbalances. We assume that the two 
countries exchange assets deno m i n a t e d  in fo r e i g n
currency, F, whose rate of return corresponds, as in 
Currie et a l . (1986), to the foreign real i n t erest
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rate. The real instead of the nominal interest rate is 
included because account is made of changes in the real
value of wealth due to inflation abroad. As both r r and
F are endogenous variables we have linearized the term 
r fF, with r** and F* being the initial levels of the
foreign real interest rate and of foreign wealth. The
initial stock of wealth outs t a n d i n g  will be of crucial 
importance for the results, so we will consider various 
cases in the range - 0 . 5 < F * < + 0 .5.Note that F is
n ormalized as a fraction of e quilibrium output. 
Fol l o w i n g  Carlozzi and Taylor r f * has been set at 0.05.
It is important to note that when d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  
occurs at the world level and monetary policy is
activated the two blocks of the model cannot be solved 
independently. This is because, unless F*=0, world 
real interest rate changes will r edistribute w e alth
among countries and activate the national d i f f e r e n c e s
b l o c k . 2
F o l l owing EMW again the trade balance depends on 
relative deviations of national outputs from the 
natural rate and on the real exchange r a t e . (e q .9 d ) For 
obvious reasons of similarity with F in the current
2This problem is of course a consequence of the crucial 
difference between the present model and that of EMW.
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account flow it is assumed, as in Currie (1986), that 
the trade balance is expressed in terms of foreign
currency unit. As in EMW the dynamic path of the real 
exchange rate is connected with the rest of the block 
by means of its effect on aggregate d e m a n d . (eq ..Id)
Financial wealth is an argument of aggregate
demand: a current account surplus stimulates domestic
demand and s y mmetrically depresses foreign demand. As a 
consequence, output differentials are enhanced. This is 
another new feature of the present model; the numerical 
value of the coefficient corresponds to that used in 
C u r r i e (1986).
Money G D P 3 levels, world averages and national 
differences, are set as the i n termediate target for
inflation c o n t r o l . ( e q . 4 and e q . l l d ) We also follow the 
procedure of EMW, in defining a path for both targets 
which is not independent from inflation and output
dynamics. The reason that they do this is to dampen
cyclical fluctuations: 25% of core inflation is
"accomodated" and 50% of the output cycle is
r e s i s t e d .(e q .4 & , eq.lld)
3Elsewhere, Miller and W i l l iamson (1987) point at 
domestic demand as the intermediate target for 
inflation control. We do not explore that possible 
alternative here for sake of simplicity.
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In all the experiments which follow, the model is 
shocked by assuming a 10% surge of world inflation, 
with national differences also being 10%. This implies 
that the initial rate of inflation is 15% in the home 
economy and 5% in the foreign economy.
The model allows for four policy instruments. Two 
are related to the world averages block, the average 
real interest rate and the average fiscal policy 
stance. Two refer to national differences: real
interest rates differentials and divergences of 
national fiscal policy stances. It is assumed that 
policy tools gradually adjust to deviations of targets 
from their desired values: the policy e x p e riments
differ in the nature of these gradual adjustments.
RESULTS
3 . THE EMW ASS I G N M E N T
EMW make use of two instruments only. They assign 
"average" monetary policy to the control of world money 
GDP(eq.l2) dis p e n s i n g  with "average" fiscal p o licy 
altogether. Red u c t i o n  of national differences in the 
rate of inflation is caused by the asymmetric stance of 
national fiscal policies: the country whose rate of
inflation is above average c o n t r a c t s . whereas the
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country whose inflation rate is below average 
e x p a n d s .Monetary policy is used to hold down the 
exchange rate at its "target zones" level.In this 
model, with perfect capital mobility real interest 
rates must be always equalized across c o u n t r i e s , s i n c e , 
as shown in eq.6), anything else would cause exchange 
rate fluctuations. A c c o r d i n g  to the EMW proposal 
neither real interest rate differentials nor real 
exchange rate dynamics ever occur. Implicitly, m o n e t a r y  
policy is left as a short run "reserve" weapon against 
exchange rate "bubbles" not accounted for in the model. 
The real exchange rate target stays constant t h r o u g h o u t  
the adjustment period and is set with reference to 
external equilibrium, although the current account does 
not appear in the model, so that there is no way one 
can assess the current account implications of their 
proposal. The aim of this section is to do e x a ctly 
this.
In order to facilitate a better u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of 
the model we undertake our analysis in stages. At 
first, as it is sometimes assumed in the lite r a t u r e  
(Bandhari et a l . 1987), we shall ignore the debt
service in the current account and consider the trade 
balance only. Secondly, we shall simulate a model where
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the debt service appears in the current account. This 
s u b s t antially complicates the picture, but as a 
prel i m i n a r y  step we shall assume that no shock occurs 
at the world level, so .that world interest rates stay 
c o n s t a n t 4 . Finally, by s i m u lating the full model, 
involving the reduction of world average inflation as 
well as control of national differences, we will 
assess the implications that the assignment of world 
monetary policy to average inflation has in terms of 
wealth redis t r i b u t i o n  and current account
d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  as part of the overall a d j u stment 
process .
3.1. A MODEL WHERE THE TRADE BALANCE IS THE ONLY SOURCE 
OF WEALTH TRANSFER
The current account equation becomes: 
dF = T;
Real interest rates d ifferences being c o n s t r a i n e d  
to zero, curbing inflation d i f f e rentials requires a 
fiscal c ontraction in the home economy and a s y m m etric 
expansion abroad. Obviously, each c o u n t r y ’s demand for 
foreign goods depends, coeteris paribus, on its own
4 A 1 t e r n a t i v e l y , we might have assumed that fiscal 
policy is assigned to control average inflation.
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rate of growth. As a consequence of the asymmetric 
fiscal policy stance the home economy runs current 
account surpluses throughout the adjustment period. 
This leads to a permanent wealth redistribution from 
the foreign economy to the home economy. The change in 
domestic holdings of foreign assets is related to the 
accumulated divergence of national outputs:
given the values of 0 and 6 . (see eq.3d)
If the two economies exhibit a low degree of 
interdependence, the increase of F is about 2% of real 
GDP. If the degree of interdependence is higher, 
international wealth redistribution amounts to about 
8% of GDP. Long run equilibrium requires that the 
permanent deviation of F from its initial value be 
compensated by a permanent bias of fiscal policy 
stance. Wealth effects do not seem to significantly 
alter the dynamic path of output and inflation with 
respect to the original EMW results.
with
0
z ao)/G® = -40%,
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3.2. REDUCTION OF NATIONAL IMBALANCES WHEN THE DEBT
SERVICE IS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AND WORLD MONETARY POLICY 
IS NOT ACTIVATED.
At this stage the simulation exercise involves 
block 2 only. It is intuitively clear that once 
national differences have died out permanent changes 
of domestic holdings of foreign assets will have to be 
offset by real exchange rate variations of opposite 
sign, if the current account is to be in equilibrium. 
This point has been repeatedly made in the literature 
on exchange rate determination.(Branson, 1978,
Dornbusch,1986) Still, it is worth recalling because it 
enables one to affirm that under the set of rules for 
international policy coordination proposed by EMW the 
exchange rate cannot be regarded as exogenous and set 
independently from the policy exercise being carried 
out. Given that divergences of national real interest 
rates are ruled out, no real exchange rate dynamics 
can take place, the adjustment must occur once and for 
all. Technically, the model becomes saddlepath: 
stability requires an immediate jump of c onto its new 
equilibrium value. Note that the inclusion of the 
foreign investment service introduces an unstable root 
as a consequence of the chosen policy mix and quite
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4
independently from the values of the structural 
parameters. It has been noted elsewhere (Vines et 
al.,1989) that if rf>x80 an increase in F will raise 
foreign interest payments more than depress imports 
through the fall of domestic expenditure, therefore 
leading to the destabilizing outcome of cumulative
current account surpluses. In this case potential 
instability arises irrespectively of rf><x20. If the 
inflationary gap between the two economies is to be 
driven down a negative differential must arise in the 
rates of real GDP growth. As a consequence, the home 
economy must run current account surpluses and 
accumulate foreign assets. The expansionary stimulus 
to domestic expenditure deriving from wealth 
accumulation will have to be matched by a permanent 
fiscal contraction. Eventually, with yd = 0 the
increased stock of foreign investment will still exert 
a positive pressure on the current account, to be 
compensated for by a real exchange rate 
appreciation.(tab.4) F„ - F0 turns out to be lower
when foreign investment service is included in the 
current account equation. This for two reasons. First, 
the initial real exchange rate appreciation worsens 
the home economy's competitiveness, thereby reducing
275
the positive impact of lower domestic growth on the 
current account. Secondly, the terms of trade permanent 
appreciation reduces the amplitude of the required 
output divergence between the two economies.(see eq.3d) 
GOf^ya = zd- - Zdo - 2GZ(cw-c0 ) ;
Table 4: permanent real exchange rate and foreign
wealth changes and relative output loss necessary when 
f-oreign investment service is included in the current 
account but monetary policy does not influence national 
differences .
interdependence Dc DF [’’yd
low -0.8% +1.5% -38.4
high -0.8 +6,0% -38.4
3.3. SIMULATING THE FULL MODEL
Permanent changes of F and c are significantly 
affected by the sign and value of F * . To a lesser 
extent dynamics of national inflationary divergences 
are altered as well. When the home economy is a net 
creditor accumulation of foreign assets is enhanced by 
higher world interest rates. This addition can be 
quite substantial when foreign investment is a
significant proportion of real GDP. At the same time, 
the higher the income elasticity of the trade balance
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the stronger the increase of F „ ; the Iower the price 
elasticity of the trade balance the bigger the real 
exchange rate appreciation, the smaller the output loss 
for the home economy. If the home economy is a net 
debtor the final outcome may turn out to be quite 
different. World antiinflationary policy raises real 
interest rates and worsens the current account.If the 
starting level of foreign debt is sufficiently high the 
foreign assets loss determined by restrictive world 
monetary policy dominates the accumulation of F 
associated with the reduction of national differences. 
As a consequence, current account equilibrium requires 
a permanent real exchange rate depreciation. This spurs 
inflation at home and curbs it abroad.
Correspondingly, the total output loss associated with 
the reduction of national imbalances must be higher. 
Also, the terms of trade depreciation initially exerts 
a positive impact on inflation differentials, but this 
perverse effect dies out rather quickly.
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Tab.5: Permanent wealth, exchange rate changes and 
output loss required when world monetary policy affects 
the current account.(percentage changes)
Interd. 
F * = 0 . 5 :
F* = - 0 .5: F * = -0.3
low DF =-10,3;
+ 13.4 ;
Dc = +5.3;
-6.9;
f-y«i =-50.6;
-26.2;
high DF= -3.3;
+15.2;
Dc= +0.4;
-2.4;
[”Yd= -40.8;
-35 . 2 ;
-5 . 6 
+ 2 . 8 
-45 . 6
+ 0 . 4 
-0 . 1 
-39 . 8
F* = -0 . 1 ; F * = 0 . 1 ; F* = 0.3
-0 .8 ;
+ 0.4; 
4 0.8;
+ 4.1; 
-0.5; 
-39 ;
+ 3 . 9 
-2 
-36
+ 7 . 8 
-1 
-38
+ 8.7; 
-4.4; 
-31.2 ;
+11.5;
-1.5;
-37;
3.4.CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE EMW PROPOSAL
The previous sections have shown that 
antiinflationary policy under a target zones regime 
might have consequences that countries might find 
undesirable.
a) Correction of national differences implies a 
permanent redistribution of wealth and a permanent 
terms of trade change. The size of the wealth transfer 
substantially increases when the income elasticity of 
the trade balance is higher.
b) For each country the total output cost of 
reducing inflation is affected by the sign and
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amplitude of the terms of trade change. A permanent
depreciation will add to the required output loss
whilst a permanent appreciation will lower it.
c) If the initial stock of foreign wealth/debt is 
not "small" in terms of real GDP world monetary policy
significantly interferes with the reduction of national
imbalances. Furthermore, the sign and magnitude of 
wealth transfers strongly depend on the initial 
distribution of wealth between countries.
Alternatively, fiscal policy might be assigned to the 
control of average Money GDP. Advocates of the target 
zones proposal did not explicitly state the reasons for 
preferring the choice of monetary policy. Fiscal 
targeting might look undesirable to many in the 
economic profession (and to governments as well) as a 
renaissance of old fashioned keynesian "fine tuning". 
But now it should be clear that if policy coordination 
is to be implemented and exchange rate fluctuations are 
too costly, some sort of fiscal intervention is 
necessary anyway for reducing national imbalances.
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EXPLORING ALTERNATIVE POLICY RULES
Policy coordination under rules alternative to the 
EMW proposal involves active use of real interest rate 
differentials and activation of real exchange rate 
dynamics. Obviously this might reproduce those real 
exchange rate misalignments that the EMW proposal aims 
to avoid. Having shown that real exchange rate
stability cannot be achieved without cost and that this 
cost might turn out to be quite substantial, in this
section we shall try to find out to what extent 
misalignments are inevitable if countries coordinate 
and yet allow real interest rates differentials occur.
4. THE "MONETARIST" ALTERNATIVE
The standard alternative to a target zones approach 
is the assignment of real interest rate differentials 
to differences of the growth rate of national money 
GDP. We label it as "monetarist" (although it departs
from the standard monetarist orthodoxy by setting a 
closed loop rule) because it is restricted to the use 
of monetary policy only and completely overlooks fiscal 
policy as a viable instrument for stabilization
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purpose. EMW discuss this case and show that real 
exchange rate misalignments occur. Also, early gains in 
inflation control, brought in by the initial exchange 
rate appreciation, are reversed later, when the terms 
of trade move back into equilibrium. We have replicated 
the EMW experiment appending the current account 
equation to the model. Our results show that when the 
two countries exhibit a 1ow degree of interdependence 
world interest rates fluctuations actually cause the 
global system to become completely unstable. If 
interdependence is high the model regains stability but 
exhibits prolonged persistence. Due to the stronger 
terms of trade effect on aggregate demand, exchange 
rate fluctuations are greatly dampened if compared with 
the EMW experiment, but huge swings occur in the stock 
of foreign wealth, fluctuating in a range of ±15% when 
F* is different from 0 . After 60 periods wealth is 
still significantly away from equilibrium. It is well 
known (Kouri,1976, Dornbusch e Fischer,1981) that 
wealth effects in domestic expenditure provide an 
endogenous correction mechanism for disequilibrium in 
the international distribution of foreign wealth; 
unfortunately they seem to be too weak to effectively 
dampen current account fluctuations. This raises the
issue, long debated in the past, of the need for active 
fiscal policy as part of a system which ensures 
external equilibrium. It is to that issue which we now 
turn.
5. POLICIES FOR INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EQUILIBRIUM
Under this set of rules, defined in table 3 as the 
"Meade" assignment, active use is made of monetary
policy in controlling money GDP differences, while 
national fiscal policy stances control international 
wealth distribution.(e q .16,17,18) Fiscal policy
gradually adjusts over time to current account
deviations from equilibrium. This implies that at any 
point in time s is targeted on F.
Although we do not impose integral control of 
foreign wealth, no permanent change of F can occur. In 
equilibrium yd = 0; dc = 0; dF = 0. For exchange rate 
dynamics to be nil rd = 0. Since sd is a linear
function of F, c = F = 0 is the only combination of
wealth and the exchange rate which ensures current 
account equilibrium when output is at the "natural 
rate" in both countries.
Intuitively, the working of this policy assignment 
can be described as follows. Reduction of national
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differences in the inflation rate requires a positive 
differential between domestic and foreign real interest 
rates. This, in turn, triggers an immediate
appreciation of the real exchange rate. Inflation 
differentials are affected in two ways. The terms of 
trade appreciation brings in early gains, to be 
reversed later when the exchange rate depreciates 
moving back towards equilibrium. Higher interest rates 
and a worsened level of competitiveness depress demand 
for domestic goods and slow down the pace of wage 
inflation. Abstracting from the effect of world 
interest rates fluctuations on wealth accumulation, as 
long as the loss of competitiveness cuts down net 
exports more than the higher real interest rates reduce 
imports the current account turns into a deficit.® 
This triggers a contractionary fiscal policy stance, 
thereby causing further downward pressure on wage 
inflation.
5The plausible parameter values which we use imply this 
outcome
5.1.CONTROL OF NATIONAL DIFFERENCES
We begin with analysis analogous to that in section
3.2, so as to explore our results in stages. Thus we 
first assume that a shock affects inflation differences 
only, so that world monetary policy is not
activated.The current account equation becomes;
dF = 2xac - x2yd _ F*0.5rd + r*F 
-0.5rd represents the change in the foreign real 
interest rate required for control of money GDP
targets. With low interdependence and -0.5<F*<0 the
real exchange rate jump is about -7% to be absorbed
rather quickly.(tab.6) After 7 periods deviation from 
equilibrium is below 1%, since then c fluctuates in a
band of approximately ±2%. The initial terms of trade 
appreciation has a favourable impact on inflation at 
the cost of slightly higher persistence later on. The 
output cycle is dampened if compared with the
corresponding results obtained in section 3.2.
Domestic holdings of foreign assets fluctuate in a band 
whose maximum range is ±1.5%. When 0<F*<+0.5 the
initial exchange rate path keeps a lower profile at
the cost of wider positive deviations from equilibrium
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later on. If F* is positive the fall of foreign real 
interest rates worsens the current account and requires 
a stronger fiscal contraction, which will have to be 
more prolonged the weaker the income elasticity of the
trade balance. At the later stage of the cycle the
stronger fiscal control will exert an excessively 
contractionary effect on money GDP growth, to be 
compensated by a negative interest rate differential, 
which triggers a real exchange rate depreciation. 
Obviously, the less effective is fiscal policy on the 
current account the more prolonged and complex the 
output cycle. In fact simulations of the "high" 
interdependence model show that if x20 is strong enough 
the effect of rf on the current account has a very 
limited influence on the overall dynamic performance of 
the model. In this case the initial exchange rate 
appreciation is substantially reduced and terms of 
trade fluctuations occur in a much narrower band. 
Also, the pattern of the exchange rate cycle does not
seem to be significantly affected by the sign and
magnitude of F * .
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5.2.SIMULATING THE FULL MODEL
Now we turn to a full analysis of the model, 
considering the implications of monetary control of 
average inflation. As in section 3.3 we assume that 
both average and differential inflation are initially 
set at 10%. Once the effect of world monetary policy on 
the current account is brought into the picture and 
interdependence between countries is low fluctuations 
become much wider than those analyzed in section 5.1. 
Wealth control by means of fiscal policy avoids the
danger of instability0 but is not very effective in
limiting fluctuations®. Both the exchange rate and 
foreign wealth exhibit huge swings. When -0,5<F*<-0.1
higher world interest rates during the first eight
years cause a redistribution of wealth from the home to 
the foreign economy ranging between 9% and 2%. The loss 
of foreign wealth requires a prolonged fiscal 
contraction that will affect the current account only 
gradually over time, complicating the task of monetary 
policy: the restrictive fiscal policy will have to be
compensated by negative interest rates differentials 
and exchange rate depreciation in order to keep money
6Except that for a very large value of F
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GDP close to its target. Dynamics follows the pattern 
discussed above, when the effects of world monetary 
policy were not taken into account, but fluctuations at 
the later stage of the cycle are much wider. When 
0.1<F*<0.5 the surge of world real interest rates has a 
strong positive effect on the home economy's current 
account. In spite of the strong initial loss of 
competitiveness the current account is driven into a 
surplus, forcing fiscal stance to be expansionary. 
Terms of trade must depreciate further before reverting 
into equilibrium. For a hi gher degree of 
interdependence, exchange rate fluctuations are far 
less wide. Although similar in the pattern, the terms 
of trade cycle is substantially dampened. This partly 
because relative prices exert a more powerful influence 
on the trade balance, partly because fiscal policy 
stance is more effective in controlling financial 
wealth. Therefore world real interest rates 
fluctuations have a 1ower impact on the current 
account: dynamic adjustment becomes far more
satisfactory.
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5.3.SUMMARIZING REMARKS
The policy assignment presented in this section 
exhibits a dynamic pattern for output and inflation 
which only marginally differs from the results obtained 
under the target zones regime. And yet both permanent 
wealth transfers between the two economies and 
permanent real exchange rate adjustments are completely 
avoided. By contrast with EMW, the model exhibits 
something of an exchange rate cycle. And although 
permanent redistribution of wealth is avoided, 
something of a cycle appears necessary in wealth, too, 
as the model converges towards the long run. One can 
say something whether these cycles are likely to be 
large or sma11.
When world monetary policy is not activated, as in 
section 5.1, the amplitude of current account swings is 
rather limited whatever the degree of interdependence 
between the two countries. Also, if the price and 
income elasticities of the trade balance are high the 
real exchange rate cycle is substantially dampened, in 
this case for another reason.
When world monetary policy is activated, as in 
section 5.2, then this interferes with the reduction of
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national imbalances by redistributing financial wealth 
(a point already familiar from our analysis of EMW). If 
the degree of interdependence is 1o w . huge current 
account and real exchange rate fluctuations can now 
occur. Also, the pattern of these swings varies 
according to the initial distribution of foreign 
wealth. If the degree of interdependence is high. these 
world real interest rate fluctuations have a limited 
extra effect on wealth and terms of trade cycles.
6.CONCLUSIONS
This chapter stresses the consequences that the 
policy assignment generally associated with the
target zones proposal has in terms of international 
wealth redistribution. In section 3.2 it has been 
shown, by appending the current account identity to the 
EMW model, that in their policy assignment the 
equilibrium exchange rate can no longer be considered 
exogenous to the disinflationary process. If policy is 
concerned with a reduction of the underlying core 
inflation trend, then, in their policy system, a 
permanent redistribution of wealth between countries 
must occur. As a consequence, if the current account is 
to end up in equilibrium, the real exchange rate must
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adjust in the opposite direction. Another worrying
feature of the EMW proposal is that the higher the
income elasticity of the trade balance the bigger 
becomes the necessary wealth redistribution between the 
two economies. In section 3.3 it has been shown that 
world interest rates fluctuations may substantially 
affect the amplitude and the direction of wealth 
redi stribution.
The chapter has constructively tried to suggest an
alternative to EMW. As reviewed in section 5, it is
possible for disinflation to be achieved without
consequential redistribution of wealth. It does however 
appear difficult to avoid exchange rate and wealth 
cycles. By considering alternative sets of structural 
parameters we were able to tell what factors might 
influence the likely size of these cycles.
More generally, our analysis suggests that the
performance of this alternative regime turns out to be 
quite enhanced if countries are highly interdependent. 
This is important because in the corresponding case the 
EMW policy assignment imposes a particularly large 
redistribution of wealth.
Finally, we turn to the issue of the instability
supposedly inherent to international financial markets
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and to the possibility that speculative "bubbles" 
occur. The EMW proposal seems designed fundamentally to 
protect the world against such instabilities and
"bubbles". If the risk of "bubbles" is to be considered 
serious then this might suggest the need for yet
another sort of policy coordination which combines the
virtues of E M W 's exchange rate targeting with the 
virtues of the new proposals presented in section 5. 
This would require explicit modelling of some kind of 
"irrational" behaviour in the formation of exchange 
rate expectations and explicit targeting of the
exchange rate. It is to an analysis of that which I 
will turn for future work.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This final chapter briefly reviews the main results of 
the thesis and outlines future research.
Our original results are presented in chapters 3, 
4 and 6. Chapter 3 has presented a model of exchange 
rate determination which allows for sticky prices, 
wealth effects and imperfect capital mobility. Our 
analysis has stressed the danger of instability 
inherent to an open economy under a monetarist rule. 
Such risk of instability is shown to occur because the 
process of wealth accumulation, operating through the 
current account, is deliberately not controlled under a 
monetarist regime.
In chapter 4 we have assessed the relative 
performance of 4 alternative policy assignments which 
involve simple feedback rules. This is done by means of 
both algebraic analysis and numerical simulations of a 
small theoretical model. The rules considered can be 
described as follows.
Rule 1, a "monetarist" rule, assignes a real interest 
rate feedback to a nominal income target. Rule 2, which 
originates from the "Group of Cambridge", working with
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Meade, and from Boughton (1989), adds fiscal control of 
a foreign wealth target to the monetary control of the 
internal objective. Rule 3 simply reverses the Meade 
assignment, as it sets fiscal control of domestic 
nominal income and monetary control of the foreign 
wealth target. Finally, rule 4 applies in a small 
country context the kind of assignment advocated in the 
Target Zones proposal by Wi11iamson: the government is 
supposed to dispense with monetary policy altogether 
and to assign fiscal policy to the domestic target. 
Here, we briefly sketch once more our main original 
results .
-Rule 1 appears to be prone to the same instability 
risk highlighted in chapter 3. Furthermore, "real" 
demand shocks necessarily involve permanent transfers 
of foreign wealth, whose accumulation/decumulation is 
deliberately not controlled.
-Rule 4 is effective in controlling the domestic 
objective and obviously achieves exchange rate 
stability. By contrast it requires a high degree of 
fiscal interventism, which governments might find hard 
to adhere to. Furthermore, we discovered that the 
reduction of inflation is necessarily associated to a 
permanent change of the equilibrium real exchange rate
304
and to a permanent transfer of foreign wealth from 
abroad, so that the home economy improves its net
external position at the end of the deflationary
process. This appears to be a key difference between a 
Target zones assignment and the other rules.
-Rule 3 does not seem to perform much better than
assignment 4 in controlling the domestic and foreign 
targets, but at the cost of nonnegligible exchange rate 
volatility. This might seem counterintuitive, as it 
involves one additional instrument, monetary policy. 
This can be easily explained by the limited influence 
of the monetary instrument on the external position of 
a country1 .
-Finally, rule two avoids the risk of dynamic
instability inherent to a "monetarist" assignment and 
is very effective in controlling the foreign wealth 
target. It enjoys the desirable property of requiring a 
relatively limited degree of fiscal intervention if 
compared to rule 4. On the other hand it does not avoid 
exchange rate swings.
Rules 2 and 4 emerge as the most suitable candidates 
for macroeconomic stabilization policy, and the choice
IThis point was forcefully raised by Boughton (1989) 
and is obviously discussed in great detail in chapter4.
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between the two should obviously depend on the relative 
costs associated to the deviations from equilibrium of 
the exchange rate and of the fiscal instrument.
In part two of the thesis chapter 6 is the substantive 
contribution of the thesis to the debate on simple 
rules and policy coordination. In a two-country setting 
we have considered a disinflation experiment and we 
have assessed the relative performance of three 
alternative proposals, which assign the same instrument 
to the control of global, or average, inflation, but 
differ in their strategies of reduction of intercountry 
inflation differentials. The first rule is the well 
known Williamson's Target Zones proposal. The second is 
a standard "monetarist" rule. The third is a two- 
country version of the Meade assignment.
The "monetarist" rule appears to be prone to 
instability or at least, in the more favourable case, 
to wide swings of foreign wealth and the exchange rate. 
Under the Target Zones regime the interesting result 
obtained in chapter 4 is confirmed. The reduction of 
inflation differentials requires a permanent wealth 
transfer in favour of the "high inflation" country. 
This wealth transfer may be increased or partially 
offset according to the external position of the home
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economy prevailing at the beginning of the policy 
experiment. This is the obvious consequence of the 
monetary contraction necessary to curb global 
inflation: as world real interet rates are increased
wealth is transferred from the debtor to the creditor 
country.
Under the Meade assignment disinflation requires less 
fiscal intervention than under the former rule. Also, 
no permanent change of foreign wealth and of the real 
exchange rate is necessary. But exchange rate 
fluctuations do occur. Indeed the performance of the 
rule is highly sensitive to the strength of the trade 
balance elasticities: it definitely improves when
interdependence is higher. The policy performance is 
unambiguously complicated by the wealth redistribution 
caused by the fluctuation of world interest rates.
Future research should extend the work done so far in 
two directions. The first is the assessment of the 
performance of the simple rules considered here in the 
context of a model where a broader definition of wealth 
is taken into account. This will involve the inclusion 
in the model of both the government budget constraint 
and of accumulation of "real" capital. An illuminating
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example of how such a research programme might be 
carried out has beeen provided by Vines et a l . (1989).
The second avenue of research I shall be concerned with 
is the analysis of simple rules in the context of a 
monetary union, as the ongoing process of european 
economic integration has brought this issue at the 
"core" of the debate on stabilization policies for open 
economies.
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